Tootle v. Coleman

Decision Date11 March 1901
Docket Number1,459.
Citation107 F. 41
PartiesTOOTLE et al. v. COLEMAN et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Syllabus by the Court.

The right to garnish a debtor is not limited to the situs of the chose in action, and a garnishment by a citizen of one state of a debtor of the same state, whose creditor resides, whose debt was contracted and is payable in another state, is such an attachment of the chose in action as will authorize the court to obtain jurisdiction to dispose of it by publication of the summons against the defendant.

One who removes a case from a state to the federal court is estopped from attacking the jurisdiction of the latter upon any ground except that the court from which it was removed had no jurisdiction.

One who instigates another to do a wrongful action, and, when the wrongdoer is sued, takes upon himself and conducts the defense of the case, is estopped from again litigating with the plaintiff in that action the issues there decided.

A defect of parties plaintiffs or defendants through misjoinder or nonjoinder is waived by a failure to suggest the same by demurrer or answer.

A creditor who indemnifies an officer against damages for seizing and converting property, and defends an action against the officer individually for the conversation, is estopped by the judgment against him from again litigating with the plaintiffs in that action the issues there decided.

Kate Tootle, W. W. Wheeler, Joshua Motter, and F. S. Dameron, the plaintiffs in error, are the surviving members of the co-partnership styled Tootle, Hosea & Co., which in 1890 was composed of these plaintiffs in error and W. E. Hosea. Hosea died in 1893, and the plaintiffs in error continued the mercantile business of Tootle, Hosea & Co., assumed their liabilities, and received their assets, as partners under the name of Tootle, Wheeler & Motter. On January 10, 1890 Tootle, Hosea & Co. commenced an action against Thomas Lynch and caused a writ of attachment to be issued against him and delivered to the United States marshal for the district of Kansas. R. L. Walker was at that time the marshal, and they gave him a bond of indemnity in the sum of $4,102 conditioned, among other things, that they would pay all damages to him which should result from his seizure under this writ of attachment of 'certain merchandise situated in the storeroom now occupied by Coleman & Lynch, on Douglas avenue, Wichita, Kansas. ' The Coleman & Lynch referred to in this bond were R. R. Coleman and C. T. Lynch, the defendants in error in this action. Walker seized their goods under this writ of attachment, and disposed of them. Coleman & Lynch brought an action at law against him in one of the state courts of Kansas for his seizure and conversion of their goods. He delivered the summons served upon him to the attorneys for Tootle, Hosea & Co., and they answered for him that the property which he seized was the property of Thomas Lynch, the defendant in the attachment suit, and that he had lawfully taken it under the writ in that action. This action resulted on December 4, 1895, in a judgment against Walker for $4,873.20 damages and $214.42 costs. H. C. Solomon, John W. Adams, and George W. Adams were the attorneys for Tootle, Hosea & Co., who brought the attachment suit, and they continued to act for that firm until the plaintiffs in error succeeded them, and have since acted for the plaintiffs in error in all the litigation which has grown out of that attachment. They were hired and paid by Tootle, Hosea & Co. and their successors to defend Walker in the action just mentioned, and Walker neither paid nor agreed to pay anything for their services. On October 28, 1897, the defendants in error, Coleman & Lynch, commenced the action now before us. They were residents and citizens of the state of Kansas, and the plaintiffs in error were residents and citizens of St. Joseph, in the state of Missouri. For the sake of brevity, the plaintiffs in error will be called the 'defendants,' and the defendants in error the 'plaintiffs,' in speaking of this action. The defendants were conducting a mercantile business in St. Joseph under the name of Tootle, Wheeler & Motter, and various parties resident in Kansas were indebted to them in various sums, payable at St. Joseph, for goods purchased of them in that city. Coleman & Lynch sued the defendants in a state court in the state of Kansas, and garnished their debtors residing in that state. These debtors answered in the garnishee proceedings that they were indebted to the defendants in amounts which in the aggregate exceeded the claim of Coleman & Lynch. No service of summons was made upon the defendants otherwise than by publication under the statutes of Kansas. On December 11, 1897, the defendants removed this action to the United States circuit court for the district of Kansas. They then appeared specially in that court and moved to dismiss the action and to discharge the garnishees because the state court of Kansas had not acquired and could not acquire any jurisdiction over them by the garnishment of their debtors and the publication of the summons, and because the United States circuit court had acquired no jurisdiction. This motion was denied, and the defendants excepted.

