De La Torre-Flores v. Napolitano
| Decision Date | 25 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 11-CV-2698-IEG (WVG) |
| Parties | DE LA TORRE-FLORES, et al., Plaintiff, v. NAPOLITANO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
Presently before the Court is Defendants'1 Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. [Doc. No. 13.] For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss for both lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This case is brought by Plaintiffs Juan De La Torre-Flores ("Torre-Flores"), a citizen and current resident of Mexico, and Servando De La Torre ("De La Torre"), a citizen of the United States and Torre-Flores's son. [See Doc. No. 1.] It arises out of the June 1998 expedited removal of Torre-Flores. [See, e.g., Doc. No. 1 at 6.]2
Torre-Flores had been residing undocumented in the United States since 1989, when, inMay 1998, he left to visit family in Mexico. [Id.] Attempting to return, on June 16, 1998, he applied for admission to the United States at the San Ysidro port of entry with "documentation not lawfully issued to him." [Id.] Having presented false documentation, he was subject to expedited removal proceedings, removed to Mexico on June 17, 1998, and barred from readmission for five years. [Id.] The next day, he reentered the United States without inspection. [Id.]
On May 11, 2007, Torre-Flores filed an application to adjust status and a request for a waiver of grounds of inadmissability resulting from his prior removal order. [Id. at 7.] On June 19, 2009, both were denied by the Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. [Id.] On March 24, 2010, Department of Homeland Security officials apprehended Torre-Flores, reinstated removal proceedings and removed him to Mexico, and instituted a twenty-year bar to his readmission. [Id.] Torre-Flores currently resides in Mexico and seeks to immigrate to the United States through a visa petition filed on his behalf by De La Torre [Id.]
On November 11, 2011, Plaintiffs (erroneously referring to themselves as "Petitioners") filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, which requested that the Court assume jurisdiction, declare that the Immigration and Naturalization Service erred in placing Torre-Flores in expedited removal proceedings, and mandate that immigration officials allow Torre-Flores to enter the United States as a lawful permanent resident. [Doc. No. 1.]
On November 30, 2011, the Court (treating the complaint as mislabeled, i.e., a petition) ordered Defendants (erroneously referred to as "Respondents" by Plaintiffs) to show cause why the petition should not be granted. [Doc. No. 3.] On December 23, 2011, Defendants filed a response to the Court's Order to Show Cause, contending that as an action for relief in the nature of mandamus, this action had to proceed as a complaint, not as a petition. [Doc. No. 4.] On January 25, 2012, the Court discharged its Order to Show Cause as improvidently issued. [Doc. No. 8.]
On February 27, 2012, Defendants answered the complaint, [Doc. No. 9.], and on April 20, 2012, the parties participated in an Early Neutral Evaluation before Magistrate Judge WilliamGallo, who ordered Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment. [See Doc. Nos. 11, 12.] On May 21, 2012, Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, [Doc. No. 13.], Plaintiffs filed an opposition on June 25, 2012, [Doc. No. 15], and Defendants filed a reply on July 6, 2012, [Doc. No. 17]. The Court heard oral argument from the parties on July 23, 2012. [See Doc. No. 18.]
Plaintiffs' complaint presents two questions:
Because neither question falls within this Court's jurisdiction, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Moreover, even were jurisdiction proper, Plaintiffs fail to state any cognizable legal theory or to raise any dispute as to material fact. Thus, the Court additionally GRANTS Defendants' motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Where, as here, a party moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), "[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Id.
As to Plaintiffs' challenge to Torre-Flores's June 1998 expedited removal, the four asserted bases for jurisdiction3 fail because this Court's jurisdiction over expedited removal orders is explicitly and severely limited by the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").4 The INA statesin pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . except as provided by [1252(e)], any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of an order of [expedited] removal."
The Ninth Circuit holds that this statute "strictly circumscribes the scope of review of expedited removal orders to the grounds enumerated in § 1252(e)," which in turn "expressly limit the scope of such review to habeas petitions alleging that the petitioner is not an alien or was never subject to an expedited removal order." Garcia de Rincon v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e). Moreover, § 1252(e)(5) flatly states: "There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(5). Thus, "[b]y the clear operation of these statutes," federal courts "are jurisdictionally barred" from hearing direct challenges to expedited removal orders. Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1139; see also Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2007) ( )
Plaintiffs concede all of this. [See Doc. No. 15 at 5-6 ().] Moreover, Plaintiffs concede that this action is not and cannot be sought by habeas petition and, even if it were, it does not fit any of the narrow subsets of habeas review allowed. [See Doc. No. 15 at 6 ()]. These uncontested facts result in this Court's lack of jurisdiction to review Torre-Flores's 1998 expedited removal. See Garcia deRincon, 539 F.3d at 1139.
This court also lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' "general attacks on the expedited removal process." U.S. v. Barragan-Camarillo, 460 Fed.Appx. 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1086 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011)). Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3), titled "Challenges on validity of the system," jurisdiction over any constitutional challenge to the expedited removal regime is specifically limited to actions "instituted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3)(A). The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly acknowledged this explicit jurisdictional proscription. See, e.g., Barragan-Camarillo, 460 Fed. Appx. at 639 () (citing Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d at 1086 n. 10); Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001) (), vacated as moot, Li v. Eddy, 324 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2001).5 Thus, this Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the expedited removal regime itself.
Again, Plaintiffs appear to concede all of this. [See Doc. No. 15 at 6 ().] Plaintiffs further concede that this action indeed challenges the constitutionality of the expedited removal regime. [See Doc. No. 15 at 3 (); see also id. at 6 ().] As such, this action raises a constitutional challenge that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear.
Defendants also assert that De La Torre ...
To continue reading
Request your trial