Torres v. Kennecott Copper Corp.

• Decision Date: 22 August 1966
• Docket Number: No. 7854,7854
• Citation: 1966 NMSC 160,76 N.M. 623,417 P.2d 435
• Parties: Cruz TORRES, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 435

417 P.2d 435

76 N.M. 623

Cruz TORRES, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 7854.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Aug. 22, 1966.

[76 NM 624] Sanchez & Thomson, Santa Fe, for appellant.

Shantz & Dickson, Silver City, for appellee.

OPINION

NOBLE, Justice.

Cruz Torres, Sr. (hereafter termed Torres), an employee of Kennecott Copper Corporation (hereafter termed Kennecott), has appealed from a judgment denying his claim for workmen's compensation benefits.

Torres argues that he submitted medical testimony establishing a causal connection as a medical probability between his disability and the accidental injury, and that consequently finding of fact no. 8, reading:

'8. That plaintiff has failed to prove by expert medical testimony as a medical probability that there is a causal connection between such present disability as he may have and the accident of April 19, 1963(,)'

and conclusions of law 2 and 3, reading:

'2. Defendant having denied that plaintiff's alleged injury is a natural and direct result of the accident, the burden of proving that causal connection as a medical probability by expert medical testimony was on the plaintiff.

'3. That plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of a compensable claim under the Act(,)'

are erroneous as a matter of law and require a reversal of the judgment. We cannot agree.

The argument springs from a misunderstanding of the requirement of § 59-10--13.3, N.M.S.A.1953, which imposes the burden upon the claimant to establish a causal connection between the disability and the accident as a medical probability by expert medical testimony, when, as in this case, the defendant has denied that the disability is a natural and direct result of the accident. See Yates v. Matthews, 71 N.M. 451, 379 P.2d 441. Torres is obviously mistaken in his belief that he has satisfied the burden imposed upon him by § 59--10--13.3(B), N.M.S.A.1953, by the mere production of one or more experts who so testify, there being other expert testimony expressing a contrary opinion. If the expert testimony is conflicting, it must be such as to convince the trial court of such causal connection as a medical probability. It is true that there was testimony of medical experts, that the disability they found resulted naturally and directly from the accident as a medical probability. The opinion of those experts was based partly, at least, upon the history given to them by the claimant. There was also testimony of a medical expert expressing a contrary opinion. The trial court was...