Toter v. Knight

• Decision Date: 06 June 1980
• Citation: 278 Pa.Super. 547,420 A.2d 676
• Parties: Michael TOTER, Appellant, v. Sara E. KNIGHT.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

420 A.2d 676

278 Pa.Super. 547

Michael TOTER, Appellant, v. Sara E. KNIGHT.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

June 6, 1980

Submitted Sept. 13, 1979.

Charles J. Conturso, Morrisville, for appellant.

Charles McIlhinney, Doylestown, for appellee.

Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.

SPAETH Judge:

This appeal arises from an order sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing an amended complaint in trespass.

The allegations of the amended complaint may be summarized as follows. On September 9, 1976, appellant was operating an automobile in Bucks County and collided with an automobile operated by appellee. At the time of the accident, appellant was a resident of New Jersey, and his automobile was registered in that state. Appellee was a resident of Pennsylvania, and her automobile was registered here. The collision occurred as a result of appellee's negligence, and caused appellant physical injuries for which appellant has or will incur medical expenses exceeding $200.00, "exclusive of hospital expenses, x-rays and other diagnostic medical expenses," and also caused appellant physical pain and mental anguish. The complaint further alleged that under Pennsylvania law, appellant's right to sue on account of these injuries was to be determined by the law of the state of his domicile, i. e New Jersey, and that under section 6A-8 of the New Jersey Automobile Reparation Act, N.J.S.A. § 39: 6A-8 (1973), a victim of an automobile accident has the right to sue in tort whenever the cost of medical treatment, exclusive of x-rays hospital bills, and other diagnostic expenses exceeds $200.

On February 22, 1978, appellee filed preliminary objections to the amended complaint, which the lower court sustained on February 14, 1979. The lower court believed that appellant's action was barred by section 301(a) of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act, 40 P.S § 1009.301(a) (1979-80 Supp.), which provides:

Tort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act if such injury arises out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, except that

(5) A person remains liable for damages for non-economic detriment if the accident results in: (B) the reasonable value of reasonable and necessary medical and dental services, including prosthetic devices and necessary ambulance, hospital and professional nursing expenses incurred in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the victim, exclusive of diagnostic x-ray costs and rehabilitation costs in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) is in excess of seven hundred fifty dollars ($750).

The lower court held that appellant had not met this $750 threshold requirement, since the amended complaint alleged that appellant's medical expenses were in excess of only $200. ^[1]

Section 110(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.110(c)(2) (1979-80 Supp.), provides:

The right of a victim or of a survivor of a deceased victim to sue in tort shall be determined by the law of the state of domicile of such victim. If a victim is not domiciled in a state, such right to sue shall be determined by the law of the state in which the accident resulting in injury or damage to property occurs.

This provision has been criticized as being "impossible of interpretation or execution." Barrett, Pennsylvania No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: Practice Under the Act 102 n. 51 (Pa. Bar Institute 1975). We do not find it all that obscure. The provision embodies two choice-of-law principles: 1) The right of the victim of a motor vehicle accident to sue in tort shall be determined by the law of his domicile; and 2) if the victim is not domiciled in a state, the victim's right to sue shall be determined by the law of the state in which the accident occurred. The first principle applies to this case, for the amended complaint alleges that appellant was domiciled in New Jersey at the time of the accident. It therefore follows the appellant's right to sue must be determined by the law of New Jersey, not Pennsylvania, and it further follows that appellant's action in not barred by section 301(a).

In holding that appellant's action was barred, the lower court found an irreconcilable conflict between sections 110(c)(2) and 301(a). The lower court emphasized that under section 301(a) "(t)ort liability is abolished with respect to any injury that takes place in this State," and that the words "any injury" necessarily encompass injuries by non-residents. While we concede that section 301(a) might have been more tightly drafted, we nevertheless reject the assertion that it is in irreconcilable conflict with section 110(c)(2).

