Toth v. Standard Oil Co.

Decision Date10 June 1953
Docket NumberNo. 33230,33230
Citation113 N.E.2d 81,50 O.O. 476,160 Ohio St. 1
Parties, 50 O.O. 476 TOTH v. STANDARD OIL CO.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The term, 'injury,' as used in the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act, comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm, accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place. Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266, approved and followed.

2. Where an employee is subjected to investigation by police on suspicion that a truck driven by such employee injured a pedestrian, and such employee subsequently suffers partial paralysis from a cerebral hemorrhage claimed to be caused by anxiety and worry as a result of the investigation, such disability is not an 'injury' as defined in the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act and is not compensable under its provisions.

Dennis Toth, the plaintiff, filed with the Industrial Commission of Ohio a claim for workmen's compensation against The Standard Oil Company, defendant a self-insurer under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

His claim was denied by the commission.

Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, a jury being waived, the court upon hearing found the plaintiff to be entitled to participate in the State Insurance Fund, and entered judgment accordingly.

The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting.

The cause is before this court following the allowance of a motion to certify the record of the Court of Appeals.

McAfee, Grossman, Taplin, Hanning, Newcomer & Hazlett and H. Vincent E. Mitchell, Cleveland, for appellant.

Maurice H. Shapiro and Allyn D. Kendis, Cleveland, for appellee.

MATTHIAS, Judge.

The facts constituting the basis of the plaintiff's claim may be briefly stated as follows:

The plaintiff on or about March 16, 1946, was a truck driver employed by the defendant. On the evening of that day he, by truck, transported a load of petroleum products from Cleveland to Middlefield, Ohio, and returned to Cleveland early in the morning of Sunday, March 17. He entered Cleveland on Kinsman avenue, returned to the bulk plant of the defendant, went off duty and went to his home.

At approximately 2:10 a. m. on March 17, the dead body of a woman was found lying in the middle of Kinsman avenue. She was apparently the victim of a hitskip accident. Investigation by the Cleveland city police disclosed that at approximately the time of the accident a red truck had been seen at the location where the body was found. It was later disclosed that the truck operated by the plaintiff had been in that vicinity about the time indicated. Upon the request of the police the defendant brought the truck to police headquarters for examination. The examination disclosed on the bottom of the truck what appeared to be particles of hair and flesh, which were removed for further examination. The supervisor of truck drivers of the defendant and one of defendant's attorneys were present at this examination and were informed by the police authorities that they would like to interview the plaintiff.

The supervisor, the attorney and a patrolman went to the home of the plaintiff on the afternoon of March 17 and requested that he accompany them to police headquarters for questioning. The attorney for the defendant acted as counsel for the plaintiff at this questioning. When plaintiff was requested by the police to submit to a lie-detector test, the attorney for the defendant informed him that he need not comply with the request but that if he did it might aid the position of the defendant if it was required to defend any claim growing out of the accident.

The next afternoon the plaintiff appeared at central police headquarters in Cleveland, was further interrogated and submitted to a lie-detector test. The actual test lasted four minutes and eleven questions were asked. At the conclusion of the test the policeman operating the machine told the plaintiff that the charts indicated he had not told the truth.

Plaintiff did not work Monday night or Tuesday night but returned to work Wednesday, March 20, and worked the remainder of the week at his usual task. On Sunday, March 24, while resting at his home plaintiff suffered a stroke and paralysis of the right side of his body. He was hospitalized and had a relatively slow recovery, following which he returned to the employment of the defendant as a warehouseman at a reduced rate of compensation.

The claim filed with the Industrial Commission by the plaintiff is that the stroke and paralysis which he suffered was an injury incurred in and arising out of his employment. The evidence disclosed that after the first questioning by the police the plaintiff was in a highly nervous state, smoked incessantly, was restless and had frequent spells of crying and sobbing which continued until the Sunday afternoon when he was stricken.

Assuming that the evidence is sufficient to disclose a causal connection between plaintiff's condition and his employment, the primary question presented is whether under the Workmen's Compensation Act he suffered an injury as therein defined.

'Injury' is defined in section 1465-68, General Code, the pertinent portions of which are as follows:

'Every employee mentioned in section 1465-61, who is injured, and the dependents of such as are killed in the course of employment, wheresoever such injury has occurred, provided the same was not purposely self-inflicted, on and after January 1st, 1914, shall be entitled to receive, either directly from his employer as provided in section 1465-69, or from the state insurance fund, such compensation for loss sustained on account of such injury or death, and such medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and such amount of funeral expenses in case of death as provided by sections 1465-79 to 1465-87 inclusive.

* * *

* * *

'The term 'injury' as used in this section and in the workmen's compensation act shall include any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee's employment.'

This section in its present form establishes a definition of the term, 'injury,' substantially more liberal than that previously in effect.

The section was first construed by this court in the case of Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E.2d 266, 267. The rule laid down in that case has been followed in subsequent cases and, although it constitutes some departure from the rule applied in previous cases, a prerequisite to an award of compensation is the necessity that the 'injury' be physical or that there be a traumatic damage, accidental in character. This rule is well stated in paragraphs one, two and three of the syllabus of the Malone case, which are as follows:

'1. The term 'injury' as used in the Constitution and in Section 1465-68, General Code, 117 Ohio Laws, 109, as amended effective July 10, 1937, comprehends a physical or traumatic damage or harm, accidental in its character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap occurring by chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular time and place.

'2. When, in...

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24 cases
  • Miller v. Bingham County
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • 2 d4 Maio d4 1957
    ...Mills Corporation v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291. Among cases which refused to award compensation are Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81; Bekeleski v. O. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741, and Lacey v. Washburn & Williams Co., 309 Pa. 574, 164 A. The claima......
  • Stivison v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • 31 d3 Dezembro d3 1997
    ...or worry. Szymanski v. Halle's Dept. Store (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 195, 17 O.O.3d 120, 407 N.E.2d 502; Toth v. Std. Oil Co. (1953), 160 Ohio St. 1, 50 O.O. 476, 113 N.E.2d 81. This limitation was removed in Ryan v. Connor (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 406, 28 OBR 462, 503 N.E.2d 1379. The court overr......
  • Seitz v. L & R Industries, Inc. (Palco Products Division)
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 4 d5 Dezembro d5 1981
    ...compensability." 2 There appears to have been only one case reported to the contra in the last twenty-five years, Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953). In that case the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that an injury must be physical or there must be a traumatic da......
  • McDonough v. Connecticut Bank and Trust Co.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 16 d2 Junho d2 1987
    ...compensation where mental or nervous stress has caused distinct physical injury. Larson, loc. cit.; contra, Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 160 Ohio St. 1, 113 N.E.2d 81 (1953)." Id., 37 Conn.Sup. at 839, 438 A.2d 1218. Donato relied on Stier v. Derby, supra, for the proposition that death from c......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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