Town of Boxford v. Mass. Highway Dep't & Another 1 (and a Companion Case 2).

• Citation: 940 N.E.2d 404,458 Mass. 596
• Decision Date: 28 December 2010
• Docket Number: SJC–10721.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Parties: TOWN OF BOXFORDv.MASSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT & another 1 (and a companion case 2).

458 Mass. 596
940 N.E.2d 404

TOWN OF BOXFORD
v.
MASSACHUSETTS HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT & another 1 (and a companion case 2).

SJC–10721.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Argued Oct. 4, 2010.Decided Dec. 28, 2010.

[940 N.E.2d 406]

Katherine A. Watras, Assistant Attorney General, for Massachusetts Highway Department & another.Gregg J. Corbo, Boston, for town of Boxford.Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ. ³BOTSFORD, J.

[458 Mass. 597] We consider here the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal, brought under the doctrine of present execution, from the denial of its motion to dismiss. The principal issue raised is the scope of a town's authority to regulate the operations of a State agency, and in particular a town's ability to seek judicial enforcement of its regulatory determination vis-à-vis the agency. The case concerns a conflict between the town of Boxford (town) and the Massachusetts Highway Department (highway department) arising from the highway department's operation of a salt storage facility (facility, or salt shed) located in the town.⁴ The town brought suit in the Superior Court principally to enjoin the operation of the facility and certain other activities of the highway department, on the ground that the agency was in violation of the regulations of the town's board of health (board) adopted under the authority of G.L. c. 111, §§ 31 and 122.

Citing principles of sovereign immunity, the highway department and the Department of Environmental Protection ⁵ (DEP; collectively, Commonwealth) moved to dismiss the town's complaint. We conclude that the highway department is not immune from all municipal regulation or from suit in relation to its operation of the facility, although as a factual matter, the [458 Mass. 598] doctrine of essential government functions ultimately may bar the town's claim for relief in this case. Sovereign immunity principles likewise do not prevent the town from seeking to enforce its regulations requiring permits for the installation of private drinking wells. Because they are before us, we have considered the Commonwealth's additional arguments as to the court's power to enjoin the highway department from causing damage to the

[940 N.E.2d 407]

environment and to enter an order in the nature of mandamus against the DEP. With respect to those arguments, we conclude that the judge correctly denied the motion to dismiss the town's claim under G.L. c. 214, § 7A, but erred in deciding to permit the town's mandamus claim to continue. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judge's denial of the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss.

Background. In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court accepts as true the factual allegations of the complaint, and supporting inferences that may be drawn from those alleged facts. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 625 n. 7, 888 N.E.2d 879 (2008). Accordingly, we summarize the pertinent facts alleged in the town's complaint. On Topsfield Road in the town, the highway department owns and operates a salt shed in which it stores salt and other chemicals used in the removal of snow and ice from Interstate 95, State Highway Route 97, and the staging area around exit 53 of Interstate 95. The highway department has acknowledged that its release of salt has contaminated private drinking water wells in the town. The town's board of selectmen asked the highway department to relocate the salt shed to an area not in the vicinity of private drinking water wells, but the highway department has refused to do so. In 2005 and 2006, the town asked the DEP to take enforcement action against the highway department under G.L. c. 85, § 7A, on account of its storage of deicing chemicals in a manner that risked contamination of a water or groundwater supply in violation of that statute; the DEP declined to do so.

By February, 2006, the highway department began work to install replacement wells at affected private residences. In undertaking these well installations, the highway department refused to comply with the town's private water supply regulations, as set forth in the Board of Health Regulations of the Code of Boxford § 202–3 (2007) (Code § 202–3), and therefore did not apply to [458 Mass. 599] the town's board of health (board) for well permits. The “shallow wells” that the highway department drilled are prohibited under Code § 202–3(E)(1) and, even with a permit, may only be installed with a variance granted by the board. The drilling for replacement wells caused “extensive environmental damage.”

