Torrey v. Congress Square Hotel Co.

• Decision Date: 22 July 1950
• Citation: 145 Me. 234,75 A.2d 451
• Parties: TORREY v. CONGRESS SQUARE HOTEL CO.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 451

75 A.2d 451

145 Me. 234

TORREY v. CONGRESS SQUARE HOTEL CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 22, 1950.

Robert A. Wilson, I. Edward Cohen, Portland, for plaintiff.

Robinson, Richardson & Leddy and John D. Leddy, all of Portland, for defendant.

Before MURCHIE, C. J., and THAXTER, FELLOWS, MERRILL, NULTY, and WILLIAMSON, JJ.

FELLOWS, Justice.

This is an action for alleged negligence tried in the Superior Court for Cumberland County. At the close of the evidence a verdict was directed for the defendant. The case is before the Law Court on plaintiff's exceptions to the granting of the motion for directed verdict, and exceptions to the exclusion of certain testimony offered by the plaintiff.

The defendant company owns the Eastland Hotel in the city of Portland. In the basement of the Eastland Hotel, or on the floor below the street level, there is a cocktail lounge operated by the defendant and known as the 'Coral Room.' The walls of the room are painted a coral shade with the woodwork painted white. It is a room approximately forty-seven feet long. The floor of the Coral Room is on two levels, one level being twelve inches higher than the other. The 'sunken floor' portion of the Coral Room, or the 'Pit,' is approximately 28 feet long by 21 feet wide, and is located about 18 feet from the entrance to the Coral Room. In other words, one must walk 18 feet on the higher level from the entrance to reach the steps to the 'Pit' or 'sunken floor' on the lower level. From the upper to the lower level 'the first riser is eight inches to a twelve inch tread, then four inches to the lower floor level.' On the day of the accident the entire floor including the steps was covered with dark green carpeting which had in it a lighter colored floral design. The right-hand wall of the lower level is mirrored and draped to represent windows, although all lighting in this basement cocktail lounge is artificial.

On the lower level there are tables and chairs to the right and left with an aisle between. There are also tables on the upper level. As one enters the room the steps down to the lower level are marked by a short white iron 'fence' on the right and left side, each of these 'fences' being 43 inches long and 3 1/2 feet high. Immediately in front of these 'fences' is a table with two chairs. There is also a column two feet square from floor to ceiling at the outer ends of the 'fences.'

The upper, or entrance level of this room is lighted by wall lights, the lower level by four chandeliers hanging from the ceiling. There are also small portable lamps for some, if not all, tables. The light in the room is made dim through the use of electric bulbs of small candle power and colored shades. The bar is on the left-hand wall of the room, and on the upper level.

On January 28, 1946 a little after 12:30 P.M. the plaintiff Mary H. Torrey, 69 years of age and a resident of Portland, went with a friend into the Eastland Hotel for lunch. As she entered the hotel, on the street level, she saw a sign indicating the Coral Room to the right and downstairs. They decided to visit the room, as they had never seen it, and they desired to have a cocktail before lunch. The plaintiff, with her friend went down the stairs and turned left at the bottom. She says she then 'saw a large door open; and I looked in and stepped in. It was very dimly lighted and I walked into it a ways and I saw the waiter coming this way (indicating) and I walked towards him.' She knew him to be a waiter because she saw his white coat. She continued to walk towards the waiter. 'Then before he got to me, I caught my right foot, went down a step and turned over and rested on my ankle.' Later she testified 'It was so dimly lighted I couldn't see much * * *. I walked towards the waiter.' She says she could see no steps down, as there were no lights there and nothing to indicate or to call attention to where the steps were. The waiter coming from the bar was on the same floor level as plaintiff. 'He was going to seat us at a table.' There was no hand rail. There was not sufficient lighting and no warning of any kind. She could see no posts in the room. She saw no iron fence upon the right and left side. She could not see the waiter's features but identified him as a waiter by the white coat. 'I fell down. One foot went down on the first step, right on my ankle, and then there was another step and I fell forward.' Her injuries were serious.

On cross-examination the plaintiff said 'the place was so dimly lighted you couldn't tell the color of anything,' and on redirect she stated that while she was lying on her back after her fall 'the room became much lighter than when I came in,' which, if true, might indicate that additional lights were then turned on.

