Towers v. City of Chicago

• Citation: 173 F.3d 619
• Decision Date: 16 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-3775,97-3775
• Parties: Sandra TOWERS, on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, and Robert Sturdivant, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Page 619

173 F.3d 619

Sandra TOWERS, on her own behalf and on behalf of others similarly situated, and Robert Sturdivant Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97-3775.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 28, 1998.

Decided April 16, 1999.

Thomas Peters (argued), Murphy, Peters & Davis, Mariel Nanasi, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Diane Larsen, Lawrence Rosenthal (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before COFFEY, RIPPLE and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiffs brought this action against the City of Chicago ("the City") to challenge city ordinances that impose a $500 fine upon the owner of a vehicle in which illegal drugs or firearms are found. The plaintiffs now seek review of the district court's decision to grant the defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and to deny the plaintiffs' motions for class certification

and preliminary injunction. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I BACKGROUND

A. The Ordinances

The Municipal Code of Chicago provides that the owner of any vehicle containing illegal drugs or unregistered firearms may be assessed an administrative penalty of $500. See Chicago Municipal Code §§ 7-24-225 (drugs), 8-20-015 (firearms). ¹ The relevant ordinances recognize only three defenses to the imposition of the penalty: 1) the vehicle was stolen at the time the illegal item was found in the vehicle, and the theft was reported within 24 hours after the theft was discovered or reasonably should have been discovered; 2) the vehicle was operating as a common carrier and the violation occurred without the knowledge of the person in control of the vehicle; and 3) the owner proves that the item found is not unlawful.

When the illegal item is found in a vehicle, a police officer must seize the car and have it towed to an impoundment facility to secure payment of the administrative penalty. When the vehicle is towed, the officer must provide notice to anyone identifying himself as the owner, or anyone else in control of the vehicle, that the owner can request a preliminary hearing. If requested, the preliminary hearing must be held within 24 hours of the seizure. All interested persons have an opportunity to be heard at the hearing, and the hearing officer determines whether there is probable cause to believe that the illegal item was found in the vehicle and that none of the three defenses applies.

If the hearing officer concludes that probable cause does not exist, then the City must return the vehicle to the owner without charge. If, however, the officer determines that probable cause does exist, or if the owner does not request a preliminary hearing, then the vehicle must remain impounded pending a final hearing, unless the owner posts a cash bond of $500 plus towing and storage costs. Notice of the time, date, and place of the final hearing must be sent to the owner by certified mail, return receipt requested, within 10 days after seizure, and the final hearing must take place within 30 days after the seizure.

At the final hearing, the hearing officer must determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the illegal item was found in the vehicle and, if so, whether any of the three defenses applies. If the hearing officer finds that no violation occurred, then the City must return the vehicle (or the cash bond) to the owner. If the hearing officer determines that a violation occurred, then he must find the owner liable for the $500 administrative penalty plus applicable towing and storage charges.

B. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Towers

On January 27, 1996, Chicago police officers stopped Ray Chambers while he was driving Sandra Towers' car. The police found a controlled substance in the vehicle. Pursuant to § 7-24-255 of the Chicago Municipal Code, the police seized and impounded Ms. Towers' car. Ms. Towers had not given Chambers express permission to use her car, let alone to use it to transport a controlled substance, and she did not know that a controlled substance was in her car. Ms. Towers was not present when the car was seized.

Ms. Towers was never informed by the City of her right to request a preliminary hearing within 24 hours of the seizure and thus did not request such a hearing. Between

January 28 and February 6, Ms. Towers attempted to retrieve her car by posting the $500 bond and paying the towing and storage fees, but she was unsuccessful because City employees had not completed the necessary paperwork. Ms. Towers was first notified by mail on February 2, 1996, that she was entitled to a final hearing. On February 6, 1996, Ms. Towers obtained her car by paying the $500 bond and $225 in accumulated towing and storage fees. At the final hearing, Ms. Towers was not permitted to assert an innocent-owner defense because the ordinance does not recognize such a defense. On March 8, 1996, a final administrative order imposing a $500 civil penalty was entered against Ms. Towers.

C. Facts Relating to Plaintiff Sturdivant

On an unspecified date in September 1996, Chicago police officers witnessed a person in possession of an unregistered handgun run and jump into Robert Sturdivant's car. Pursuant to § 8-20-015 of the Chicago Municipal Code, the police seized and impounded Mr. Sturdivant's car. Mr. Sturdivant was not present at the time of the seizure and did not know that a gun was in his car. He was never notified of his right to request a preliminary hearing and thus did not request one.

On October 1, 1996, Mr. Sturdivant received notice of his right to a final hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Sturdivant was unable to assert an innocent-owner defense because the ordinance recognizes no such defense. Consequently, Mr. Sturdivant did not prevail at the final hearing and was found liable for the $500 administrative penalty. Mr. Sturdivant was without his vehicle for more than fifteen days before he was able to pay to have the car released to him. The interrupted use of his vehicle affected his ability to make a living and his access to the necessities and amenities of life.

D. Earlier Proceedings in the State Court and in the District Court

Plaintiff Towers filed this action against the City of Chicago in state court, and the City removed it to federal district court. On January 27, 1997, Ms. Towers filed a second amended complaint, including two additional plaintiffs (Mr. Sturdivant and Kevin Amos) and purporting to represent a class of similarly situated people. The plaintiffs brought federal claims under § 1983 (on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of car owners). They alleged that the administrative penalty violated substantive due process and the Excessive Fines Clause; that the procedures specified in the ordinances violated procedural due process; and that the City seized their cars in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Ms. Towers also contended that the City had deprived her of procedural due process by delaying the return of her vehicle after she tendered the required cash bond and fees.

On February 7, 1997, the parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge. On September 30, 1997, the magistrate judge, in a comprehensive and thoughtful opinion, granted the City's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and for preliminary injunction. This appeal followed. ²

E. Holding of the District Court

The court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The district court first dismissed the procedural due process claim; it held that, under the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), the ordinances provide adequate procedural protection for The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims. It held that the ordinances impose constitutionally permissible civil fines. Finding the City's fines analogous to civil in rem forfeitures, the district court relied on Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996), in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Michigan in rem forfeiture statute that did not recognize an innocent-owner defense. ³

the owner. The district court determined that, along with other available state law remedies, the post-deprivation procedures under the ordinances satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. Specifically, with respect to the plaintiffs' claim that they did not receive notice of the preliminary hearing, the court held that the police officers' notice to the person in control of the vehicle was adequate.

The district court also dismissed the plaintiffs' Excessive Fines Clause claims. The court determined that the fines imposed were analogous to fines levied in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings and were not excessive under the Eighth Amendment. The district court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they were completely without culpability and concluded that, because they did not report the cars stolen, the plaintiffs must have given at least some degree of consent to the use of their cars, either before or after the fact. Accordingly, the district court reasoned, the fines were not excessive in light of their purpose of inducing owners to exercise greater care in entrusting their property to others.

Because the plaintiffs' claims failed to survive the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, ⁴ the district court also held that their proposed class action based on those claims must also fail. The district court further held that, even if the plaintiffs' individual claims had survived dismissal, the requirements for class certification had not been met because there was inadequate evidence of numerosity. The district court did not reach the issue whether the plaintiffs had met the...