ORDER
KRISTI K. DuBOSE, District Judge.
This action is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 by Defendant Metal Services LLC d/b/a Phoenix Services, LLC (“Metal Services”). In support of the motion, Metal Services has filed a memorandum (Doc. 29), evidentiary material (Docs. 30–36), and suggested determinations of undisputed fact and conclusions of law (Doc. 37). Plaintiff Frank L. Toole (“Toole”) has timely filed a Response in opposition (Docs. 40–41) and supporting evidentiary material (Docs. 42–57), to which Metal Services has timely filed a Reply (Doc. 61). Contemporaneous with his Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Toole also filed a Motion to Strike (Doc. 58), to which Metal Services has timely filed a response (Doc. 62). After the motion for summary judgment was taken under submission, Toole, with leave of the Court, filed a memorandum of supplemental authority (Doc. 63), to which Metal Services has timely responded (Doc. 65).
Both motions have been taken under submission and are ripe for adjudication. (See Docs. 38, 60). Upon consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28) and that the Motion to Strike (Doc. 58) are due to be DENIED.
On March 27, 2013, Toole initiated this action by filing a Complaint (Doc. 1) asserting a cause of action against Metal Services1 under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (effective Jan. 1, 2009) (hereinafter, the “ADA”). On June 4, 2013, Toole filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 7), the operative complaint in this action. See, e.g., Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp., 193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n. 1 (11th Cir.1999) (“An amended complaint supersedes an original complaint.”). The Amended Complaint alleged the following causes of action against Metal Services:
• Count I—Unlawful discrimination in violation of the ADA. Specifically, that Toole applied and was qualified for the position of Safety Technician with Metal Services but that Metal Services failed to hire him due to his disability (“i.e., no vision in his left eye and/or the Defendant's perception of [Toole] as disabled.”). (Doc. 7 at 4).
• Count II—Improper medical inquiry in violation of the ADA. Specifically, that, when he applied for the position of Safety Technician with Metal Services, Metal Services “unlawfully required [Toole], a pre-offer applicant, to be subjected to an improper medial inquiry/exam.” This examination was allegedly “not job related” and “was, instead, required by the Defendant in order to identify and exclude persons with disabilities or perceived disabilities, such as [Toole], from consideration for employment.” Metal Services allegedly “failed to hire” Toole due to his disability as a result of these “improper medial exam/inquiries ...” (Doc. 7 a 5).2
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56(c) governs procedures and provides as follows:
(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). As the Eleventh Circuit has articulated, however,
The nature of this responsibility varies ... depending on whether the legal issues, as to which the facts in question pertain, are ones on which the movant or the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.
... Celotex requires that for issues on which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,
that party must show affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion with credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial. In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party. If the moving party makes such an affirmative showing, it is entitled to summary judgment unless the non-moving party, in response, come[s] forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.
[United States v. ] Four Parcels [of Real Property ] 941 F.2d [1428,] 1438 [ (11th Cir.1991) ] (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
For issues, however, on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial,
the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim in order to discharge this initial responsibility. Instead, the moving party simply may show [ ]—that is, point[ ] out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Alternatively, the moving party may support its motion for summary judgment with affirmative evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.
Four Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1437–38 (citations, footnote, and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).
If the party moving for summary judgment fails to discharge the initial burden, then the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if any, showing the non-movant has made. Coats & Clark, 929 F.2d at 608. If, however, the movant carries the initial summary judgment burden in one of the ways discussed above, responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to show the existence of a genuine issue as to the material fact.
For issues on which the movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the non-movant, in order to avoid summary judgment, must come forward with evidence sufficient to call into question the inference created by the movant's evidence on the particular material fact. Only if after introduction of the non-movant's evidence, the combined body of evidence presented by the two parties relevant to the material fact is still such that the movant would be entitled to a directed verdict at trial—that is, such that no reasonable jury could find for the non-movant—should the movant be permitted to prevail without a full trial on the issues. Anderson [v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ], 477 U.S. [242,] 249–50, 106 S.Ct. [2505,] 2511 [91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ].
For issues on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, the means of rebuttal available to the non-movant vary depending on whether the movant put on evidence affirmatively negating the material fact or instead demonstrated an absence of evidence on the issue. Where the movant did the former, then the non-movant must respond with evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial on the material fact sought to be negated. Where the movant did the latter, the non-movant must respond in one of two ways. First, he or she may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was “overlooked or ignored” by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 332, 106 S.Ct. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Second, he or she may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. See Melissa L. Nelkin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 Hastings L.J. 53, 82–83 (1988).
Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115–17 (11th Cir.1993) (headings and footnotes omitted).
The mere existence of a factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial; rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude...