One of the witnesses for the plaintiff testified that at the time the plaintiff entered, the light in the room 'was very dim,' and that 'the lights in the Pit were not on.' After the plaintiff's fall the lights were turned on. This witness further stated that he saw a waiter start diagonally from the center of the bar towards the plaintiff when she came into the room. The light was so dim that the witness could not see more 'than the white of her face' as plaintiff came towards the steps leading to the lower level. The witnesses for the defendant contradicted the witnesses for the plaintiff by insisting that 'all the lights were on,' and that the room was well lighted although 'dim.'

First Exception

The counsel for the plaintiff asked in direct examination of an orthopedic surgeon, several questions relative to the power of the eye to accommodate itself to different degrees of light and darkness, and the variations in different individuals. The surgeon had stated that he did not know 'too much about the eye.' These questions were objected to and excluded. The allegations in the declaration were to the effect that the defendant created and maintained a defective and dangerous trap, particularly 'because plaintiff came into the hotel from the brightness of snow covered ground.' The admission or exclusion of these questions from this doctor was discretionary on the part of the presiding justice. We cannot see that there was any abuse of discretion here, because of lack of proper foundation and qualification, and because of the fact that it is common knowledge to every juror that eyes vary with individuals, and all normal eyes adjust themselves somewhat to different degrees of light. In any event, the exclusion was harmless and no exception lies unless prejudicial. McCully v. Bessey, 142 Me. 209, 49 A.2d 230.

Second Exception

The plaintiff offered evidence tending to show that employees of the defendant had previously reduced the amount of light in the Coral Room, and to show the extent of reduction, a witness employed on January 1, 1946 was asked 'were you able to read your checks in the pit?' This was objected to and excluded. Counsel for plaintiff insists that what this employee could do in relation to reading a newspaper or check was material and important. The admission of this evidence was also discretionary and we do not see abuse of discretion. Even if it were proved that light conditions were the same on January 1 as on January 28 there are so many factors involved that evidence in the nature of experiments might not assist the jury. There must be similarity of all conditions. Baker v. Harrington, 196 Mass. 339, 82 N.E. 33; Eastport Water Co. v. E. A. Holmes Packing Co., 121 Me. 345, 117 A. 311; 20 American Jurisprudence 'Evidence', 627, Sections 755, 756.

Third Exception

This third exception is similar to the second. The same former employee was asked in substance from his observations after the light was subdued, as one goes into the Coral Room, 'what is the appearance?' This was excluded. It was discretionary and the discretion was not abused. 'Appearance' embraces too many facts, circumstances, and conditions. How the room 'appeared' to this witness might not be the same as it appeared to some other person, and perhaps at some other time and under other conditions.

Fourth Exception

This exception was to the exclusion of a question, asked by counsel for the plaintiff, of a witness who stated that he had entered the Coral Room for the first time in the preceding November. 'Whether or not in November when you went to get that wine at the Coral Room, whether or not you fell into the pit?' This was objected to by the counsel for defendant and excluded. Exception was taken. Counsel for the plaintiff stated in his offer of proof that 'if we are allowed to pursue the question further, we will show that the reason for this fall was because he could not see the presence of the two steps leading from the upper level to the lower level in that room under the conditions of light then and there obtaining.' The presiding justice in excluding the questions stated that 'it is very dangerous to open the door to collateral issues of other accidents, each one of which may have had its separate causation and which might introduce a whole series of trials involving separate facts, separate questions of contributory negligence and separate conclusions. I do note a dictum of our Court in the Bath Iron Works case [Spence v. Bath Iron Work. Corp.] (140 Mr. 287, 37 A.2d 174). That case appears to have been limited to a situation where a number of workmen doing the same work contracted the disease * * *. I prefer to apply the language in the Portland Publishing Company case [Parker v. Portland Publishing Co.] (69 Me. 173, ) to my ruling here.' The presiding justice was correct.

Relevancy and materiality present some of the most difficult phases of the law of evidence. Relevancy is applicability to the issue which has been joined, in order to determine the truth or falsity of the matter in dispute. Legal relevancy generally requires a higher standard than mere logical relevancy. It includes the logical, but...