Torres v. Stewart

• Decision Date: 27 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3:00 CV 595 SRU WIG.,3:00 CV 595 SRU WIG.
• Citation: 263 F.Supp.2d 463
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Robert TORRES v. E. STEWART, et al.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>

Page 463

263 F.Supp.2d 463

Robert TORRES v. E. STEWART, et al.¹

No. 3:00 CV 595 SRU WIG.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

May 27, 2003.

Robert Torres, Suffield, CT, pro se.

Matthew B. Beizer, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, CT, for defendants.

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNDERHILL, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Robert Torres ("Torres"), currently incarcerated at the Northern Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut filed this civil rights action pro se and in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. He alleges that, as a pretrial detainee, he was designated a Security Risk Group Safety Threat Member without receiving a hearing and confined in segregation from June 6, 1994, through April 22, 1997, in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. Torres seeks damages as well as the restoration of forfeited good time credits. Pending are cross motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Torres' motion is denied and the defendants' motion is granted.

I. Standard of Review

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); White v. ABCO Engineering Corp., 221 F.3d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 2000). A court should grant summary judgment `"if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact ...."' Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist, 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

To defeat a motion for summary judgment that is supported by documentary evidence and sworn affidavits, a plaintiff "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). He "must come forward with enough evidence to support a jury verdict in [his] favor, and the motion will not be defeated merely ... on the basis of conjecture or surmise." Trayis Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 188 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 523. Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 849, 112 S.Ct. 152, 116 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991). See also Suburban Propane v. Proctor Gas, Inc., 953 F.2d 780, 788 (2d Cir. 1992).

Where one party is proceeding pro se, the court reads the pro se party's papers liberally and interprets them to raise the strongest arguments suggested therein. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.1994). Despite this liberal interpretation, however, a "bald assertion," unsupported by evidence, cannot overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Carey v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d Cir.1991).

II. Facts²

In June 1994, Torres was incarcerated at the Hartford Correctional Center as a pretrial detainee. Correctional officials learned that Torres was a high-ranking member of the Latin Kings. Torres had been charged with the murder of a rival gang member. On June 9, 1994, the Department of Correction held a hearing to determine whether Torres should be designated a Security Risk Group Safety Threat Member ("SRGSTM"). Torres received notice of the hearing on June 7, 1994, and declined the assistance of an advocate. During the course of the hearing process, Torres stated that he intended to remain affiliated with the Latin Kings throughout his period of incarceration.

As a result of the hearing, Torres was designated SRGSTM and placed in the Department of Correction's Close Custody Program. This designation was reviewed by correctional security staff in July 1995, February 1996, September 1996, March 1997, and April 1997. Torres' progress through the Close Custody Program was impeded by his receipt of several disciplinary reports. In April 1997, however, Torres completed the Close Custody Program and was transferred to general population.

Torres commenced this action by complaint received by the court on March 29, 2000. He challenges the June 1994 SRGSTM designation and the June 1994 through April 1997 confinement in the Close Custody Program. Torres seeks damages and the restoration of lost good time credits.

III. Discussion

Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. These motions are considered below.

A. Torres' Motion for Summary Judgment

In his motion for summary judgment, Torres restates the allegations in the complaint and argues that summary judgment should enter in his favor because the court denied defendants' motions to dismiss. The defendants oppose the motion on the ground that denial of a motion to dismiss is not a basis for granting summary judgment in Torres' favor.

To prevail on his motion, Torres must demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Miner v. Glens Falls, 999 F.2d at 661. Torres has presented no evidence to support his claims other than his own declaration which repeats the allegations in the complaint. In opposition, the defendants have moved for summary judgment and supplied evidence showing the basis for the SRGSTM designation and demonstrating that the defendants complied with the procedures set forth in the administrative directives.

In addition, although the court denied defendants' previous motions to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings, it has yet to review the merits of Torres' claims. Thus, Torres' assumption that the denial of these motions demonstrates his entitlement to summary judgment is without merit.

Torres has presented no evidence to support his claim that his SRGSTM classification was intended as punishment and, therefore, unconstitutional. Thus, the court cannot conclude that Torres is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Torres' motion for summary judgment is denied.

B. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendants assert six grounds in support of their motion for summary judgment: (1) Torres cannot state a viable claim based upon his classification as SRGSTM; (2) Torres cannot state a viable claim for the restoration of good time credits; (3) this action is barred by the prior pending action doctrine; (4) this action is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (5) the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; and (6) Torres received due process when the classification decision was made.

1. Restoration of Good Time Credit

The court first considers Torres request for the restoration of good time credit that was lost and that he could have earned but for his confinement in the Close Custody Program.

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court determined that where a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily implicate the validity of the plaintiffs conviction or the length of his sentence, a cause of action under section 1983 is not cognizable unless the plaintiff can show that his underlying "conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364. The Court has extended this holding to a challenge to the disciplinary hearing process afforded an inmate where a judgment in favor of the inmate would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, namely, the revocation of earned good time credit. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644-48, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997). Other courts have applied the holding of Heck to "`proceedings which call into question the fact or duration of parole.'" Glenn v. Armstrong, No. 3:93cv807(AHN), 1998 WL 241199, at *3 (D.Conn.1998) (quoting Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 851, 116 S.Ct. 148, 133 L.Ed.2d 93 (1995)).

Torres seeks the restoration of earned good time credits. A judgment in his favor would implicate the length of his sentence. Thus, these claims are not cognizable until the determination revoking the good time credits has been invalidated in the state courts.

In addressing these claims, the defendants argue that the claims are not cognizable because Torres filed a state habeas action on this issue and provide a copy of the decision of the state court denying the petition. After reviewing the state court decision, the court concludes that the defendants' arguments are without merit.

Torres' state petition concerned a SRGSTM designation made after a 1998 incident involving an assault on a member of a rival gang.³ Following the guilty finding on the disciplinary charge, Torres was designated SRGSTM for a second time. The state court indicates that following his completion of the Close Custody Program in 1997, Torres...