Toro-Pacheco v. Pereira-Castillo

• Decision Date: 07 October 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 08-1133 (FAB)(JA).
• Citation: 662 F.Supp.2d 202
• Parties: Julio F. DEL TORO-PACHECO, Plaintiff v. Miguel A. PEREIRA-CASTILLO, Secretary of Correction and Rehabilitation Administration, Roberto Izquierdo-Ocasio, Director of Special Arrest Unit, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

662 F.Supp.2d 202

Julio F. DEL TORO-PACHECO, Plaintiff v. Miguel A. PEREIRA-CASTILLO, Secretary of Correction and Rehabilitation Administration, Roberto Izquierdo-Ocasio, Director of Special Arrest Unit, Defendants.

Civil No. 08-1133 (FAB)(JA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

October 7, 2009.

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Israel Roldan-Gonzalez, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiff.

Lumy Mangual-Mangual, P.R. Department of Justice-Federal Litigation, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUSTO ARENAS, United States Chief Magistrate Judge.

This matter is before me on a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants Roberto Izquierdo-Ocasio (Izquierdo-Ocasio) and Miguel A. Pereira (Pereira) on June 30, 2009. (Docket No. 28.) Plaintiff Julio F. del Toro-Pacheco (del Toro) filed a motion in opposition on July 31, 2009 (Docket No. 33) to which defendants replied on August 14, 2009. (Docket No. 40.) For the reasons set forth below defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On December 20, 1993, plaintiff started to work for the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("DCR"), and in 1996 plaintiff became part of the escort assigned to protect dignitaries within the DCR. In 2000, plaintiff became part of the Special Arrest Unit ("SAU") of the DCR. (Docket No. 31-2, Docket No. 36, at 5, ¶ 2 & Docket No. 41, at 3, ¶ 2.)

Defendant Pereira was appointed by the Governor as Secretary of the DCR. (Docket No. 1, at 6, ¶ 31 & Docket No. 13, at 4, ¶ 31.) Defendant IzquierdoOcasio was plaintiff's immediate supervisor from 2000 to 2007 and was also the Director of the SAU at the DCR. (Docket No. 1, at 6, ¶ 31, Docket No. 13, at 4, ¶ 31, Docket No. 36, at 5, ¶ 3 & Docket No. 41, at 3, ¶ 3.)

On March 27, 2006, the wife of one of plaintiff's friends was the victim of an alleged sexual assault. Authorities suspected plaintiff was the assailant after the victim filed a formal criminal complaint before the Puerto Rico Police Department against him. (Docket Nos. 31-3 & 31-4.)

On March 29, 2006, after finding out of the criminal complaint filed against plaintiff, defendant Izquierdo-Ocasio notified defendant Pereira. (Docket No. 31-7.) After defendant Pereira was informed of the criminal complaint that was filed against plaintiff, an internal investigation ensued. (Docket No. 27, at 4, ¶ 15 & Docket No. 36, at 2, ¶ 15.)

On February 22, 2007, after the DCR conducted its investigation, defendant Pereira notified plaintiff of the agency's intention to discharge him. (Docket No. 27, at 7, ¶ 27, Docket No. 31-12 & Docket No. 36, at 3, ¶ 27.) The notification explained to plaintiff the charges that were filed against him. (Docket No. 27, at 7, ¶ 28, Docket No. 31-12 & Docket No. 36, at 3, ¶ 28), and the statutes that had been allegedly breached. (Docket No. 27, at 8, ¶ 29, Docket No. 31-12 & Docket No. 36, at 3, ¶ 29.) Plaintiff was informed that if he did not agree with the charges that were being notified against him, he had the right to request an informal administrative hearing. (Docket No. 27, at 8, ¶ 30, Docket No. 31-12 & Docket No. 36, at 3, ¶ 30.) Plaintiff was also explained that the purpose of the hearing was to give him the chance to present the necessary evidence before a hearing officer, who would then make recommendations. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff requested an informal administrative hearing. (Docket No. 27, at 8, ¶ 31, Docket No. 31-13 & Docket No. 36, at 3, ¶ 31.) The hearing was held on January 2007. Plaintiff attended the hearing accompanied by his attorney. (Docket No. 27, at 8, ¶ 32, Docket No. 31-13 & Docket No. 36, at 4, ¶ 32.) However, plaintiff decided not to give his side of the story. (Docket No. 27, at 8, ¶ 33, Docket No. 31-14 & Docket No. 36, at 4, ¶ 33.)

