Torres v. Precision Indus., Inc.

Decision Date27 January 2020
Docket NumberCase No. 1:16-cv-01319-STA
Citation437 F.Supp.3d 623
Parties Ricardo TORRES, Plaintiff, v. PRECISION INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee

Bryce William Ashby, Donati Law Firm, LLP, Steven George Wilson, The Steve Wilson Firm, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiff.

James L. Holt, Jr., Jackson Shields Yeiser Holt Speakman & Lucas, Memphis, TN, Paula Rachelle Jackson, Jackson Shields Yeiser & Holt, Cordova, TN, for Defendant.

ORDER ON REMAND

S. THOMAS ANDERSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before this Court on remand from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. After a two-day bench trial on the matter, the Court granted Defendant's oral motion for judgment on partial findings ("Torres I ") and entered judgment in favor of Defendant on July 19, 2018. (ECF Nos. 72, 73.) This Court held that federal law and policy embodied in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") and articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB , 535 U.S. 137, 122 S.Ct. 1275, 152 L.Ed.2d 271 (2002), precluded the relief sought by the Plaintiff under Tennessee Workers' Compensation Laws and Tennessee case law for a retaliatory discharge claim. (ECF No. 72 at p. 6.)

Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court on August 13, 2018. (ECF No. 74.) The Sixth Circuit entertained briefing from the parties on the issue of preemption and issued an Order on September 6, 2019, vacating the Court's Judgment in Torres I. (ECF No. 80.) The Sixth Circuit held that the Court erred in holding that federal law preempted state law before first deciding whether Defendant had violated Tennessee law and remanded the matter. (Id. at p. 5.)

On remand, the district court should decide whether Precision violated Tennessee law. If the answer is no, then neither the district court nor our court will need to address the question presented by this appeal. If the answer is yes, however, then the district court will also have to determine the appropriate remedy. The court should decide what remedies are available under Tennessee law before resolving whether federal law preempts any of those remedies.

(Id. at 5–6.)

This Court requested that the parties file notice of whether they believed any additional briefing or argument would be required in light of the Sixth Circuit's ruling. (ECF No. 82.) The parties filed a Joint Statement alerting the Court that they would rely upon their Appellate Briefs regarding the issue of preemption and that otherwise no further briefing or argument would be necessary. (ECF No. 83.) Thus, as directed, the Court will consider the record and transcripts from the bench trial (ECF Nos. 65, 66) and the Parties' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (ECF Nos. 67, 68) to determine whether Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for claiming benefits under the Tennessee Workers' Compensation statute in violation of Tennessee law, the available remedies, and whether those remedies are precluded by federal law.

PARTIAL FINDINGS OF FACT IN TORRES I
1. Plaintiff was born in Mexico and arrived in the United States illegally in 1997.
2. Plaintiff currently resides in Charlotte, North Carolina, and has lived there since December 2012.
3. Defendant manufactures high-performance torque converters for automatic transmissions. Defendant is located in Whiteville, Tennessee, and is incorporated under the laws of Nevada.
4. Defendant has been in business since July 1994 and employs around 18 to 20 employees.
5. Plaintiff began employment with Defendant on or about January 5, 2011, and was employed by Defendant until September 7, 2012.
6. During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was not legally authorized to work in the United States.
7. At the beginning of his employment, Plaintiff provided Defendant with a Social Security Number that, unbeknownst to Defendant, Plaintiff had not received from a United States government agency but had instead purchased on the streets of North Carolina for $120.
8. Defendant recorded the Social Security Number provided by Plaintiff in its payroll system and included the number in its tax filings but never received any feedback from a government agency suggesting that there was a problem with the number.
9. During Plaintiff's employment, Terry Hedrick, who was and remains Defendant's President and owner, was unaware that Plaintiff was not legally authorized to work in the United States.
10. Indeed, Mr. Hedrick was unaware that any of his employees were not authorized to work in the United States prior to Plaintiff's termination.
11. Plaintiff claims that he told Defendant's Production Manager, Craig Momberger, that Plaintiff was not legally authorized to work in the United States during his interview with Mr. Momberger in December 2010.
12. Mr. Momberger, however, claims that he did not discuss Plaintiff's immigration status during Plaintiff's interview but was told by Jesus Ruiz, then a friend of Plaintiff and an employee of Defendant, that Plaintiff was "legal."
13. Mr. Momberger did not fill out any form regarding Plaintiff's immigration status, including an I-9 form.
14. Mr. Momberger is not aware if any employee of Defendant filled out such a form.
15. In the early part of 2012, Mr. Hedrick received a letter in the mail advising him of a new law in Tennessee that would require Tennessee employers to review and check the documentation of every employee to make sure that he or she was legally authorized to work in the United States beginning in 2013.
16. This was the first time that Mr. Hedrick had knowledge of these specific legal requirements involving an employee's authorization to work in the United States.
17. Mr. Hedrick conducted a meeting in or about March 2012 to advise all employees of this new law.
18. Mr. Hedrick told employees that, beginning in November 2012, Defendant would require every employee to show their documentation.
19. Plaintiff attended the meeting conducted by Mr. Hedrick about the new law.
20. On September 8, 2012, Defendant terminated Plaintiff.
21. Plaintiff testified that he was injured while working for Defendant and was seeking workers' compensation benefits from Defendant when he was terminated.
22. In April 2013, four other employees of Defendant were terminated when they did not return to work with completed I-9 forms.

