Toro Co. v. John Deere & Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 99-725 (DSD/JMM).,Civ. 99-725 (DSD/JMM). |
| Citation | 143 F.Supp.2d 1122 |
| Parties | The TORO COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DEERE & COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Earl D. Reiland, Alan W. Kowalchyk, Theodore R. Plunkett, Samuel A. Hamer, Dennis C. Bremer, Merchant & Gould, Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
Michael R. Cunningham, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, Minneapolis, MN, Kathleen A. Lyons, Dressler, Rockey, Milnamow & Katz, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
This matter is before the court on the cross-motions of the parties for summary judgment. Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated, plaintiff's motion is granted in part and denied in part, and defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
This action involves the alleged infringement of three patents relating to an aerating method and machine that uses liquid jets to penetrate the soil for cultivation. Plaintiff Toro Company ("Toro") is a well-known manufacturer of equipment used in treating and maintaining turf. Toro's commercial division manufactures and sells the HydroJect 3000, a machine designed to aerate and loosen compacted soil without disturbing the turf surface and without leaving the "plugs" of dirt that result from other aeration methods. This invention helps grass grow in high traffic areas such as golf courses. The machine accomplishes this by utilizing a plurality of nozzles to periodically inject water under high pressure into the turf to create openings and aerate the soil. The nozzles are specifically spaced on a frame and situated at a specified distance above the turf.
Toro is the owner of three United States patents relating to the HydroJect 3000: U.S.Patent Nos. 5,101,745 (the "'745 patent"), 5,119,744 (the "'744 patent") and 5,207,168 (the "'168 patent"). The '168 patent focuses on the method of treating the turf. The '744 and '745 patents focus on the design of the machine that performs the method of the '168 patent.
Defendant John Deere and Company ("Deere") is a well-known manufacturer of agricultural, construction and turf care equipment. Deere manufactures a machine known as the RZI 700. This machine is designed to inject chemicals, such as fertilizers and pesticides, into the root zone of the turf. Plaintiff alleges that the RZI 700 infringes all three of its patents. Defendant denies infringement and asserts that it is entitled to a declaration of non-infringement as a matter of law. Both parties now move for summary judgment. For the reasons stated, the court grants plaintiff's motion as it relates to the '168 patent and grants defendant's motion as it relates to the '744 and '745 patents.
The court applies the same summary judgment standard to motions involving patent claims as it does to motions involving other types of claims. See Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed.Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence of record establishes that no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court should grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and omission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). There is no genuine issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party and gives that party the benefit of all justifiable inferences that can be drawn in its favor. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The nonmoving party, however, cannot rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings. Id. Nor may the nonmoving party simply argue that facts supporting its claims may be developed later or at trial. Id. Rather, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts, by affidavit or otherwise, to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
The owner of a patent may recover for infringement if the defendant "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention ..." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). The patent holder has the burden of proving infringement by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1547 (Fed.Cir.1985). An infringement analysis requires two steps. The first is to construe the meaning and scope of the patent claims. Southwall Tech., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed.Cir.1995). The second is to determine whether the accused invention infringes the patent claims as construed. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995). A product infringes a patent if it contains every limitation of any one claim or an equivalent of each limitation not literally met. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., Inc., 16 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed.Cir.1994); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed.Cir.1990). While the first step is solely a question of law to be determined by the court, the second step is one for the trier of fact. Id.
If the parties do not dispute any relevant facts about the accused invention but instead assert two different meanings for the patent's claims, then "the question of literal infringement collapses to one of claim construction and is thus amenable to summary judgment." Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg. Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1996). Even if the parties disagree about the meaning of key terms in the patent claims, summary judgment may be appropriate since a mere dispute over the meaning of a term does not in itself create an issue of fact. Id.
The '168 patent relates to a turf treating aeration method. While plaintiff alleges that defendant has infringed a number of claims in the '168 patent, for purposes of the present motion, the parties limit their argument to claim 1 of that patent. Claim 1 reads as follows:
A turf treating method comprising: (a) creating a source of relatively high pressure incompressible liquid, (b) periodically injecting jets of said incompressible liquid from above said turf through the turf into soil below the turf at a pressure that will cause a lateral dispersion of the liquid within said soil, (c) moving said source of incompressible liquid over the surface of said turf in a pattern such that the lateral dispersion from adjacent jets coact with one another to lift and fracture the soil and reduce the general soil density.
The parties concede that the purported infringing device performs steps (a) and (b). Therefore, only clause (c) is in dispute.
Claim construction involves ascertaining the true meaning and scope of each claim as a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 386, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed.Cir. 1992) (). In determining the meaning of the terms of the claims, the court considers "intrinsic" evidence, which consists of the language of the claims, the specification of the patent and the prosecution history. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). If the meaning of the claim terms is not ambiguous and can be determined from the intrinsic evidence, the court need not rely on extrinsic evidence in rendering its claim construction. See id. at 1583. Courts should give the words of a claim their ordinary and accustomed meaning, unless it appears that the inventor used them differently. See ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1988).
The parties concede that the '168 patent raises no real claim construction issues and as such the terms and phrases should be given their ordinary meaning. Thus, the chief issue for the court to resolve is whether the RZI 700 infringes claim 1 of the '168 patent.
While plaintiff contends that defendant's device literally infringes on claim 1, defendant asserts the affirmative defense of invalidity arguing that the '168 patent was anticipated by U.S.Patent No. 4,907,516 ("'516 patent").1 Defendant contends that the RZI 700 merely practices the prior art taught by the '516 patent. Plaintiff disagrees and asserts that the RZI 700 practices the teachings of the '168 patent not the '516 patent.
In order for a patent to be valid, the invention must be novel. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). An invention is not novel if it is anticipated by the prior art. Id. Anticipation specifically occurs when the invention was "known or used by others in this country, or patented" before its invention. Id. The standard for anticipation is rigorous. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1565 (Fed.Cir.1992). The challenger must show by clear and convincing evidence that a single prior art reference discloses every element of the challenged claim and enables one skilled in the art to make the...
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Toro Co. v. Deere & Co.
...in the '168 patent. The '516 patent does not thus anticipate the '168 patent. The '168 patent is valid. Toro Co. v. John Deere & Co., 143 F.Supp.2d 1122, 1130 (D.Minn.2001). 2. Our Review of the District Court's We discern several errors in the district court's analysis: First, the district......