Tower v. Halderman
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | FERNANDEZ; LIVERMORE, P.J., and LACAGNINA |
| Citation | Tower v. Halderman, 782 P.2d 719, 162 Ariz. 243 (Ariz. App. 1989) |
| Decision Date | 17 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | CA-CV,No. 2,2 |
| Parties | Thomas TOWER dba Tower Development, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. James E. HALDERMAN, Defendant/Appellant. 89-0101. |
James Halderman appeals from the judgment entered against him after a court trial in appellee Thomas Tower's suit for specific performance of a real estate contract. Halderman argues that the trial court erred in awarding Tower specific performance, contending that Halderman cancelled the contract and that Tower failed to prove that he was able to pay the funds required to close escrow. We affirm.
In June 1985, Halderman was the lessee of a parcel of land in the Scottsdale-Tempe area with an option to purchase. He signed a listing agreement with Debbie Brugliera to sell the property. On July 31, 1985, Halderman accepted an offer from Tower, an experienced real estate agent, to purchase the property. Halderman was then operating a boat sale and repair business on the property.
The selling price was $337,000, to be paid as follows: $5,000 earnest money; $40,000 cash to be paid "[o]n or before close of escrow"; $200,000 in a new loan to be obtained by Halderman and secured by the property; and a second note and deed of trust in Halderman's favor in the amount of $92,000. With regard to the new loan, the contract provided as follows: "Seller to secure new loan; Buyer to approve said terms in writing within 24 hours of Sellers [sic] notification; Seller to allow Buyer to assume." It also provided: Close of escrow was set for January 30, 1986.
Escrow was opened August 1, 1985 at Ticor Title Insurance and a preliminary title report was issued August 28. On September 25 Halderman obtained an interest-only five-year loan in the amount of $200,000 from Sentinel Savings and Loan Association. On October 11 he obtained title to the property as a result of the exercise of his option to purchase. In early December close of escrow was extended to April 25, 1986 at Halderman's request.
The parties took no further action until March 30, 1986 when Tower sent a letter to Ticor stating that the four contract contingencies had been satisfied. An amended preliminary title report was sent to Halderman's agent on April 25. It listed the deed of trust on the loan from Sentinel Savings recorded October 15, 1985.
Halderman's agent Brugliera testified that she knew Halderman had obtained the loan in the fall of 1985 but never had any details about it until she received the amended title report in April 1986. The escrow officer testified that Ticor obtained a copy of the deed of trust from the county recorder's office and repeatedly attempted to obtain a copy of the note from Sentinel. Ticor was finally successful on May 1. A copy of the note was delivered to Brugliera who then showed it to Tower. Because Sentinel had told the escrow officer that Tower would have to qualify to assume the loan, a process Tower testified would take an additional 30 to 90 days, and because the extended date for close of escrow had already passed, Tower responded within the required 24-hour period by executing a form prepared by Ticor at Brugliera's request. The form instructed Ticor to close escrow without notifying Sentinel and without obtaining its consent to transfer of title. Brugliera presented the form to Halderman, but he never signed it.
On May 15 Halderman's attorney sent two forms to Ticor, both of which were signed by Halderman. One provided that the parties mutually agreed to cancel escrow. Tower never signed that form. The second form stated that Halderman had elected to cancel escrow at the end of 13 days as provided in the contract unless Tower remedied his breaches. The two breaches listed were that Tower had not approved the new loan within 24 hours of notification and that he had not waived the four contract contingencies. Ticor sent copies of the two forms to all interested parties on May 20. On May 30 Tower responded with a letter to Ticor that he was ready, willing and able to close escrow. At Tower's request, the escrow officer sent Halderman a letter on May 30 stating that Ticor could advise Tower as to the amount of funds required to close when Halderman furnished the required mortgage information and signed the final documents. No further action was taken, and Tower filed suit on June 2, 1986.
The contract provided as follows:
Cancellation. If any party elects to cancel this Contract because of any breach by another party or because escrow fails to close by the agreed date, the party electing to cancel shall deliver to escrow agent a notice containing the address of the party in breach and stating that this Contract shall be cancelled unless the breach is cured within the 13 days following the delivery of the notice to the escrow agent. If the breach is not cured within such period, this Contract shall be cancelled. Within three days after receipt of such a notice, the escrow agent shall send it by United States Mail to the party in breach at the address contained in the notice. Notice shall be effective on the date of mailing and no further notice shall be required.
Halderman contends that the contract was cancelled by his notice of cancellation sent May 15, 1986. Only two breaches are listed in that notice: the failure of Tower to remove the contract contingencies and his failure to approve Halderman's loan within 24 hours after he received notification of it. Halderman conceded in cross-examination that Tower had deleted the contract contingencies in a letter to Ticor dated March 30, a month and a half before Halderman's cancellation notice. Halderman also testified that Brugliera had notified him approximately May 2 that Tower had timely approved the Sentinel loan, nearly two weeks prior to the cancellation notice. Halderman in essence, then, acknowledged that Tower was not in breach at the time the notice was sent. Those two requests, therefore, could not properly trigger a cancellation of the contract.
Halderman also argues that the contract was cancelled because the April 25 closing date had passed. In making that argument, however, he ignores the fact that that was not one of the reasons listed in his cancellation notice. We fail to see how the passing of the specified escrow date...
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
...132 Ariz. 549, 647 P.2d 1147 (1982).......................................................................... 7-18 Tower v. Halderman, 162 Ariz. 243, 782 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1989)................................................ 6-35, 37, 40, 43 Towery v. Brewer, 672 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2012).......
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§ 6.11.2.3 Remedy at Law Inadequate
...to award specific performance to a wronged real estate buyer. It appears that the parties and courts involved in Tower v. Halderman, 162 Ariz. 243, 782 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1989), took it as a given that a remedy at law would be inadequate. Perhaps Tower intended to use the property, and ther......
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§ 6.11.2.3 Remedy at Law Inadequate
...to award specific performance to a wronged real estate buyer. It appears that the parties and courts involved in Tower v. Halderman, 162 Ariz. 243, 782 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1989), took it as a given that a remedy at law would be inadequate. Perhaps Tower intended to use the property, and ther......
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§ 6.11.2.1 Definite and Certain Contract Terms
...if agreement appears in several documents identifiable with certainty.” The terms of the real estate sale contract in Tower v. Halderman, 162 Ariz. 243, 782 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1989 ), were definite and certain, in spite of defendant/appellant Halderman’s attempt at obfuscation. Halderman’s ......