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT

Retaliation Claim

23. Mr. Momberger was the Production Manager, and Cheri Norwood was the Office Administrator/Safety Manager responsible for tasks such as handling workers' compensation claims.
24. Ms. Norwood was given no training on Tennessee workers' compensation law prior to assuming responsibility for those claims.
25. Plaintiff started as a parts maker, later became a welder, and then became a converter builder.
26. Adriana Chavira trained Plaintiff.
27. On May 17, 2012, Plaintiff injured his back at work by attempting to hold on to a part.
28. When an employee is injured at work, Precision's policy is for Ms. Norwood to file a claim and provide the employee with a list of approved doctors.
29. On May 17, 2012, Plaintiff attempted to report his injury to Ms. Norwood but was unsuccessful, as she was on the phone.
30. On May 18, 2012, when Plaintiff reported his injury to Ms. Norwood, she asked him about his pain, and she filled out the proper paperwork.
31. Ms. Norwood scheduled Plaintiff an appointment at Whiteville Clinic for that day, and Plaintiff received a work excuse for the remainder of the week.
32. The Employee Manual in effect at the time of Plaintiff's injury, dated June 29, 2012, states in part, "Employees returning to work after being absent due to a work-related injury must report to the Human Resource Manager prior to beginning work and must bring a doctor's clearance for returning to work."
33. On May 29, 2012, Plaintiff returned to work without a release from his doctor.
34. Mr. Momberger and Ms. Norwood requested the release but never received it, but Plaintiff continued to work.
35. Plaintiff testified that, although he had returned to work, his back injury had not healed, and the pain worsened.
36. Plaintiff claims that he reported the pain to Ms. Norwood several times and requested another doctor's appointment.
37. Plaintiff never returned to the Whiteville Clinic.
38. Plaintiff scheduled his own appointment to go to a doctor in Memphis for his back in June or July of 2012. He attended on August 7, 2012, and received a bill.
39. The doctor in Memphis referred Plaintiff to a specialist for an MRI.
40. On August 24, 2012, Plaintiff recorded his conversation with Ms. Norwood regarding the medical bills generated by his doctor's appointment in Memphis and the results of his MRI. Ms. Norwood stated, "You didn't tell me you were hurt again," "You didn't notify me or Craig, so we have no way to verify that it actually happened here. I can't turn this into workers' comp," and "There won't be a workers' comp claim on this." Ms. Norwood indicated that the claim was closed without verification from the workers' compensation insurance company.
41. On September 6, 2012, Plaintiff met and retained Attorney John Fields to pursue a workers' compensation claim.
42. On September 7, 2012, at 10:00 a.m., Ms. Norwood received a call from Plaintiff's attorney requesting information regarding Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim.
43. Ms. Norwood told Plaintiff's attorney that Plaintiff's May 2012 workers' compensation claim was closed.
44. Ms. Norwood went to Mr. Momberger, and they decided to speak to Plaintiff about the call. The "heated" exchange occurred at approximately 10:30 a.m. Plaintiff surreptitiously recorded the conversation. Ms. Norwood repeatedly stated that Torres did not tell her that he was hurt again and threatened to "knock the hell out of" Plaintiff. Mr. Momberger said, Now that you got a fucking lawyer involved. Good luck on that son of a bitch ... I don't even get why the fucking lawyer's involved. Why? You trying
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