On January 24, 2007, the agency informed plaintiff that they had decided to discharge him from the DCR. (Docket No. 27, at 9, ¶ 35, Docket No. 31-16 & Docket No. 36, at 4, ¶ 35.) Plaintiff then filed an appeal before the Investigative, Procedure and Appellative Commission ("CIPA"), where he challenged the discharge. (Docket No. 27, at 9, ¶ 36, Docket No. 31-17 & Docket No. 36, at 4, ¶ 36.)

On April 2008, an evidentiary hearing was held at CIPA. After listening to the evidence submitted by the plaintiff and the agency, CIPA confirmed the administrative decision discharging plaintiff from the DCR. (Docket No. 27, at 9, ¶ 37, Docket No. 31-18 & Docket No. 36, at 4, ¶ 37.)

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 30, 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Plaintiff also brought several claims under the laws of Puerto Rico alleging violations of his rights under Personnel Law of Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 130 et seq., sections 1, 4, 6 and 7 of Article II of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Law No. 382 of 1950, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 136-138 and Law No. 100 of 1959, as amended, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 146. (Docket No. 1, at 1-3, ¶¶ 1-14.)

On August 22, 2008, and on June 29, 2009, defendants Izquierdo-Ocasio and Pereira respectively filed their answer to plaintiff's complaint. (Docket Nos. 13 & 25.) On April 2, 2008, defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for the following reasons: (1) it was time-barred; (2) plaintiff failed to state a claim under section 1983, and (3) they were protected from liability under the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity. (Docket No. 7.)

On November 21, 2008, I entered an order granting and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss. I held that plaintiff's complaint was not time barred; that plaintiff did not fail to state a claim under section 1983 and that defendants were not entitled to either qualified or the Eleventh Amendment immunity. Also, plaintiff's Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, and Puerto Rico Law No. 100 claims were dismissed with prejudice. (Docket No. 23.)

On June 30, 2009, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and memorandum of law in support. Defendants argue that plaintiff (a) failed to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (b) failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination; and (c) that since he failed to allege any cause of action under federal law, the claims brought forth under supplemental jurisdiction should also be dismissed. Also, in the alternative, defendants claim that they would be entitled to qualified immunity if the court were to find that plaintiff's rights have been violated. (Docket No. 28.)

On August 4, 2009, plaintiff filed his opposition to summary judgment. Plaintiff claims that he has a valid cause of action since he has proffered sufficient evidence that shows that defendants intentionally and under color of authority, personally and/or by means of other officials acted to deprive him of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also states that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity since the facts presented in the complaint demonstrate that they acted maliciously and intentionally. (Docket No. 35.)

On August 14, 2009, defendants replied claiming that plaintiff did not meet the burden of showing there were genuine issues in controversy that were trial worthy. Defendants argue that plaintiff only objected to their statements of uncontested facts for evidentiary reasons and/or on unsupported grounds. (Docket No. 40.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgement

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The intention of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e)). "Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, with respect to each issue on which [it] has the burden of proof, to demonstrate that a trier of fact reasonably could find in [its] favor." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997)).

"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see also Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 236-37 (1st Cir.2002) (quoting J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson. Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996)) ("`[N]either conclusory allegations [nor] improbable inferences' are sufficient to defeat summary judgment."). The nonmoving party must produce "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); see also López Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 413 (1st Cir.2000).

"A genuine issue exists when there is evidence sufficient to support rational resolution of the point in favor of either party." Nereida-González v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992)). "In this...