Torrez v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't
| Decision Date | 16 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-cv-02478-RMR-KLM |
| Parties | JOSEPH TORREZ, Plaintiff, v. EL PASO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE COUNTY OF EL PASO, GRACE EASTHAM, El Paso County Jail Technician, and DEPUTIES JOHN DOE 1-4, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) [#21][1] (the “Motion”). Plaintiff, who proceeds as a pro se litigant, [2] filed a Response [#23] in opposition to the Motion [#21], Defendants filed a Reply [#24]. The Motion [#21] has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1. See [#22]. The Court has reviewed the Motion the Response, the Reply, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises. For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#21] be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff was sentenced to two years in the El Paso County Jail, to run concurrently with all current and former time, in El Paso County case 15CR1210. Compl. [#4] ¶ 5. Plaintiff was in custody at the time of his sentencing, had already been in custody prior to sentencing, and remained in custody until his sentence in case 15CR1210 expired. Id. ¶ 6. There was no language in the sentencing order stating that Plaintiff was to begin serving the sentence in 15CR1210 after his release on his other concurrent sentences. Id. ¶ 7.
On April 14, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested and taken into custody by deputies of the El Paso County Sheriff's Department and transported to the El Paso County Jail. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff was advised that he was taken into custody in connection with El Paso County case 15CR1210 to serve the sentence in that case, but he alleges that he had already served that sentence in full. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. When he was arrested, he informed the Doe Defendants that the warrant was invalid and that they were falsely arresting him because the sentence for which he was being arrested had already been served. Id. ¶ 8. The Doe Defendants ignored his statements and arrested him anyway, taking him to the El Paso County Jail and placing him in the custody of the El Paso County Sheriff's Department. Id. ¶ 9.
After he was booked, he told several deputies and Defendant Grace Eastham (“Eastham”), an El Paso County Jail Technician, that he had been wrongfully arrested and had already served his sentence. Id. ¶ 10. He contacted Defendant Eastham several times, and she told him that she would not look into the issue and that he had to petition the courts himself. Id. ¶ 11. After repeated inquiries by Plaintiff and submission of the sentencing orders (via outside help) in 15CR1210 and another of Plaintiff's criminal cases, 2015CR3729, Defendant Eastham said that Plaintiff's sentence in 15CR1210 was supposed to run consecutively to his other cases. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff wrote several kite requests and several grievances regarding the issue but was denied and ignored. Id. ¶ 13. Eventually, with further outside help, Plaintiff was able to establish that he had been wrongfully confined. Id. ¶ 14. On May 11, 2020, he was released after having served twenty-four days after a paralegal helped him correspond with the Clerk of Court for El Paso County, since Defendant Eastham would not. Id. Robin Parker, a Clerk of Court for El Paso County, confirmed that the sentence was concurrent and had already been served. Id.
As a result of these events, Plaintiff brings five claims: (1) Claim One: “false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment and excessive confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment, ” as well as a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, [4] against Defendant Eastham and the Doe Defendants; (2) Claim Two: violation of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, ” against the El Paso Sheriff's Department; (3) Claim Three: “respondeat superior under Colorado state law and municipal liability under Monell, ” against the Board of County Commissioners of for the County of El Paso and the El Paso County Sheriff's Department; (4) Claim Four: “infliction of emotional distress, ” asserted against Defendant Eastham and the Doe Defendants, and (5) Claim Five: “negligence: negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, ” against the Board of County Commissioners for the County of El Paso and the El Paso County Sheriff's Department. Id. ¶¶ 15-111. Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory/injunctive relief. Id. at 15. In the present Motion [#21], Defendants (except for the Doe Defendants, who are not parties to the Motion [#21]) seek dismissal of all claims asserted against them.
Rule 12(b)(1) concerns whether the Court has jurisdiction to properly hear the case before it. Because “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, ” the Court must have a statutory basis to exercise its jurisdiction. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Statutes conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on federal courts are to be strictly construed. F & S Const. Co. v. Jensen, 337 F.2d 160, 161 (10th Cir. 1964). “The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may take two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a facial attack on a complaint, the Court accepts the allegations of the complaint as true. Id. By contrast, with a factual attack, the moving party challenges the facts upon which subject-matter jurisdiction depends. Id. at 1003. When reviewing a factual attack on a complaint, the Court “may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations.” Id. at 1003. The Court therefore must make its own findings of fact. Id. In order to make its findings regarding disputed jurisdictional facts, the Court “has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing.” Id. (citing Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990); Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test “the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true.” Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) (). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Moreover, Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “the mere metaphysical possibility that [the] plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that [the] plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). However, “[t]he court's function on a 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
The Court has been unable to find a case with similar allegations, where a convicted prisoner served his time, was released, and then was taken back into custody under the mistaken belief that he had been released early in error. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with Defendants that this case appears to fall into the “overdetention” category of cases, where a convicted prisoner's sentence (or the holding of a pretrial detainee) is alleged to be prolonged past a date when the person was legally supposed to be released. In short, “overdetention” generally means that “the plaintiff has been imprisoned by the defendant for longer than legally authorized, whether because the plaintiff's incarcerative sentence has expired or otherwise.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1192 (...
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