On November 21, 2008, relying on its authority under G.L. c. 111, § 122, to order abatement of nuisances, the board ordered the highway department to cease and desist all operations at the salt shed within seven days. The highway department notified the board that it did not intend to comply with the order. On December 3, 2008, the town filed the present action in the Superior Court seeking injunctive relief against the highway department and relief in the nature of mandamus against the DEP.⁶

The town's complaint includes four counts. In count I, the town alleges that

[940 N.E.2d 408]

the salt shed operations constitute a public health nuisance in violation of G.L. c. 111, § 122,⁷ and seeks a preliminary injunction pursuant to G.L. c. 111, § 130,⁸ ordering the highway department to cease and desist all salt shed [458 Mass. 600] operations and abate the damage. In count II, the town alleges that the highway department is causing or is about to cause substantial harm to the environment and seeks a preliminary injunction pursuant to G.L. c. 214, § 7A,⁹ again ordering the highway department to cease all salt shed operations and to abate the resulting damage. In count III, the town seeks an injunction ordering the highway department to apply for permits from the board for all replacement wells, in compliance with Code § 202–3, adopted pursuant to G.L. c. 111, § 31. ¹⁰ Finally, in count IV, the town seeks mandamus relief pursuant to G.L. c. 249, § 5,¹¹ requiring the DEP to institute an enforcement action against the highway department for violations of G.L. c. 85, § 7A. ¹²

On February 2, 2009, the Commonwealth filed its motion to dismiss the town's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming sovereign immunity, and for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). On September 1, 2009, a Superior Court judge denied the motion. The Commonwealth [458 Mass. 601] appealed, and we transferred that appeal to this court on our own motion.

Discussion. Ordinarily, interlocutory rulings are not appealable until the final disposition of the case because they are not “final orders.”

[940 N.E.2d 409]

Brum v. Dartmouth, 428 Mass. 684, 687, 704 N.E.2d 1147 (1999). However, an order denying a motion to dismiss based on immunity from suit may be the subject of an interlocutory appeal under the doctrine of present execution. Kent v. Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 312, 315 n. 6, 771 N.E.2d 770 (2002). As stated, the Commonwealth brings the present appeal under that rule, and the town does not dispute the rule's application. The Commonwealth's appeal is properly before us.¹³

1. Lack of jurisdiction: sovereign immunity. The highway department claims that sovereign immunity insulates it from suits brought under G.L. c. 111, §§ 31 and 122, and Code § 202–3.¹⁴ We disagree.

In general, the Commonwealth or one of its agencies “cannot be impleaded in its own courts except with its consent, and, when that consent is granted, it can be impleaded only in the manner and to the extent expressed [by] statute.” DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1, 12, 848 N.E.2d 1197 (2006), quoting General Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, 329 Mass. 661, 664, 110 N.E.2d 101 (1953). Sovereign immunity applies both to money judgments and more generally to “interference by the court at the behest of litigants,” except when and as authorized by the Legislature. New Hampshire Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Markem Corp., 424 Mass. 344, 351, 676 N.E.2d 809 (1997). At the same time, however, “a statutorily created entity is not necessarily exempt from all [municipal] [458 Mass. 602] regulation.” Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth. v. Somerville, 451 Mass. 80, 85, 883 N.E.2d 933 (2008) ( Somerville ). Instead, a legislatively created entity, including a State agency, is subject to local regulations to the extent that those regulations “do not interfere with its ability to fulfil its essential governmental purposes and have only a negligible effect on its operations.” Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist. v. North Andover, 439 Mass. 16, 22, 785 N.E.2d 337 (2003) ( Greater Lawrence Sanitary Dist.), citing Village on the Hill, Inc. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Auth., 348 Mass. 107, 118, 202 N.E.2d 602 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955, 85 S.Ct. 1089, 13 L.Ed.2d 971 (1965). See Somerville, supra at 85–86, 883 N.E.2d 933. See also Bourne v. Plante, 429 Mass. 329, 332, 708 N.E.2d 103 (1999).¹⁵

The Legislature has granted to local boards of health the power to “make reasonable health regulations.”

[940 N.E.2d 410]

G.L. c. 111, § 31. The town alleges in its complaint, and we accept as true, that the town, acting through the board, has adopted Code § 202–3 under this statutory authority; and that pursuant to Code § 202–3, the town regulates the placement and construction of private wells. The Legislature also has given local boards of health an express grant of power to regulate nuisances. See G.L. c. 111, § 122 (local “board of health shall examine into all nuisances ... within its town ... and shall make regulations for the public health and safety relative thereto”).

The power to enforce local health and environmental laws is integral to the power to regulate. Although certain procedures contemplated by the Legislature for ordering the abatement of local nuisances apply...