Torres v. House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of P.R.

• Decision Date: 16 April 2012
• Docket Number: Civil No. 10–1265 (GAG).
• Citation: 858 F.Supp.2d 172,45 NDLR P 37,26 A.D. Cases 586
• Parties: Celia Pagan TORRES, Plaintiff, v. The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF P.R., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

858 F.Supp.2d 172

26 A.D. Cases 586

45 NDLR P 37

Celia Pagan TORRES, Plaintiff,

v.The HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF P.R., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 10–1265 (GAG).

United States District Court,

D. Puerto Rico.

April 16, 2012.

Erick Morales–Perez, Erick Morales Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Ivan M. Castro–Ortiz, Michael C. McCall, Sheila J. Torres–Delgado, Aldarondo & Lopez Bras, PSC, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Celia Pagan Torres (“Plaintiff”), filed a complaint against the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and against Jenniffer Gonzalez Colon, president of the House of Representatives (“Defendant Jenniffer Gonzalez”), Camille Rivera Perez, director of the Office of Advisors to the President of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Defendant Rivera–Perez”), and Freddy Velez Garcia, administrator of the Office of Administration at the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (“Defendant Velez”), alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and retaliation. The action is brought pursuant to Title I and V of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also invokes the supplemental jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate his claims under Puerto Rico state laws, to wit: Puerto Rico Law 44 (“Law 44”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, §§ 501 et seq.; Puerto Rico Law 115 (“Law 115”), P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 194 et seq.; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico (“Article 1802”) P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 §§ 5141–5142; and damages claims under the Commonwealth's libel and defamation statute, P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 32 §§ 3141–3149.

This matter is presently before the court on defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 67). Plaintiff timely opposed Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Docket 80) and defendants replied to the opposition (Docket No. 86). After reviewing the pleadings and pertinent law, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 67).

I. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). “An issue is genuine if ‘it may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party’ at trial, and material if it ‘possess[es] the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.’ ” Iverson v. City of Boston, 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir.2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The nonmoving party must then “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). If the court finds that some genuine factual issue remains, the resolution of which could affect the outcome of the case, then the court must deny summary judgment. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of any and all reasonable inferences. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summaryjudgment may be appropriate, however, if the non-moving party's case rests merely upon “conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.” Forestier Fradera v. Municipality of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir.2006) (quoting Benoit v. Technical Mfg. Corp., 331 F.3d 166, 173 (1st Cir.2003)).

II. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff alleges she was discharged from her position as legislative advisor to the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico because she has a disability. ( See Docket No. 1 at 1.) On January 6, at the age of seventeen, Plaintiff suffered a stroke that paralyzed the left side of her body. ( See Docket No. 80–1 at ¶ 2.) As a result, Plaintiff needs a wheel chair and a motorized scooter for her daily activities. ( See Docket No. 80–1 at ¶ 2.) Plaintiff earned a Master's Degree in social work from the University of Puerto Rico, and obtained her social worker's license in August of 2000. ( See Docket No. 80–1 at ¶ 3.)

She began working at the Puerto Rico House of Representatives on April 9, 2001, for House Representative Oscar Ramos as an administrative aid. ( See Docket No. 80–1 at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's duties were to advise Representative Ramos on Handicapped Legislation, and maintain communication with all pertinent agencies dealing with handicapped individuals. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was provided with reasonable accommodation to perform her duties. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12.) The reasonable accommodation given to Plaintiff consisted of providing her with a first floor office with easy access, an assistant, and electronic key cards to access the different entrances of the capitol building. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 12.) She was given a flexible schedule because she needed to attend physical therapy. ( See Docket no. 77–2 at 3 L. 18–19.)

Plaintiff expressed at her deposition that in 2001, each accommodation she requested was granted to her. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 5 L. 12.) Between the years 2001–2004, before Plaintiff received a laptop, Plaintiff was able to perform her work by dictating to a coworker who would transcribe her work. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 6 L. 8–13.) In 2004, Plaintiff was provided with the laptop computer. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 8 L. 13–17.) Plaintiff claims this laptop had special features such as, a voice recognition program for word processing and large letters on the keyboard. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 8 L. 13–17, at 9 L. 7–9, 15–17.) While working as an advisor with Representative Oscar Ramos, plaintiff performed all her duties in a satisfactory manner. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff continued working as an Advisor to Representative Ramos up to December 2004. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 13.)

In the year 2005, Plaintiff was assigned to work at the Office of Advisors to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the Honorable Jose Aponte Hernandez. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff was a legislative advisor to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and worked in the advisor's office of the Speaker of the House. Her duties included drafting legislation, attending public hearings, representing the Speaker in community events, and coordinating events with the disabled community, among other duties. ( See Docket No. 80–1 ¶ 6–7.)

During this four, year term (2004–2008), Plaintiff was given reasonable accommodation. Initially, Plaintiff worked at the second floor of the annex of The House of Representatives, however because the elevator became damaged, Plaintiff was relocated to a first floor office belonging to Representative Yuyo Roman. Plaintiff was also provided with the same laptop that she had under Representative Oscar Ramos. According to Plaintiff's deposition, the laptop she had been using was quickly moved to the office of the advisors to the new President of the House Representatives where Plaintiff was relocated. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 10, L. 7–9, 13 and at 11 L. 8–9.) Plaintiff was later accommodated to the old State Electoral Commission building, which served as an annex to the House of Representatives. Plaintiff was also given flexible work hours in order to accommodate medical therapies for her medical condition. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 16.) Up until December 31, 2008, while working as a Legislative Advisor for the Advisors' Office of the House of Representatives, Plaintiff performed all her duties in a satisfactory manner. ( See Docket No. 1 at ¶ 17.)

Defendant Jenniffer Gonzalez took office as Speaker of the House of Representatives on January 12, 2009. On December 30, 2008, under Hon. Jose Aponte's administration, Plaintiff's appointment was extended effective until January 15, 2009. In December 2008, Plaintiff was not allowed to access the laptop that had been assigned to her as a reasonable accommodation. ( See Docket no. 77–2 p. 12, l. 18–21.) At the time, she was informed that the Office of Advisors to the Speaker would relocate to the third floor of the Capitol's main building. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 13, L. 3–5.)

By December 2008, most of the trust employees resigned, because all employees at the Office of the Speaker, and their advisors, are at-will employees. ( See Docket No. 68–2 at 25 L.2–4.) Some employees, like Plaintiff, did not resign and Defendant Jenniffer Gonzalez extended their appointments on a month-by-month basis until June 30, 2009. ( See Docket 68–2 at 25 L. 5–11.) Defendant Rivera–Perez became the Director of the Office of Advisors to The Speaker of the House upon the change in political administration, meaning, she became Plaintiff's supervisor. Also in January 2009, Defendant Velez–Garcia started working at the House of Representatives as its Administrator.

Plaintiff stated in her deposition that she verbally requested reasonable accommodation from Defendant Rivera–Perez at least twenty times. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 17, L. 5–9.) According to Plaintiff's deposition, Rivera–Perez instructed her to put the application for reasonable accommodation in writing. ( See Docket No. 77–2 at 19, L. 4–11.) Plaintiff claims she hand delivered a letter to defendant Rivera–Perez...