Torry v. City of Chi.
| Decision Date | 20 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-8383 |
| Parties | MARCUS D. TORRY, LATRELL Q. GOSS, and WILLIAM I. ROBERTS, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case arises from a 2014 traffic stop that Plaintiffs claim violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs Marcus Torry, Latrell Goss, and William Roberts sued Defendant Officers and the City of Chicago in September 2015, [1], alleging the following claims: (I) Illegal Stop, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (II) False Arrest/Illegal Detention, under § 1983; (III) Assault; (IV) Battery; (V) Illegal Search and Seizure, under § 1983; (VI) Failure to Intervene, under § 1983; (VII) Conspiracy to Interfere with Plaintiffs' Civil Rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (VII) Conspiracy to Deprive Plaintiffs of Civil Rights, under § 1983, [23].
The parties cross-filed for summary judgment. [63, 66]. For the reasons explained below, this Court denies Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, [66], and partially grants and partially denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment, [63].
On September 23, 2014, Officers Jacek Leja and Justin Raether and Sergeant Robert King (Defendant Officers) stopped Plaintiffs' car on the 2900 block of West Polk Street in Chicago. PSOF ¶¶15-18, 21; DSOF ¶ 10.1 The parties dispute many of the circumstances surrounding the stop and this Court notes those disagreements in its discussion of the incident.
The parties' disputes extend to almost the entirety of each other's statements of fact. See generally R. DSOF; R. PSOF. This Court has broad discretion to enforce the local rules governing summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2014). As such, simply denying a fact that has evidentiary support "does not transform it into a disputed issue of fact sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment," and this Court disregards any insufficient denials. Roberts v. Advocate Health Care, 119 F. Supp. 3d 852, 854 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Malec v. Sanford, 191 F.R.D. 581, 584 (N.D. Ill. 2000). Likewise, "purely argumentative denials," legal conclusions, and unsupported general denials do not belong in Local Rule 56.1 statements, and this Court disregards them as well. See, e.g., R. DSOF ¶ 14; see also Phillips v. Quality Terminal Servs., LLC, 855 F. Supp. 2d 764, 771 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Malec, 191 F.R.D.at 584; Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 2000) (). Finally, this Court finds no merit in either parties' claims that their opponents' statements of fact are irrelevant, see e.g., R. DSOF ¶ 11, R. PSOF ¶ 30, because the facts bear directly on the outcome of this case, see Fed. R. Evid. 401.
This Court further finds the videos of the stop recorded by Torry and Goss, as well as the statements within Torry's video, constitute admissible evidence for purposes of summary judgment. See [60-7]; [60-8]. Although Torry and Goss recorded the videos and submitted them as joint exhibits with Defendants, Plaintiffs now appear to challenge the video evidence on the grounds of authenticity and completeness. See, e.g., R. DSOF ¶ 20. But the parties already agreed to the tapes' authenticity in their statements of fact, and thus undermine any challenges to the admissibility of the videos at this stage. See R. PSOF ¶¶ 9, 10; Fed. R. Evid. 901(a); Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741-42 (7th Cir. 2001).
As to completeness, Plaintiffs contend that "there is no video of the entire incident, and no video of the incident before plaintiffs were pulled over by defendants." R. DSOF ¶ 20. Without citation to any relevant portions of the record, this insufficient factual denial, see Malec, 191 F.R.D. at 584, fails to show that any portion of the video has been withheld, or explain how in fairness some other evidence ought to be considered at the same time as the video evidence. Thus, this Court has nothing further to consider under Federal Rule of Evidence 106, and Plaintiffs fail to make a proper showing under the completeness doctrine orotherwise call the video's accuracy into question. See United States v. Cejas, 761 F.3d 717, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2014) ().
As to the statements audible on Torry's video, [60-7], Plaintiffs offer a general objection to all such statements as inadmissible hearsay, R. DSOF ¶ 20; [88] at 4. Where Defendants offer Plaintiffs' statements as evidence, and vice versa, those statements are admissible as statements of a party-opponent. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Where Defendants offer their own statements, those made in the context of King's heated discussions with Torry are admissible on multiple grounds, including as present sense impressions or excited utterances. See id. 803(1) and (2).
