Del Toro v. Stamford, (AC 20207)
Decision Date | 26 June 2001 |
Docket Number | (AC 20207) |
Citation | 779 A.2d 202,64 Conn. App. 1 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | RICHARD DEL TORO v. CITY OF STAMFORD ET AL. |
Schaller, Spear and O'Connell, JS.
Gary J. Wilson, for the appellant (plaintiff).
James L. Sullivan, with whom was James D. Moran, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff, Richard Del Toro, appeals from the decision of the workers' compensation review board (board) affirming the denial by the workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) of his motion to preclude the defendant city of Stamford1 from contesting liability. On appeal, the plaintiffs sole claim is that the board improperly upheld the commissioner's decision on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist. We reverse the decision of the board.
The relevant facts as found by the commissioner are as follows. Between 1981 and 1996, the plaintiff was employed as a police officer for the defendant city. On or about November 30, 1985, the plaintiff, while working within the scope of his employment, was involved in a shooting incident that resulted in the death of a civilian. He thereafter sought treatment to address the potential psychological distress resulting from the shooting incident. On May 12, 1994, Mark Rubinstein, a physician, examined the plaintiff pursuant to the defendants' request and opined that the plaintiff did not require psychiatric treatment or psychological counseling with respect to the shooting incident. Approximately one year later, a psychiatrist concluded to the contrary and, as a result, the plaintiff began receiving psychiatric treatment in connection with the shooting incident.
On July 9, 1996, the plaintiff filed a form 30C2 in which he alleged a repetitive trauma stress injury with a July 27, 1995 date of injury. The injury is described in the form as "officer involved shooting on 11-30-85." The defendants failed to contest the claim within twenty-eight days of receipt of written notice of the claim as mandated by General Statutes § 31-294c (b),3 which establishes a conclusive presumption of liability if the employer fails to so contest. Consequently, on August 28, 1996, the plaintiff filed a motion to preclude the defendants from contesting liability. The commissioner denied that motion and, in doing so, accepted the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs injury was not a compensable "injury" within the meaning of General Statutes § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii).4 That statute precludes recovery for a mental or emotional injury unless it arises from a "physical injury" or "occupational disease." Id.
The plaintiff then appealed to the board from the commissioner's decision. Although the defendants had failed to contest the claim within twenty-eight days as required by § 31-294c (b), the board affirmed the commissioner's ruling on the ground that the commissioner lacked jurisdiction over the injury alleged by the plaintiff. In support of its decision, the board relied on Biasetti v. Stamford, 250 Conn. 65, 735 A.2d 321 (1999). The plaintiff now appeals from the board's decision.5 The plaintiff claims that the board improperly upheld the commissioner's decision denying the motion to preclude on the ground that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist. The crux of his claim is that the board mischaracterized the determination of whether the injury was compensable under § 31-275 (16) (B) (ii) as a jurisdictional matter, thereby circumventing the mandatory presumption of liability contained in § 31-294c (b). Such a determination, according to the plaintiff, does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, and there is no claim questioning the existence of an employer-employee relationship. In response, the defendants argue that subject matter jurisdiction requires proof, not only of the employee-employer relationship, but also proof that the injury is the type of injury compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. We disagree.
Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff's claim, we set forth our standard of review applicable to workers' compensation appeals. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnik, 244 Conn. 781, 797-98, 712 A.2d 396, cert. denied sub nom. Slotnik v. Considine, 525 U.S. 1017, 119 S. Ct. 542, 142 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1998). Because this issue of statutory construction has not been subjected to judicial scrutiny, our review is plenary.
We begin by examining the statute that precludes the employer from contesting liability. Section 31-294c (b) provides in relevant part:
Although the conclusive presumption contained in § 31-294c (b) is phrased in absolute language, it does not preclude the employer from challenging the commissioner's subject matter jurisdiction. Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420, 427, 541 A.2d 1216 (1988). "Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.... A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy.... It is a familiar principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling legislation....
* * *
(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 427-30. The dispositive question, therefore, is whether the compensability of an injury6 is a jurisdictional issue so that the conclusive presumption of § 31-294c (b) does not apply. We answer that question in the negative.
The concept that subject matter jurisdiction encompasses the issue of the compensability of an injury finds no support in our case law. To the contrary, our case law reveals that, in the context of workers' compensation proceedings, subject matter jurisdiction is implicated only with issues concerning the existence of an employee-employer relationship; id., 430-37; or the proper initiation of the claim itself. Infante v. Mansfield Construction Co., 47 Conn. App. 530, 534, 706 A.2d 984 (1998). Our courts have repeatedly refused to characterize as issues of subject matter jurisdiction claims involving whether an injury arose in the course of employment. In such circumstances, the courts precluded the employers from circumventing the conclusive statutory presumption of liability imposed if they failed to contest liability. LaVogue v. Cincinnati, Inc., 9 Conn. App. 91, 93, 516 A.2d 151, cert. denied, 201 Conn. 814, 518...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Toro v. Stamford, (SC 17050).
...were barred from contesting liability because their notice pursuant to § 31-294c (b) had been untimely. See Del Toro v. Stamford, 64 Conn. App. 1, 8-9, 779 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 913, 782 A.2d 1242 (2001). We agree with the defendants and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of ......
-
Tower v. Miller Johnson, Inc.
...unlike jurisdiction of the person, cannot be created through consent or waiver." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Del Toro v. Stamford, 64 Conn. App. 1, 6-7, 779 A.2d 202, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 913, 782 A.2d 1242 In Del Toro, we considered whether the compensability of an injury is a j......