Torres v. Diaz
| Decision Date | 31 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 19-cv-01964-LAB-JLB |
| Parties | EDUARDO TORRES, Petitioner, v. RALPH DIAZ, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER:
(1) DENYING RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS;
[ECF Nos. 31; 35; 44; 49]
On September 20, 2019, Petitioner Eduardo Torres, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF Nos. 1; 9.) Before the Court are Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 31), Petitioner's Motions for Stay and Abeyance (ECF Nos. 35; 49), and Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 44).
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Alan Burns pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After a thorough review of the parties' motions and the record before the Court, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court DENY Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, GRANT Petitioner's Motions for Stay and Abeyance, and DENY Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend.
On September 20, 2019, Petitioner constructively1 filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Original Petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the conviction and sentence imposed on him by the San Diego Superior Court in case number SCD267474. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) On January 10, 2020, Respondents moved to dismiss the Original Petition as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). (ECF No. 14.)
On February 21, 2020, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Amended Petition") containing an additional, unexhausted claim. (ECF No. 21 at 17.) In light of the Amended Petition, the Honorable Larry Alan Burns denied Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) as moot on March 3, 2020. (ECF No. 22.)
On March 20, 2020, Respondents moved to dismiss the Amended Petition on the grounds that the Original Petition was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and the Amended Petition contained an unexhausted claim. (ECF No. 31.) Petitioner filed an opposition on May 24, 2020. (ECF No. 41 at 3.)
/// On April 30, 2020, Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay and Abeyance requesting that the Court stay the case and hold his exhausted claims in abeyance pending the exhaustion of his unexhausted claim. (ECF Nos. 35; 35-1 at 1.) Respondents filed an opposition on June 17, 2020. (ECF No. 42.) Petitioner filed a reply on July 5, 2020. (ECF No. 45 at 5.) Petitioner filed a second request for stay and abeyance on November 30, 2020.2 (ECF No. 49.)
On June 16, 2020, Petitioner moved for leave to amend the Amended Petition and add an additional, unexhausted claim. (ECF No. 44 at 3.) Respondents did not file a response to Petitioner's Motion for Leave to Amend.
Petitioner is a state prisoner incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison ("MCSP") in Ione, California. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) On June 29, 2017, in case number SCD267474, Petitioner pleaded guilty to first-degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) and oral copulation by force (Cal. Penal Code § 288a(c)(2)(A)).3 (ECF No. 15-2 ¶ 1.) Petitioner agreed to a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder charge and twenty-five years to life plus ten years for the oral copulation charge and was sentenced on August 4, 2017. (Id. ¶ 2; ECF No. 15-4 at 1.) As part of his guilty plea, Petitioner waived certain appeal rights and did not otherwise seek direct review in the California Courts of Appeal. (See ECF No. 15-2 ¶ 8.)
On August 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior Court. (ECF No. 15-5 at 7.) On September 12, 2018, the superior courtdenied the petition. (ECF No. 15-6 at 1.) On September 21, 2018, Petitioner filed an amended petition in the San Diego Superior Court. (ECF No. 15-7 at 7.) On November 1, 2018, the superior court denied the amended petition. (ECF No. 15-8 at 1-2.)
On November 1, 2018, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Courts of Appeal. (ECF No. 15-9 at 7, 9.) On November 7, 2018, an appellate court denied the petition. (ECF No. 15-10 at 1.)
On March 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Supreme Court. (ECF No. 15-11 at 4.) On July 17, 2019, the California Supreme Court denied the petition. (ECF No. 15-12 at 1.)
On September 20, 2019,4 Petitioner filed the Original Petition in the Southern District of California, seeking federal habeas relief. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) The Original Petition raised seven claims: (1) general ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to "investigate, develop, [and] present available important evidence" and a "diminished actuality" defense; (3) denial of a competence hearing; (4) lack of competence to stand trial; (5) unknowing and involuntary guilty plea; (6) a Massiah violation; and (7) coerced guilty plea.5 (ECF No. 1 at 6-12.)
On February 21, 2020, Petitioner filed the Amended Petition, wherein Petitioner added an additional, and admittedly unexhausted claim to the seven claims he raised in the Original Petition. (ECF No. 21 at 17.) Petitioner's eighth claim in the Amended Petition alleges that counsel "failed to investigate, develop, [and] present available important evidence of [Petitioner's] cannabis-induced psychosis." (Id. at 13; 45.)
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal habeas corpus petitions:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
Federal habeas corpus claims filed after April 24, 1996, such as those here, are subject to the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). Under AEDPA, a petitioner must overcome a high threshold to obtain relief:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on all federal habeas petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
Respondents move to dismiss the Amended Petition first on the grounds that it is time-barred under AEDPA's one-year limitations period and Petitioner is not entitled to sufficient statutory or equitable tolling to render the Amended Petition timely. (ECF No. 31-1 at 3-6.) Petitioner argues in opposition that the Amended Petition is timely under AEDPA because he is entitled to a later limitations commencement date under § 2244(d)(1) and sufficient statutory and equitable tolling. (See ECF No. 41.)
To determine whether the Amended Petition is timely, the Court must first determine when AEDPA's one-year limitations period began to run. Respondents argue that the limitations period began to run on October 3, 2017, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). (ECF No. 31-1 at 3.) Petitioner contends that that the limitations period began to run on June 24, 2018, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(B). (ECF No. 41 at 8, 16.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds § 2244(d)(1)(B) inapplicable and agrees with Respondents that the one-year limitations period began on October 3, 2017, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A).
As stated above, AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on all federal habeas petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Under § 2244(d)(1), the limitations period begins to run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
In most cases, § 2244(d)(1)(A) applies, and the limitations period begins to run from "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). "It is only in 'rare instances' that, pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D), the limitation period may run from a date later than the date on which judgment becomes final." Fredrick v. Vigra, No. CV 12-04487-VBK, 2013 WL 3283527, at *6 (C.D. Cal. ...
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