Finally, this Court finds that any remaining statements not covered by these provisions meet the requirements for admissibility under the completeness doctrine, or remain admissible for non-hearsay purposes. See id. 106; United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258-1259 (7th Cir. 1993). Torry's video is just over 13 minutes long; it depicts the entirety of the stop after King approached Plaintiffs' car. See generally [60-7]. Plaintiffs challenge the legality of the stop from start to finish. See generally [68]; [88]. Since determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop requires a context-dependent inquiry, in which courts assess the justification for, duration, and manner of the stop "in light of the surrounding circumstances," see Matz v. Klotka, 769 F.3d 517, 523-25 (7th Cir. 2014), this Court finds that admitting any additional statements in the video: (1) explains the previously admitted statements; (2) contextualizes them; (3) avoids misleading thetrier of fact; and (4) ensures "a fair and impartial understanding of all the evidence," see United States v. Doxy, 225 F. App'x 400, 402-03 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Velasco, 953 F.2d 1467, 1475 (7th Cir. 1992)).
This Court also rejects Plaintiffs' assertion that Defendants cannot create a genuine issue of material fact because they no longer independently recall the stop. See, e.g., [88] at 4. This argument ignores the documentary and video evidence related to the circumstances of the stop, as well as Defendants' deposition testimony about their general recollections of their tasks, duties, and knowledge at the time of the stop. See, e.g., [60-4]; [61-2]; [65-1]. Absent any meaningful and specific objection to the exhibits, this Court may properly consider such admissible evidence at summary judgment. See, e.g., Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2009).
Finally, this Court may take judicial notice of Defendants' Google Maps print-out, [65-1] at 13, which shows distances and locations of events relevant to the stop, see Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 177 n.3 (7th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 864 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). Absent any showing calling this exhibit's accuracy into question—which Plaintiffs do not offer, see, e.g., R. DSOF ¶ 14—this Court may properly consider such evidence at summary judgment, see Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).
On the day of the stop, Torry resided at 2442 West Polk Street. [60-1] at 4. While at home with Roberts, Torry received a call from Goss—Torry's brother—whose car had broken down near the intersection of West Polk and South California Avenue. Id. at 6; PSOF ¶ 14. Around noon, Roberts and Torry picked up Goss, with Torry driving his mother's gray Ford Fusion. PSOF ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiffs then drove west along West Polk to South Kedzie Avenue, where they turned south to take Goss to an auto parts store on West Roosevelt Road. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. After Goss bought the part he needed, Plaintiffs retraced their route to Goss' disabled car, ending up eastbound on West Polk toward South California. See id. ¶¶ 14, 18; [60-1] at 6-7.
Manley High School is located at 2935 West Polk, in the stretch between South California and South Kedzie. See DSOF ¶ 14; [65-1] at 13. Plaintiffs' car therefore approached Manley for at least the second time that day as they drove to Goss' car, around 12:48 p.m. See PSOF ¶ 18; DSOF ¶¶ 16, 17. It was at this point that they were stopped, on the same block as the school. See PSOF ¶¶ 18-22; DSOF ¶¶ 10, 20.
On the day of the stop, King was working as a "school sergeant," meaning that he responded to and investigated violence near schools within his beat, including by patrolling the area around the schools. DSOF ¶¶ 18-19; [60-4] at 7-8. Around the time of the stop, King stood outside the school and saw Plaintiffs' car pass in front of Manley on West Polk for at least the second time "within a short timeframe." DSOF ¶ 20. King claims that he initiated the stop alone at approximately 1:00 p.m. Id.; PSOF ¶ 22. Plaintiffs' versions of events differ, compare [60-1] at 11 with [60-2] at 8 and [60-3] at 5, but Goss claims that at leastone other officer participated in the initial stop, [60-2] at 8, and Roberts describes all three Defendant Officers as standing on the sidewalk together before jumping in their cars to jointly effect the stop, [60-3] at 12. Goss' cell phone video shows a marked police car pulling up to Plaintiffs' car after King had already approached Torry's window to ask for identification, but the angle does not capture any officers getting in or out of the vehicle. See generally [60-8].
According to King, he stopped Plaintiffs' car because he had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs might engage in violence related to either an earlier shooting nearby or ongoing violence in the area, some of which was gang-related....
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