Section 301(a) provides that "(t)ort liability is abolished" only "with respect to any injury that takes place in this State in accordance with the provisions of this act." The phrase "in accordance with the provisions of this act" modifies the verb "is abolished," and by incorporating all the other provisions of the no-fault act, indicates the extent to which tort liability is abolished. As one of the "provisions of th(e) act," Section 110(c)(2) explicitly preserves the right of a non-resident to sue in tort in this Commonwealth, provided that his action is maintainable under the law of his domicile. Sections 301(a) and 110(c)(2) are therefore not in conflict, but are rather complementary provisions that function as a unit.

Moreover, even if we could find a conflict between sections 110(c)(2) and 301(a), section 110(c)(2) would nevertheless prevail under the principle that "(w)henever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933 (1964-78 Supp.). To hold that all non-residents must meet the requirements of section 301(a) in order to sue in tort in Pennsylvania would be to nullify section 110(c)(2), for then there would be no situation in which section 110(c) (2) could operate. To apply section 110(c)(2) to non-residents and limit the effect of section 301(a) to residents, however, is to give meaning and effect to both provisions.

Finally, even were we to agree with the position taken by the lower court, that an irreconcilable conflict existed between sections 110(c)(2) and 301(a), still section 110(c)(2) would prevail under the principle that "(i)f the conflict between () two provisions is irreconcilable, the special provisions (sic) shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision." 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1933 (1964-78 Supp.); Appeal of Yerger, 460 Pa. 537, 333 A.2d 902 (1975); Paxon Maymar, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 11 Pa.Cmwlth. 136, 312 A.2d 115 (1973). Section 301(a), abolishing tort liability with respect to any injury that occurs in the Commonwealth, is a general provision; section 110(c)(2), preserving the right to sue in tort for a limited class of persons (domiciliaries of other states) is a narrow, or special, provision, specifically addressed to the situation present in this case. ^[2]

We do not share the lower court's belief that the Legislature could not have reasonably granted non-residents the right to sue in tort in situations where residents were denied the right.

To understand the policies that might have prompted the Legislature to enact section 110(c)(2), the provision should be read in conjunction with section 110(c)(1), 40 P.S. § 1009.110(c)(1) (1979-80 Supp.), which provides:

The basic loss benefits available to any victim or to any survivor of a deceased victim shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of the state no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance in effect in the state of domicile of the victim on the date when the motor vehicle accident resulting in injury occurred. If there is no such state no-fault plan in effect or if the victim is not domiciled in any state, then basic loss benefits available to any victim shall be determined pursuant to the provisions of the state no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance, if any, in effect in the state in which the accident resulting in injury occurs.

Thus, section 110(c)(1) expresses two general rules governing the rights of a non-resident to recover basic loss benefits when the non-resident is injured in a motor vehicle accident in this state. If the non-resident is domiciled in a state that has in effect a state no-fault plan for motor vehicle insurance, the non-resident is denied the benefits available under Pennsylvania's No-Fault Act and is remitted to the benefits available under the plan of his home state. If the non-resident is domiciled in a state that does not have in effect a state no-fault plan, or if the non-resident is not domiciled in any state, then he is entitled to the basic loss benefits provided under Pennsylvania's No-Fault Act. ^[3] However, no matter which of these rules pertains, under section 110(c)(2) the non-resident always retains the tort remedies that are available under the law of his home state.

The fairness of this statutory scheme has been defended on the following grounds:

First, it (the statutory scheme) is more consistent with contemporary treatment of conflict of laws problems by the Pennsylvania courts. If a Pennsylvania court has jurisdiction over a controversy, it will look first to Pennsylvania law including its conflicts provisions. Pennsylvania generally accepts the Restatement Second view on conflicts of law, which looks to "significant contacts" of the parties involved in the controversy. In any case, a significant "contact" which the court will consider is the party's domicile. But, more importantly, in a no-fault context it may be the critical contact. As earlier...