For a cause of action, the plaintiffs alleged in their original petition that the defendants had directed and caused R. L. Walker, the United States marshal, to seize and convert their property. They also averred that they had brought the action and recovered against Walker the judgment for this conversion which has been recited, and that the defendants had employed and paid the attorneys and conducted the defense of that action for Walker, and were the real parties in interest therein. On motion of the plaintiffs these averments regarding the trial of the action and the judgment against Walker were stricken from the petition, and thereupon the plaintiffs filed an amended petition in which they alleged that the defendants instigated and caused the conversion of their property, and sought to recover the value thereof. The defendants answered with a denial of every allegation of the amended petition, and an averment that the property in controversy belonged to Thomas Lynch, the defendant in the attachment suit, and that it was lawfully levied upon by Walker under the writ in that action. The plaintiffs replied that the issues tendered by the plea of justification had been tried in the action between them and Walker; that, while Walker was the nominal defendant, the defendants were the real defendants in that action; that they had given the bond of indemnity which induced Walker to make the levy; that they had employed and paid the lawyers who defended him in the action against him for conversion; that they were the real defendants in that suit; that judgment had been rendered against Walker therein; and that all the issues tendered by the plea of justification became res adjudicata between the plaintiffs and defendants by virtue of that judgment. The defendants moved to strike from the reply all allegations referring to the trial and judgment in the action against Walker. They demurred to the reply. They moved to dismiss the action. They objected to any evidence under the pleadings, to the introduction in evidence of the pleadings and judgment in Coleman & Lynch against Walker, and insisted in every way possible that the trial and judgment in that case were immaterial to any issue in this action. The court below denied their motions, overruled their demurrer, received the pleadings and judgments in the Walker case in evidence, and refused to permit the defendants to contradict the findings in that case relative to the ownership of the goods seized by Walker and their value. The plaintiffs introduced evidence, which was not contradicted, tending to show that Tootle, Hosea & Co. gave the bond of indemnity to Walker before he seized the goods of the plaintiffs; that he was a mere nominal party to the action of Coleman & Lynch against him; that the defendants were the real parties in interest in that action; that they hired and paid the attorneys who acted for Walker, and really inspired and conducted the defense. At the close of the evidence the court below instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiffs for the amount of the judgment against Walker, and interest at 6 per cent. from the date of its entry. The defendants challenge this judgment by their writ of error.

John W. Adams and H. C. Solomon (George W. Adams, on the brief), for plaintiffs in error.

J. D. Houston (J. V. Daugherty, on the brief), for defendants in error.

Before CALDWELL, SANBORN, and THAYER, Circuit Judges.

SANBORN Circuit Judge, after stating the case as above, .

The first objection urged against the judgment in question is that the court below was without jurisdiction because the state court of Kansas in which the action was commenced could not obtain jurisdiction over the defendants, who were residents and citizens of Missouri, or over the choses in action owned by them, by means of garnishment of their debtors, who resided in Kansas, and by service of the summons upon the defendants by publication of the suit of the plaintiffs, who were also residents and citizens of Kansas. The statutes of that state in terms authorize such garnishments, and the application of the amounts due to the defendants from the garnishees to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs' demand, upon publication of the summons against the defendants. Gen. St. Kan. 1897, c. 95, Secs. 48 72, 227, 228. The ground of the objection is that the situs of the choses in action attached by the garnishment was in St. Joseph, Mo., where the debts were contracted and were payable, and where the...

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