Town of Branford v. Santa Barbara

• Decision Date: 16 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18090.,18090.
• Citation: 294 Conn. 803,988 A.2d 221
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF BRANFORD v. Thomas SANTA BARBARA, Jr., et al.

988 A.2d 221

294 Conn. 803

TOWN OF BRANFORD v. Thomas SANTA BARBARA, Jr., et al.

No. 18090.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 26, 2009.

Decided February 16, 2010.

Linda L. Morkan, with whom, on the brief, were Steven R. Humphrey, Brian R. Smith and Jeffrey J. White, Hartford, for the appellants (plaintiffs Thomas Santa Barbara, Jr., et al.).

Wesley W. Horton, Hartford and William H. Clendenen, Jr., New Haven, with whom were Kimberly A. Knox, Hartford and, on the brief, Kevin C. Shea, New Haven, Michael S. Taylor, David A. Reif and Matthew A. Weiner, Hartford, for the appellee (defendant town of Branford).

NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.^*

McLACHLAN, J.

The question raised by this appeal is whether the offer of judgment statute, General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 52-192a,¹ applies in the context of condemnation appeals. The plaintiffs, Thomas Santa Barbara, Jr., and Frank Perrotti, Jr., the owners of real property (owners) condemned by the defendant town of Branford (town),² appeal from the judgment of the trial court sustaining the town's objection to the owners' offer of judgment.³ The owners claim that the court improperly concluded, on the basis of its determination that the offer of judgment statute conflicts with General Statutes § 8-130,⁴ which specifically limits the award of prejudgment interest in condemnation cases, that § 52-192a cannot be utilized in a condemnation appeal. The owners contend that the eminent domain statutory scheme can be read harmoniously with § 52-192a, and that failure to apply § 52-192a to condemnation appeals would run contrary to that statute's well established purpose of encouraging pretrial settlements. The town maintains that General Statutes §§ 8-133⁵ and 37-3c⁶ provide the exclusive remedy for awards of prejudgment interest to property owners in condemnation cases and, therefore, the offer of judgment statute is inapplicable. The town also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the owners' offer of judgment was invalid because it did not offer to settle the case for a "`sum certain'" as required by § 52-192a(a). We affirm the judgment of the trial court, albeit on different grounds.

The facts underlying this appeal are set out more fully in the companion cases of Branford v. Santa Barbara, 294 Conn. 785, 988 A.2d 209, 2010 WL 432345 (2010), and New England Estates, LLC v. Branford, 294 Conn. 817, 988 A.2d 229, 2010 WL 432363 (2010), which were released on the same date as this opinion. The following additional facts are necessary for the resolution of this appeal. On December 18 2003, pursuant to General Statutes § 8-129(a)(3),⁷ the town filed a statement of compensation for the taking of property known as 48-86 Tabor Drive in Branford in the amount of $1,167,800. The town also deposited the sum of $1,167,800 with the clerk in the Superior Court. In May, 2004, the owners, believing the amount of the compensation to be inadequate, filed an appeal and application for review of the statement of compensation pursuant to General Statutes § 8-132(a).⁸ Thereafter, in May, 2005, pursuant to § 52-192a(a), the owners filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $3,967,800. In its objection to the offer of judgment, the town argued that an offer of judgment is not appropriate in condemnation cases because an appeal from a statement of compensation does not seek the recovery of money damages and that the application of § 52-192a would be inconsistent with § 37-3c because § 37-3c specifically provides for the recovery of interest in condemnation cases.

Following a hearing on September 19, 2005, the court, Blue, J., sustained the objection to the offer of judgment. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that § 52-192a, which awards prejudgment interest on the entire amount recovered, cannot be applied to condemnation appeals without violating § 8-130, which prohibits the assessment of interest on the amount deposited by the town in accordance with § 8-129(a)(3). The court reasoned that applying § 8-130 to the exclusion of § 52-192a is consistent with the well established principle that statutes specific to a particular subject matter control over a more general statute that may also be applicable. See, e.g., Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison, 289 Conn. 723, 729 n. 10, 961 A.2d 338 (2008) ("[i]t is a well-settled principle of [statutory] construction that specific terms covering [a] given subject matter will prevail over general language of ... another statute which might otherwise prove controlling" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, the trial court concluded that an offer of judgment cannot be made in condemnation cases.

