Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles

Decision Date19 October 1989
Docket NumberNo. B042669,B042669
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesTOPANGA ASSOCIATION FOR A SCENIC COMMUNITY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents, OAKMONT DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATES et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
Rosemary Woodlock, for plaintiffs and appellants

Gold, Marks, Ring & Pepper and Joshua L. Rosen, Los Angeles, for defendants, real parties in interest and respondents.

LILLIE, Presiding Justice.

Plaintiffs Topanga Association for a Scenic Community and Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization appeal from judgment denying their petition for a writ of mandate which would have ordered the County of Los Angeles, its board of supervisors and certain of its agencies to set aside their approval of a project for development of a tract of land in an unincorporated area of the county.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The project in question is located on the southern flank of the Santa Monica Mountains just below their crest. The property immediately to the north, south and east of the project is vacant; the property to the west consists of single-family residences. The project contemplates subdivision of a tract of 78.7 acres into 83 single-family residential lots and 6 open-space lots with construction of roads, utilities and appurtenances necessary for the development of the residential lots.

Oakmont Development Associates (developer) submitted to the county Department of Regional Planning (department) applications for approval of a tentative tract map, a hillside management conditional use permit and an oak tree permit for the project. On the basis of an initial study which it prepared, the department recommended approval of the applications and found that the project qualified for a negative declaration. Following a hearing the county Regional Planning Commission (commission) determined that the project would not have a significant effect on the environment and approved the tentative tract map, the conditional use permit and the oak tree permit authorizing removal of 57 out of 177 oak trees on the project site in order to make way for construction of interior streets, driveways and building pads. The commission also approved the negative declaration prepared for the project.

Plaintiffs appealed the commission's decision to the county Board of Supervisors (board). The board held a de novo hearing on the appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing the board announced its intention to approve the project and directed the county counsel to prepare appropriate findings and conditions. On September 27, 1988, the board adopted such findings and conditions and approved the tentative tract map, the conditional use permit, the oak tree permit and the negative declaration.

On November 1, 1988, plaintiffs petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5) ordering the board, the commission and the board to set aside their respective recommendations and approvals. The amended petition alleged violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) by issuance of a negative declaration rather than preparation of an environmental impact Judgment was entered denying the petition. This appeal followed. 1 Other pertinent facts are developed in the discussion.

report (EIR). Violation of the Subdivision Map Act (Gov.Code, § 66410 et seq.), the Los Angeles County General Plan and county zoning and planning ordinances also was alleged. Following the sustaining of a demurrer to the causes of action alleging violation of the CEQA, plaintiffs filed a second amended petition for writ of mandate which omitted reference to the CEQA and added an allegation of the unconstitutionality of a provision of the Subdivision Map Act.

DISCUSSION
I ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT APPROVAL OF THE PROJECT

Appellants argue that elimination of their CEQA causes of action does not foreclose an environmental challenge to the approval of the project because the Subdivision Map Act, in Government Code section 66474, subdivision (e), 2 provides for environmental impact review separate from and independent of the requirements of the CEQA. We agree. "[T]he finding required by section 66474 subdivision (e) is in addition to the requirements for the preparation of an environmental impact report" or a negative declaration pursuant to the CEQA. (59 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 129, 130 (1976).) As respondents point out, section 66474 subdivision (e) requires disapproval of a project upon a finding that it is likely to cause substantial environmental damage; it does not require a finding of no substantial environmental damage as a condition of approval of a project. The board nevertheless made the following finding: "The design of the subdivision and the proposed improvements will not cause substantial environmental damage or substantial and avoidable injury to fish or wildlife or their habitat, since the project is not located in a Significant Ecological Area and the initial study for the project shows that the proposed development will not have a significant effect on the environment."

Appellants argue that the finding of no substantial environmental damage 3 constitutes an abuse of the board's discretion because the finding is not legally sufficient and is unsupported by substantial evidence. 4 (See Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)

The findings of an administrative agency must be sufficient to enable the parties to determine whether and upon what basis they should seek review and to allow a reviewing court to determine the basis for the agency's action. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 514, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.) However, great specificity is not required. It is enough if the findings form an analytic bridge between In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings an appellate court must " '... determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent, sustains the findings subject to review, resolving any reasonable doubts in favor of those findings. [Citation.] In making this determination the appellate court must resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment or decision of the tribunal below and indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to support it.' " (Greenebaum v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 391, 408, 200 Cal.Rptr. 237.)

                the evidence and the agency's decision.  (Id., at p. 515, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.)   In addition findings are to be liberally construed to support rather than defeat the decision under review.  (Fair Employment Practice Com. v. State Personnel Bd.  (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 322, 329, 172 Cal.Rptr. 739.)  "[W]here reference to the administrative record informs the parties and reviewing courts of the theory upon which an agency has arrived at its ultimate finding and decision it has long been recognized that the decision should be upheld if the agency 'in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are essential to sustain its ... [decision].'  [Citations.]"  (McMillan v. American [214 Cal.App.3d 1357] Gen. Fin.  Corp. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 175, 184, 131 Cal.Rptr. 462.)   The finding which plaintiffs attack meets these criteria inasmuch as it clearly informs plaintiffs and this court that one of the grounds upon which the board approved the project was that it would cause no substantial environmental damage
                

Appellants contend the board's finding of no substantial environmental damage is not supported by the initial study made by the department and mentioned in the finding. 5 The contention lacks merit. The initial study separately analyzed 15 environmental factors and on that basis determined that the project would have no significant impact on the environment. Appellants insist that the 1987 initial study contains "inaccuracies and misstatements," as shown by testimony of interested citizens at the public hearings on approval of the project, and other evidence. This contention amounts to an invitation to reweigh conflicting evidence before the board. We may not do so. (See McMillan v. American Gen. Fin. Corp., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d 175, 186, 131 Cal.Rptr. 462; Estate of Gerber (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 96, 112-113, 140 Cal.Rptr. 577.)

Appellants next argue that the initial study is inadequate as a finding under section 66474, subdivision (e) of the Government Code because it was prepared before discovery of archaeological sites on the project and hence does not consider that factor. The record shows: The initial study, prepared in 1987, indicated that the project site was not in or near an area containing known archaeological resources. In August 1988 Dr. Chester King, a self-employed anthropological consultant, surveyed the project area and discovered two archaeological sites which he registered with the UCLA Institute of Archaeology. At the de novo hearing before the board on September 1, 1988, Dr. King testified to the discovery and expressed his opinion that both archaeological sites would be "seriously impacted" by the project. On September 13, 1988, Dr. Mark Raab and other staff archaeologists at the Northridge Center for Public Archaeology inspected the archaeological sites in the project area discovered by Dr. King. Based on such inspection the archaeologists recommended measures to be taken at the project site in order to eliminate or lessen damage to archaeological resources. The results of the inspection and the recommendations were set forth in a written evaluation dated September 22, 1988.

Respondents correctly state that the mere presence of archaeological resources on property does not require a finding that The board made no finding that the archaeological sites in the project contain unique archaeological resources. Accordingly,...

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