Torres v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 25 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | Docket 97-2061. |
| Citation | 140 F.3d 392 |
| Parties | Marie Haydee Beltran TORRES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Michael A. Simons, Asst. U.S. Atty, New York, NY (Mary Jo White, U.S. Atty for S.D. of New York, Craig A. Stewart, Asst. U.S. Attorney, New York, NY, on brief), for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: NEWMAN, ALTIMARI and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
Like the Phoenix, this case rises from the smoldering ashes of a young woman's discarded political beliefs. Almost two decades ago, petitioner-appellant Marie Haydee Beltran Torres ("Torres"),1 a member of the Fuerzas Armada de Liberacion Nacional ("FALN"),2 believing that the United States was Puerto Rico's enemy, took the position that United States' courts had no jurisdiction over those who supported Puerto Rican independence.
Torres was indicted for the 1977 bombing of the Mobil Oil Building in Manhattan, for which the FALN claimed responsibility, and which resulted in the death of one man and injury to several others. At her trial, Torres refused the appointment of counsel, demanded to represent herself and then informed the district court that she would neither present a defense nor participate in the proceedings. Firm in her political stance, Torres declined every opportunity during a three-day trial to change her mind. After a guilty verdict was announced, the district court decided to submit the question of punishment to the jury and conducted a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether Torres should be sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 34. Torres refused to participate in the sentencing hearing and presented no mitigating evidence. Convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, Torres did not pursue the court-initiated appeal on her behalf.
Fifteen years later, Torres claimed she was denied her constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments. She now appeals from an order entered on November 27, 1996 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Knapp, J.), denying her petition to vacate her sentence and conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
The unusual sequence of events surrounding this case necessitates a review of the rights granted and the burdens imposed by our Constitution. Today we consider: (1) whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived her Sixth Amendment right to counsel when she refused to raise a defense or participate in the proceedings and when she subsequently learned that the jury would determine her sentence; (2) whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated by the absence of mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing; and (3) whether a defendant's sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to a statute that failed to identify mitigating factors constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Having considered each of these questions, we find no basis to undo Torres' trial, and, accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of her petition to vacate her sentence and conviction.
In September 1977, a grand jury indicted Torres, charging her with destruction of property in interstate commerce by means of an explosive, which resulted in the death of a Mobil employee, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Torres remained a fugitive until her arrest on April 4, 1980.
At her arraignment on April 16, 1980, Torres was accompanied by two attorneys, Elizabeth M. Fink, Esq., and Mara Siegal, Esq.3 Torres described herself as a Puerto Rican freedom fighter and refused to recognize the authority of the court. Declaring herself to be a "prisoner of war," she demanded that her case be tried before an international court. Torres unequivocally stated her position:
Torres: I'm here representing myself and I don't need attorneys. I don't need Court-appointed attorneys. I don't need to hire any attorneys. I can very well represent myself in this so-called court, which I consider an illegal court, illegal proceeding.
. . . . .
Now, I will be speaking in this court on my behalf. I have absolutely nothing, nothing to defend myself against because I have committed no crimes.
My legal advisers, and that is what they are, they are advisers, and when I choose to speak to them, that is when I want their advice.
The Court: You mean Ms. Fink and Ms. Siegal?
Torres: I do not want any appointed lawyers. I do not want anyone defending me. I don't have anything to defend myself against.
I will repeat myself. I will not continue to participate. I refuse to participate in anything....
The district court advised Torres of her constitutional right to appointed counsel, the risks associated with self-representation and the benefits of securing legal representation. Torres confirmed that she had discussed her constitutional rights and her decision to waive counsel with her advisers:
Torres: I will repeat myself.
I don't need lawyers. I don't need Court-appointed lawyers. I don't need to hire lawyers. I have nothing, nothing to defend myself against. I'm not going to participate in your so-called trial or, you know, circus, charade, whatever you want to call it.
The Court: Of course, it is your right to do whatever you wish in that respect.
Torres: That is what I have chosen to do.
The Court: You have discussed with your advisers the risks involved in that decision?
Torres: Yes, I have.
Because Torres refused to enter a plea, the district court entered a plea of not guilty on her behalf and denied her request to be treated as a "prisoner of war," ruling that the trial would go forward.
On May 5, 1980, the district court again advised Torres of the consequences of her decision to waive her right to counsel. In particular, the district court informed Torres that, even though she did not intend to recognize the court's jurisdiction, "as a practical matter," her interest in avoiding a conviction would be better served if counsel were protecting her interests during jury selection, during the testimony of witnesses and admission of evidence, and during the government's opening and closing statements.
In light of Torres' unwillingness to participate in the proceedings, the government requested that the district court appoint counsel for Torres. The district court refused:
The Court: ... [Torres] is an intelligent woman, based on what happened last time, and if she wants counsel she knows she can have counsel. I explained that to her last time. If she wants counsel, counsel will be appointed. She has no obligation to say anything to me, and I will not require her to say anything, but Miss Fink ... [i]t seems to me you told me that last time, that you had advised ... Torres of what her rights were.
Ms. Fink: Yes, your honor.
The Court: And you intend to continue doing that?
Ms. Fink: Yes, your honor.
When asked if she would like to make a statement, Torres restated her belief that she was a "prisoner of war" and refused to recognize the court's authority.
On May 19, 1980, prior to jury selection, the court expressed its concerns regarding the statute under which Torres would be sentenced should there be a guilty verdict. At the time, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) carried a maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. If death resulted from the offense, however, the defendant could be sentenced to imprisonment for "any term of years," life imprisonment or the death penalty as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 34 ("Section 34"). Under Section 34, the jury had discretion to impose life imprisonment or the death penalty.4
The government requested that the district court impose sentence, up to a maximum of life. The court questioned its authority to impose a life sentence under Section 34 and expressed concerns on a jury-imposed life sentence without considering mitigating factors.5 The court considered whether Torres could have knowingly and intelligently waived her right to counsel if she was unaware of who would determine her sentence. The government disagreed with the court's reading of the statute, and the resolution of these issues was deferred.
When Torres entered the courtroom on May 19, 1980, she spoke Spanish to her supporters in the gallery, causing a considerable commotion. Despite the court's warning that continued disruption would require her removal from the courtroom, Torres continued to agitate the crowd in Spanish. She was temporarily removed from the court-room until order was restored.
Although stating that he did not represent Torres in these proceedings, Michael Deutsch, Esq., one of Torres' advisers, informed the district court that he applied to the United Nations on Torres' behalf for prisoner of war status. The district court denied Deutsch's request to stay proceedings until the United Nations responded.
During the course of the district court's colloquy with Deutsch, Torres insisted on leaving the courtroom. The court ordered the marshals not to restrain Torres and informed her that she would be permitted to leave the courtroom and return whenever she wished. Torres left the courtroom followed shortly thereafter by Deutsch, and jury selection began.
The district court informed the venire pool that Torres did not wish to participate but would be able to hear the proceedings through an audio connection in an adjoining room. Prospective members of the jury were apprised that their sole function was to determine guilt or innocence, and that the judge would determine punishment. At all times, Torres and her advisers heard the discussions and proceedings, but did not participate. In addition, Torres received a...
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