Torres v. Cynet Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01171 (RDA/JFA)
| Decision Date | 09 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01171 (RDA/JFA) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | JUAN J. TORRES, Plaintiff, v. CYNET SYSTEMS, INCORPORATED, Defendant. |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Cynet Systems's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"). Considering the Motion, the Memorandum in Support of the Motion (Dkt. 28), Plaintiff Juan J. Torres's ("Plaintiff") Opposition to the Motion (Dkt. 31), and Defendant's Reply (Dkt. 32), and for the following reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is GRANTED.
Defendant is a recruiting and staffing firm headquartered in Sterling, Virginia. Dkt. 28-1, ¶ 3. The firm recruits consultants to work at companies in the software, information technology, and engineering industries. Id. On January 8, 2018, Plaintiff submitted an application to Defendant for a "DecOps engineer/architect" position with HCL America. Dkt. 28-2, 5-6. When he applied for that position, Plaintiff understood that Defendant was a staffing agency and that he would perform substantive work for HCL America and HCL America's client, Novartis. Id. at 8-9. In applying for the position, Plaintiff indicated that he was "willing to relocate and travel at [ ] [his] own expense." Id. at 10.
Defendant then submitted Plaintiff's application materials to HCL America. Dkt. 28-1, ¶ 6. On January 11, 2018, HCL America, through its client, Novartis, interviewed Plaintiff. Id. During the interview, Plaintiff was told that would be referred for the job.1 Dkt. 28-2, 11.
Subsequent to the interview, Defendant provided Plaintiff with an Independent Contractor Agreement ("Agreement"), which is the contract that is at issue in this matter. Dkt. 28-1, ¶ 9. It is not reasonably disputed that Plaintiff read and understood the Agreement before he signed it on January 17, 2018. Dkt. 28-2, 14-16. The following clauses were included in the Agreement and are relevant here:
Dkt. 28-3, 2, 5. Plaintiff claims that on January 22, 2018, he spoke with one of Defendant's employees, Ankur Sharma ("Mr. Sharma"). Dkt. 31, 2. Plaintiff explains that during that conversation, Mr. Sharma told Plaintiff that he was cleared and should move to Fort Worth, Texas. Id. Plaintiff, who was then a Eustis, Florida resident, arrived in Fort Worth, Texas on January 25, 2018, expecting to commence work on January 29, 2018. Id. at 22; 28-5, 1.
On February 5, 2018, "Varun," one of Defendant's employees, asked Jaya Vadodaria ("Ms. Vadodaria"), one of HCL America's employees, when Plaintiff would report for his first day of work.2 Dkt. 228-9, 2. On February 6, 2018, and February 8, 2018, Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Sharma, one of Defendant's employees, and he told Plaintiff that he still needed to "wait" to beginwork. See id. at 29; see also Dkt. 28-1, ¶ 17. On February 8, 2018, Ms. Vadodaria responded to Varun's request for a status update, indicating that HCL America "w[ould] not be able to onboard [ ] [Plaintiff] as [ ] [it] d[id] not have a confirmation from" Novartis. Id. The parties disagree regarding whether Plaintiff ever received notice that he would not be needed for the position. See Dkt. Nos. 31, 3; 28-1, ¶ 19.
On September 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint in the instant matter. Dkt. 1. Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. Dkt. 5. Without opposing the Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. 9. In turn, Defendant withdrew its Motion to Dismiss the original Complaint, and moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Dkt. 10. The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint—granting that motion with respect to the Plaintiff's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim, and denying the same with respect to the breach of contract claim. Dkt. 16.
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the remaining count in the Amended Complaint. Dkt. 27. Plaintiff opposes Defendant's Motion. Dkt. 31.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has theburden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-28. A "material fact" is one that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Id. at 248; JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001). Whether a fact is considered to be "material" is determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2001). A "genuine" issue concerning a "material fact" arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant breached two provisions of the Agreement. See Dkt. 9, ¶ 14. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant breached Section 1.2 of the Agreement that provided that Defendant's representative would "provide to [ ] [Plaintiff] information appropriate for [ ] [Plaintiff] to perform the Services" contemplated by the Agreement. See id. It appears that Plaintiff's theory of complaint is that Defendant breached the Section 1.2 provision when its representative told Plaintiff that "HCL America accepted [Defendant's]services to start around January 29, 2019" and subsequently failed to inform Plaintiff when HCL America indicated that they no longer needed Plaintiff's services. Id.
Second, in the Amended Complaint,3 Plaintiff maintains that Defendant breached Section 6.1(c) of that same Agreement. Id. Section 6.1(c) indicates that "[t]he Parties may terminate [the] Agreement as follows: . . . (c) by [Defendant] with ten (10) business days written notice to [Plaintiff] for any reason not specified in Section 6.1(d) including where [Defendant's] client determines it no longer wants [Plaintiff] to provide services[.]" Dkt. 28-3, 5. Essentially, Plaintiff believes that Defendant breached Section 6.1(c) when it did not give him the requisite 10-day notice that HCL America no longer needed his services. Dkt. 9, ¶ 14.
Defendant moves for summary judgment arguing that the Agreement was null and void, and argues that therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact. See generally, Dkt. 28. According to Defendant, because the Agreement set forth that "if, at any time prior to Plaintiff starting his performance of services, [ ] [D...
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