Torres v. Waterbury, (SC 16051)

• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KATZ J.
• Citation: Torres v. Waterbury, 733 A.2d 817, 249 Conn. 110 (Conn. 1999)
• Decision Date: 01 June 1999
• Docket Number: (SC 16051)
• Parties: BETHSAIDA TORRES ET AL. v. CITY OF WATERBURY ET AL.

249 Conn. 110

733 A.2d 817

BETHSAIDA TORRES ET AL. v. CITY OF WATERBURY ET AL.

(SC 16051)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 16, 1999.

Officially released June 1, 1999.

Callahan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Peters, Js. Raymond J. Antonacci, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Charles E. Oman III, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellees (defendants).

Opinion

KATZ J.

The principal issue in this tax appeal is whether, under the circumstances of this case, the defendant tax assessor (defendant assessor) of the named defendant, the city of Waterbury (city),¹ failed, when he assessed the condominium units at issue in this appeal, to comply with General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 12-64,² which requires that all nonexempt property be taxed at a uniform rate. We conclude that the trial court properly found that the defendant assessor had complied with the statute.

The following facts and procedural history are pertinent to this appeal. Relying upon the work of a certified revaluation company,³ the city implemented its last general revaluation of property, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 12-62,⁴ on October 1, 1980. In 1987, the condominium units in a complex called Lakewood Village were first entered onto the city's grand lists. Claiming to be aggrieved by the actions of the defendant assessor, the plaintiffs—twenty-seven owners of nineteen units in Lakewood Village—challenged the assessments of their units (Lakewood units) that appeared on the grand list of 1994. On February 28, 1995, the plaintiffs appeared before the defendant Waterbury board of tax review (board) and, on March 9, 1995, the board dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. Thereafter, pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1995) § 12-117a,⁵ the plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court. The complaint was amended to include the assessments on the grand lists of 1995, 1996 and 1997, in addition to the 1994 assessment that had been the basis of the plaintiffs' original challenge.

The complaint alleged that the values placed upon the Lakewood units were "grossly excessive, disproportionate and unlawful" and were not a percentage of the units' true and actual values as of the dates of the respective grand lists in violation of § 12-64. The complaint also alleged that the defendant assessor had "failed to establish a uniform percentage of fair value for uniform application to all property within the town, in violation of [§] 12-64" and that the defendant assessor had "applied a nonuniform percentage of 70 [percent]." The defendants denied the material allegations in the complaint.

On November 5, 1997, the case was tried in the Superior Court, with the plaintiffs seeking a reduction in their assessments from the assessed values of $22,950 for a one floor unit or "flat," $24,030 for an end flat and $25,920 for a townhouse, to $8300, $10,500 and $11,040, respectively.⁶ A total of three witnesses were called by the parties. They were: (1) Walter Kloss, a licensed real estate appraiser, called by the plaintiffs; (2) Robert Ghent, an attorney, called by the defendants; and (3) Michael Moriarty, a former assessor for the city, also called by the defendants. The relevant portions of their testimonies will be summarized later in this opinion. Additionally, various documents were admitted into evidence, including a statement of facts stipulated to by the parties.⁷

