Toro v. Mastex Industries
| Decision Date | 07 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 97-30022-MAP.,Civ.A. 97-30022-MAP. |
| Parties | Omar TORO, Plaintiff, v. MASTEX INDUSTRIES, and Carroll Stewart, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Alan M. Katz, Katz, Sasson & Hoose, Springfield, MA, for plaintiff.
Robert L. Dambrov, Cooley, Shrair, P.C., Springfield, MA, for defendants.
Upon de novo review this Report and Recommendation is hereby adopted and the cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED. The clerk will set the matter for a status conference.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 24) and PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 27)
Omar Toro ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint against his employer, Mastex Industries ("Mastex"), and its human resources manager, Carroll Stewart ("Stewart") (collectively "Defendants"), with respect to his termination effective November 27, 1995. Plaintiff avers that he was unjustly terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Before the court are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, which have been referred to the court for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons which follow, the court recommends that both motions be denied.
In accord with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment will be granted if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir.1998). Once the moving party has asserted that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the opposing party has the burden to contradict that assertion "by pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is, indeed, a trialworthy issue." Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir.1995). A "genuine" issue is one "`that a reasonable jury could resolve ... in favor of the nonmoving party.'" McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 315 (1st Cir.1995) (quoting United States v. Plat 20, Lot 17 Great Harbor Neck, New Shoreham, R.I., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992)). Not every genuine factual conflict, however, necessitates a trial. It is only when a disputed fact has the "potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," if found favorably to the nonmovant, that the materiality hurdle is cleared. Hinchey, 144 F.3d at 140 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
The fact that both parties move for summary judgment does not change the foregoing analysis. United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 14, AFL—CIO—CLC v. Int'l Paper Co., 64 F.3d 28, 32 n. 2 (1st Cir.1995). Barring special circumstances, a "court must consider each motion separately, drawing inferences against each movant in turn." Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1997).
Plaintiff had been employed as a knotter by Mastex, a textile manufacturer, since August 7, 1992. In the last week of October, 1995, Plaintiff found out that his wife, who was living in Colombia at the time, needed a mastectomy. On November 2, 1995, Plaintiff requested leave to care for his wife, beginning on or around November 24, 1995. Also on November 2, 1995, Plaintiff sent an FMLA leave of absence form via express mail to his wife's doctor in Colombia.
On November 16, 1995, Stewart, Mastex's human resources manager, spoke with Plaintiff and told him that his leave had not been granted because the medical certification form had not yet been returned. Stewart claims to have told Plaintiff that, if Plaintiff left without providing the medical certification, he would be leaving without Defendants' permission. Plaintiff stated that he would return the necessary form.
The medical certification form was completed by Plaintiff's wife's physician on or around November 14, 1995. However, by November 21, 1995, when Plaintiff left for Colombia, he had not yet received the form from his wife's physician. Plaintiff left anyway and gave his mailbox key to his sister-in-law. Plaintiff claims to have asked his sister-in-law to check his mailbox daily. Plaintiff's wife's mastectomy was performed in November 25, 1995.
When Plaintiff did not appear for work for three consecutive days, Defendants considered him a "no show" and terminated him in a letter dated November 27, 1995. The no show attendance rule is delineated in the Mastex's policy handbook which Plaintiff received. (Docket No. 28 at Exh. 4.) On December 7, 1995, Plaintiff's sister-in-law hand delivered the completed medical certification form to Defendants.
Plaintiff claims that he was improperly terminated because of his exercise of rights guaranteed under the FMLA. As applicable here, the FMLA provides that "an eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period ... in order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). Following a qualified leave, an employee is entitled to return to the same or an alternate position with equivalent pay and benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); 29 C.F.R. § 825.100(c).
The First Circuit recently took the opportunity to explain the rights created by the FMLA, and the manner in which courts should analyze FMLA disputes. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics, Corp., 144 F.3d 151 (1st Cir.1998). The court recognized two types of FMLA rights: first, certain substantive entitlements which the court described as "prescriptive," and, second, certain protections from discrimination which the court termed "proscriptive." Id. at 159-60. When prescriptive rights are at issue, "[t]he issue is simply whether the employer provided its employee the entitlements set forth in the FMLA—for example, a twelve-week leave or reinstatement after taking a medical leave." Id. at 159. "Because the issue is the right to an entitlement," the court explained, "the employee is due the benefit if the statutory requests are satisfied, regardless of the intent of the employer." Id. With prospective rights, however, the court stated that an employer's motive is relevant "and the issue is whether the employer took the adverse action because of a prohibited reason or for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason." Id. at 160. The analysis of such alleged discrimination in the absence of direct evidence, the court explained, is to be undertaken in accord with McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-06, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Id.
Although the parties do not describe their respective claims in this manner, it is apparent that their dispute falls on the prescriptive side of the equation, at least for purposes of their cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff argues that he was denied a right secured by the FMLA. Defendants allege that Plaintiff's FMLA rights were never triggered. Because there are genuine and material facts at issue concerning the parties' respective compliance with the FMLA, the court believes that both motions should be denied.1
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's claim must fail in its infancy. In essence, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comport with the requirements for foreseeable leave under the FMLA and that, accordingly, Plaintiff was not a covered employee under the statute. Defendants claim, therefore, that they were justified in denying Plaintiff's request to return to work on or about December 28, 1995.
In support, Defendants point to the FMLA requirement that an employee must provide his employer with no less than thirty days advance notice when the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 2612(2)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 25.302. "If an employee fails to provide in a timely manner a requested medical certification to substantiate the need for FMLA leave due to a serious health condition," the regulations continue, 29 C.F.R. § 825.312(b). If the court were to find that Plaintiff failed to comport with these requirements, Defendants conclude, Plaintiff cannot meet the initial prerequisites of his claim.
In opposition, Plaintiff argues that his need for an FMLA leave was unforeseeable and that his claim must be measured under less stringent procedural requirements. FMLA regulations provide that, "when the approximate timing of the need for leave is not foreseeable, an employee should give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave as soon as practicable under the facts and circumstances of the particular case." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303 (emphasis added). In the instant matter, Plaintiff claims, it was not practicable for him to provide medical certification in advance.
As a preliminary matter, the court finds no support for Defendants' claim that the FMLA does not contemplate an exception for impracticability and that, to the extent the regulations allow that possibility, they are contrary to Congressional intent and unenforceable. First, regulations promulgated by the agency charged with the implementation of a statute are to be given great deference by a court. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 165 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)); Duckworth v. Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1998). Here, Congress authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate regulations "necessary to carry out" the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654.
Second, it is readily apparent how the regulations cited by Plaintiff...
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