Torrent v. City of Muskegon
| Decision Date | 19 October 1881 |
| Citation | 47 Mich. 115,10 N.W. 132 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | TORRENT v. MUSKEGON. |
A bill will not lie to restrain the common council of a municipal corporation from putting up suitable public buildings for the purposes of city officers if the provisions of the charter do not prevent it.
The citizens of a municipality cannot confer upon the common council functions not left with them by the charter.
Courts cannot interfere with the discretion of municipal bodies in the expenditure of public funds unless it has been plainly abused and practically exceeded under pretence of keeping within their charter powers.
City charters must be rationally construed as intended to create corporations which shall resemble in their essential character the class into which they are introduced.
The constitution of Michigan contemplates that the legislature shall create cities and other municipalities with full powers of beneficial legislation; and when the legislature prescribes the limit of financial action it must be assumed to permit all reasonable and proper expenditures within those limits.
Interference by injunction should not be allowed where the delay may work great damage without making full provision for redress by an adequate injunction bond.
Appeal from Muskegon.
Henry H. Holt, for complainant.
A.B Allen, for appellants.
Complainants who are considerable tax-payers, obtained from the circuit court for the county of Muskegon, a decree restraining the city from putting up a building for the purposes of city officers and of the fire department. The claim of complainants, which seems to have been adopted by the court below, is that the building is more expensive than would be needed by the fire department, and that no power is given by the charter to build a city hall; and further that it could not be lawful to undertake such a large expenditure without the assent of the citizens by vote for that purpose. If there is no power to build a city hall, or an edifice intended to subserve similar purposes, there is no power in the citizens to increase the functions of the council. Our attention has not been called to any provision in the city charter authorizing any financial question to be submitted to the electors, except that of issuing bonds. Charter, �� 66-67. That ground becomes wholly immaterial, and the question for us to determine is whether the facts of the case bring it within any rule to be drawn from the charter, allowing or forbidding the action in dispute.
The contract in question was made on the seventeenth of August of this year, and provides for a building for the use of the fire department, and for city officers, to be finished March 15, 1882. The cost is to be $15,371, payable in monthly instalments. It involved the destruction and removal of a smaller engine-house already on the lot. The bill relies largely on the fact that the city will not have funds to pay it, and will thus be brought in debt. This last consideration standing alone, would not be one which we can properly pay much attention to. It is provided by the charter that the city may raise annually for its general purposes not more than 7 per cent. on the property assessable; which at present rates would be about $100,000. The contingent fund which receives this money, is also entitled to the liquor taxes, and some other receipts, said to be not far from $10,000 a year. This tax levy is under the discretion of the common council. It appears clearly enough that at the present rates of expenditures for public purposes, the city may, if it chooses, raise money enough to pay for this expenditure, and that there is no controlling financial reason against it, if lawful.
But in saying this we do not assume that it belongs to this court or to any other to dictate to the city how it shall spend its money. The council must use its own discretion where it will save and where it will spend; and the case must be a very clear one, and the subterfuge very plain, before that discretion can be regarded as having been exceeded so as to show an excess of power under a pretence of keeping within it. It is not the business of courts to act as city regulators, and unless the authority of the representatives of the citizens has been exceeded their action cannot be interfered with merely because it may not seem to other persons to be as wise as it might be. We shall therefore confine ourselves to the question of power, merely adding, in view of the large range of the argument, that there is, in our opinion, nothing which indicates the slightest misconduct in the council, if they acted within their powers.
There is nothing said in the charter about any such building, by name as a city hall, or city offices. There is power given expressly to build and maintain water-works, hospitals markets, and cemeteries. Section 4391. Full power is given concerning a fire department. Sections 45 et seq. The council is authorized to take as well as to contract for private property, for--among other things--public grounds, parks, market places--land necessary for public buildings and cemeteries. Section 119 as amended in 1879, Local Acts, 201. It is to be noticed in this connection, that prior to 1879, this section mentioned lands "for necessary public buildings," which in 1879 was changed to "land necessary for public buildings." This change is somewhat significant, as bearing on the discretion of the council. The enumeration of most of these subjects enables us to see that the city of Muskegon has been empowered to do several important and expensive things, which are often left to private enterprise, and several...
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