Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co.

Citation126 N.W. 554,143 Wis. 52
PartiesTOPOLEWSKI v. PLANKINTON PACKING CO.
Decision Date24 May 1910
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Judge.

If one before instituting a criminal prosecution states to a duly licensed attorney at law, fully and fairly, all the facts and circumstances within his knowledge or of which he has reasonably reliable information, and acts upon the advice of such attorney respecting whether such facts render the defendant guilty of a criminal offense, he has, in the legal sense, probable cause for his action rendering him immune from liability for malicious prosecution.

The foregoing rule applies liberally to informers, in that the attorney consulted need not necessarily be the public prosecutor, and the term “full and fair statement of all the facts” does not call for all facts reasonably discoverable, or require the informer to make diligent inquiry in respect thereto.

In case of a criminal prosecution being commenced upon the initiative of a private person, and the action being prosecuted to conviction and judgment, without collateral fraud, such judgment will stand as probable cause for such commencement, rendering such person immune from liability for malicious prosecution, though the judgment be reversed on appeal for error committed upon the trial; even error in holding that the facts claimed by such person to exist constituted guilt of the criminal charge.

The fraud which will take a judgment of conviction out of the rule stated, is fraud extrinsic, not in respect to matters litigated and passed upon in the trial of the action.

If the agent of a corporation, acting within the scope of his duties, even though abusing his authority in that he uses methods not expressly or impliedly authorized, or which could reasonably have been anticipated, commits a remediable wrong to another, causing that other recoverable damages, the corporation as well as the agent is liable.

In case of the agent of a corporation, assuming to act in its behalf, committing a remediable wrong to another by some act outside the scope of his authority, if the corporation, with knowledge of the facts, ratifies his conduct, it is liable the same as if such act was done by its authority.

In case a person to whom the general management of a corporation is intrusted by corporate action, or one who is permitted to exercise such authority, employs another to perform some service for the corporation, such employment makes such other a corporate agent as to all acts done by him within the scope of his duties, and in case he acts outside such duties, its agent so far as such acts are subsequently ratified.

Ratification by a corporation of the acts of a person falsely assuming to have authority in the premises, may be established, circumstantially, as by conduct of those intrusted with the governing authority or general management of the corporate affairs clearly showing approval.

Punitory damages are not allowable as matter of right, nor are such damages allowable, at all, unless the wrongdoer in perpetrating the wrongful act is actuated by bad intent to injure, either actual or with such reckless disregard of consequences as to be equivalent thereto.

It is for the court, in an action for damages sounding in tort, to determine whether, in any reasonable view of the evidence, punitory damages would be proper, and if so, to leave it to the jury to allow such damages or not, in their discretion, informing them, adequately, that such an allowance is not to be made out of any regard for the plaintiff but solely as a punishment of the defendant and a warning to others, and are to be measured out as to amount solely in that view.

Punitory damages are not allowable, generally, against a corporation for the malicious act of its agent within the scope of his authority or otherwise; its liability is limited, in any case, to actual damages, in the absence of authority to commit the wrong with its malicious characteristic, or subsequent ratification of its commission with knowledge of the facts.

The maxim, “Every one is presumed to know the law,” does not obtain literally and generally; it is limited by the reason for the rule, viz.: to prevent violators of the Criminal Code from escaping punishment on the ground of ignorance of the law and violators of private rights, escaping liability for actual loss thereby inflicted on such ground.

If a person acts, in commencing a criminal prosecution, upon the advice of one duly licensed to practice the profession of law, and such advice proves to be wrong, he cannot be rightly held to have acted in bad faith because of a legal presumption that every one knows the law.

The maxim, “Every one is presumed to know the law,” does not prevail against the real truth as to any particular situation, except as regards punishment for a criminal offense, or responsibility for actual damages for violation of private rights.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County; Orren T. Williams, Judge.

Action by John Topolewski against the Plankinton Packing Company. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Timlin, J., dissenting.