The question of whether § 52-192a applies properly to an appeal from a statement of compensation presents a question of statutory construction, over which we employ plenary review. Saunders v. Firtel, 293 Conn. 515, 525, 978 A.2d 487 (2009). "When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, 292 Conn. 125, 134, 971 A.2d 24 (2009).

Our inquiry in any issue of statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute at issue. See General Statutes § 1-2z; Director of Health Affairs Policy Planning v. Freedom of Information Commission, 293 Conn. 164, 170, 977 A.2d 148 (2009). The relevant language of § 52-192a(a) provides: "After commencement of any civil action based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages, whether or not other relief is sought, the plaintiff may, not later than thirty days before trial, file with the clerk of the court a written `offer of judgment' signed by the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, directed to the defendant or the defendant's attorney, offering to settle the claim underlying the action and to stipulate to a judgment for a sum certain...."

Section 52-192a is silent as to the inclusion or exclusion of condemnation appeals.⁹ Therefore, we must determine whether those appeals come within the purview of § 52-192a. By its terms, § 52-192a (a) sets out three elements that must be met in order to benefit from the offer of judgment statute. Specifically, the party must be: (1) a plaintiff; (2) in a civil action; (3) that is based upon contract or seeking the recovery of money damages. We turn our attention, then, to whether a condemnation appeal satisfies these three requirements.

Because the question of whether persons who file an appeal from a statement of compensation are "plaintiffs" pursuant to § 52-192a(a) turns, in part, on whether such an appeal is a civil action, we first consider whether an appeal from a statement of compensation brought pursuant to § 8-132 is a civil action.¹⁰ Although § 52-192a does not define "civil action," a civil action generally is an action that is commenced by service of process. See General Statutes §§ 52-45a and 52-91;¹¹ see also Board of Education v. Tavares Pediatric Center, 276 Conn. 544, 557-58, 888 A.2d 65 (2006) (Rhode Island administrative proceeding not civil action because not commenced by service of process or controlled by rules of pleading). This rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. Administrative appeals, for example, are civil actions in some circumstances. See Practice Book § 14-6.¹² The offer of judgment statute, therefore, is not clear and unambiguous. See PJM & Associates, LC v. Bridgeport, supra, 292 Conn. at 134, 971 A.2d 24 ("[t]he test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, we turn to extratextual sources for further guidance as to legislative intent.

A subsequent amendment to § 52-192a(a) is instructive. See Chambers v. Electric Boat Corp., 283 Conn. 840, 855 n. 8, 930 A.2d 653 (2007) (this court has previously considered subsequent enactments to illuminate legislative intent with respect to earlier legislation). In 2007, as part of its changes to eminent domain legislation following our decision in Kelo v. New London, 268 Conn. 1, 843 A.2d 500 (2004), aff'd, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 162 L.Ed.2d 439 (2005), the legislature added the following language to § 52-192a(a): "For the purposes of this section, such plaintiff includes a counterclaim plaintiff under [§ ]8-132...." Public Acts 2007, No. 07-141, § 16 (P.A. 07-141). Public Act 07-141, § 9, also added the following language to § 8-132(a): "For the purposes of [an application for review of a statement of compensation], review and appeal therefrom, and for the purposes of sections 52-192a to 52-195, inclusive ... such applicant shall be deemed a counterclaim plaintiff." Thus, in 2007, the legislature unambiguously evidenced an intent that condemnation appeals should be subject to the offer of judgment statute. Significantly, the legislature made the amendments effective from the date of passage of the act, June 25, 2007, and with respect to § 8-132 the changes were "applicable to property acquired on or after said date"; P.A. 07-141, § 9; and with respect to § 52-192a "applicable to applications filed on or after said date...." P.A. 07-141, § 16. "[W]e will not impute to the legislature an intent that is not apparent from unambiguous...