On May 8, 1998, the trial court dismissed the appeal. In essence, the trial court was not persuaded by statistical evidence presented by the plaintiffs or by the plaintiffs' appraiser's interpretation of that evidence offered to prove that the defendant assessor had failed to follow statutory requirements in valuing the plaintiffs' property. Additionally, the court found the plaintiffs' method of valuing the Lakewood units to be unsuitable in the present case. The trial court concluded further that the defendant appraiser was not bound by the values agreed to in the Superior Court case of Ghent v. Board of Tax Review, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. C92-109836S (September 8, 1995) (1995 stipulated judgment). In that case, the parties had stipulated to the values of certain condominium units in a complex known as Woodhaven Condominiums (Woodhaven), which the parties to the present appeal had stipulated were the only units that could be used appropriately as "comparables" for valuing the Lakewood units. Finally, the court noted that the valuation method employed by the defendant assessor, the "comparable sales approach," was a proper valuation method. Based on the foregoing, the trial court concluded that the valuations of the Lakewood units determined by the defendant assessor were not excessive. Consequently, the court rendered judgment for the defendants. We will provide additional facts and discussion of the trial court's opinion as needed.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment and, pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c), we transferred the appeal to this court. On appeal, the plaintiffs make the following three claims. First, they claim that the trial court improperly found that the defendant assessor had complied with the requirements of § 12-64. Second, they argue that the trial court improperly found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving that their property had been overvalued and, consequently, improperly dismissed their appeal. Third, they claim that the trial court improperly disregarded the 1995 stipulated judgment that had been offered by the plaintiffs to establish the values of the Woodhaven units used by the parties as comparables for the purpose of valuing the Lakewood units.⁸ We are not persuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments and, therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I

Before considering the merits of the parties' arguments, we set forth the basic legal principles and standard of review applicable to this appeal. Recently, in Ireland v. Wethersfield, 242 Conn. 550, 698 A.2d 888 (1997), we reiterated the legal tenets governing tax appeals brought pursuant to § 12-117a, stating: "[T]he trial court tries the matter de novo and the ultimate question is the ascertainment of the true and actual value of the [taxpayer's] property.... At the de novo proceeding, the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that the assessor has overassessed its property.... The trier of fact must arrive at his own conclusions as to the value of [the taxpayer's property] by weighing the opinion of the appraisers, the claims of the parties in light of all the circumstances in evidence bearing on value, and his own general knowledge of the elements going to establish value."⁹ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 556-57, quoting Xerox Corp. v. Board of Tax Review, 240 Conn. 192, 204, 690 A.2d 389 (1997). "If the trial court finds that the taxpayer has failed to meet his burden because, for example, the court finds unpersuasive the method of valuation espoused by the taxpayer's appraiser, the trial court may render judgment for the town on that basis alone." Ireland v. Wethersfield, supra, 557-58. "A taxpayer ... who fails to carry [the burden of establishing overvaluation] has no right to complain if the trial court accords controlling weight to the assessor's valuation of his property." Id., 559.

An appellate court's review of a trial court decision is circumscribed by the appropriate standard of review. As we have often stated: "The scope of our appellate review depends upon the proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) SLI International Corp. v. Crystal, 236 Conn. 156, 163, 671 A.2d 813 (1996).

With these basic principles in mind, we consider each of the claims on appeal.

II

The plaintiffs first claim that the defendant assessor failed to comply with the requirements of § 12-64 when he assessed the Lakewood units for their first appearance on the city's grand list in 1987. According to the plaintiffs, this rendered improper the 1994 through 1997 assessments, which are at issue in this appeal and which are based on the original assessment. We disagree.

Before considering this claim, we note the statutes pertinent to this issue. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 12-62a (b) provides in relevant part that "[e]ach ... municipality shall ... assess all property for purposes of the local property tax at a uniform rate of seventy per cent of present true and actual value...." General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 12-64 (a) provides in part that all nonexempt real estate "shall be liable to taxation at a uniform percentage of its present true and actual valuation, not exceeding one hundred per cent of such valuation, to be determined by the assessors...." Section 12-64 "then sets forth a three step procedure for carrying out the statute's mandate: `(a) The fair value of property as of the assessment date must be determined, (b) A percent, not exceeding 100 percent, of the fair value, must be determined by the assessing authority for uniform application to all property within the town, (c) The assessment value, i.e., the value for the purpose of taxation, for any given piece of property in the town, must be ascertained by applying the determined uniform percent to its fair value as of the assessment date.'" Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review, 203 Conn. 425, 434, 525 A.2d 91 (1987), quoting Lerner Shops of Connecticut, Inc. v. Waterbury, 151 Conn. 79, 85, 193 A.2d 472 (1963).

A

The facts surrounding the assessment of the Lakewood units, as well as...