Action to recover compensation for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

For the first cause of action it was alleged that defendant, a corporation, falsely and maliciously claiming that plaintiff was guilty of having committed the crime of larceny of its goods, to wit: three barrels of meat and leaf lard of the value of $55.26, caused him, without legal proceedings, to be restrained of his liberty for the period of one hour and then to be delivered to the public authorities and to be restrained of his liberty in the police station at Milwaukee for the period of two hours.

For a second cause of action it was alleged that defendant, maliciously and without probable cause, in due form of law, caused plaintiff to be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of larceny of its goods, as stated in the first cause of action; that he was found guilty as charged; that upon a review of the conviction on writ of error it was held that the facts established in the action did not constitute a criminal offense and the conviction was, therefore, reversed and cause remanded for a new trial; and that, subsequently, such proceedings were duly had in the trial court that the cause was again heard, resulting in its being decided that the facts claimed to exist, of which proof was made and considered, did not show plaintiff to be guilty of any criminal offense and he was, therefore, upon motion discharged.

Damages were claimed to have been sustained by plaintiff to the extent of $50,350.

Defendant, for an answer to the first cause of action, admitted that, at the time and place alleged, plaintiff was restrained of his liberty on a charge of larceny, and was, while so restrained, placed in custody of the chief of police of the city of Milwaukee and that he, subsequently, obtained his release on bail; and put in issue allegations as to aggravated character of the restraint.

Defendant, for an answer to the second cause of action, admitted (1) its alleged corporate character; (2) the claim that plaintiff, previous to his detention, was a retail meat dealer in the city of Milwaukee and accustomed to purchase stock of defendant; (3) that one Layer, at the time of such detention, was in its employ; (4) that plaintiff was prosecuted for larceny and convicted; that the conviction was reversed and on a retrial he was discharged, as alleged, but denied that the prosecution was maliciously commenced or carried on, or that the same was without probable cause, or, in any event, that he was damaged as claimed.

The evidence tended to prove, or was to this effect: On and prior to October 14, 1905, one Moody was defendant's secretary, one Booth its general manager and said Layer manager of its wholesale department with one White as an assistant, and that one Dolan was one of its employés up to a few days before such date. Prior to the particular date a suspicious shortage was discovered in Layer's department. Circumstances came to his knowledge arousing suspicion that plaintiff, in his dealings with defendant, by the aid of dishonest employés, was the cause of the difficulty. Layer was informed by Dolan and another employé that plaintiff had endeavored to conspire with them to defraud defendant. The general manager's son informed Layer of having overheard a conversation between plaintiff and Dolan in regard to stealing meat from defendant. The conversation was, by consent of the secretary, brought about by Dolan in the hearing of Booth for the purpose of discovering whether the suspicions as to plaintiff were correct, and if so, to lay a plan whereby he might take meat, intending to steal the same, and under such circumstances as to be detected in the act. The younger Booth's presence within hearing was unknown to the accused. The conversation confirmed the existing suspicion. Thereafter Layer consulted with one of the city detectives and later it was arranged with Dolan to trap the plaintiff into stealing meat, if he were disposed to do so. Dolan ceased to be an employé of defendant some two weeks prior thereto. He was indebted to plaintiff who requested him to pay the indebtedness by aiding plaintiff to get meat from defendant without either party paying therefor. The two agreed that Dolan should cause four barrels of meat to be placed on a loading platform in the morning in the customary place for customers to receive goods. Layer and Booth, unknown to plaintiff, were behind Dolan in the scheme. Plaintiff, by connivance of the three, was deceived into the belief that Dolan was still at work for the defendant. Dolan promised to be at the platform the next morning and by connivance with Booth and Layer kept his promise and was, apparently, on duty as an employé. The four barrels of meat were placed on the platform convenient for plaintiff to consummate the scheme...

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    ...of the plaintiff's rights. See, e. g., Manz v. Klippel, 158 Wis. 557, 562-563, 149 N.W. 375 (1914); Topolewski v. Plankinton Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52, 70, 126 N.W. 554 (1910); Thomas v. Williams, 139 Wis. 467, 469, 121 N.W. 148 (1909). See also, Wis. J.I. Civil No. 1707, Punitive Damages; M......
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