Town of Bristol v. Palmer
Decision Date | 12 November 1909 |
Citation | 83 Vt. 54,74 A. 332 |
Parties | TOWN OF BRISTOL v. PALMER. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Appeal from Chancery Court, Addison County; George M. Powers, Chancellor.
Action by the Town of Bristol against Edson E. Palmer. Decree for orator, and defendant appeals. Affirmed and remanded.
Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, and HASELTON, JJ.
Frank L. Fish and James B. Donoway, for appellant. Chas. I. Button and William H. Bliss, for appellee.
This was an injunction bill with a prayer for damages to be determined on an accounting. The case was heard in the court of chancery on the report of a special master, and comes here on an appeal from a decree in favor of the orator.
The New Haven river runs through the town of Bristol. Across it is a certain covered bridge, known as the "lower notch bridge," that is part of a public highway, and it is conceded by the defendant that the highway, including the bridge, was legally established in 1850. At the point in question the bridge runs practically east and west, and the river runs under it in a southerly direction. Since 1850, and indeed since 1842, this bridge has been maintained at all times where it is now, except that, as the master states, "the west end may have swung a foot or two more or less up or down stream." In 1900 the defendant commenced to build a dam immediately under the south side of the bridge. The work was under water until 1903, when the defendant completed the building of the dam, and when for the first time the selectmen of Bristol learned of the structure. The dam was tied to, or built up, against each abutment of the bridge. The height of the dam was four or five feet above the natural level of the water. When, in 1903, for the first time, the selectmen learned of the dam, they went to the place and ordered employés of the defendant whom they found there to stop work on the dam. The defendant was informed of this action, and subsequently the selectmen called upon the defendant himself and told him that he had no right to build the dam. The defendant claimed that he had such right, basing his claim upon grounds which will hereinafter be referred to. His claimed rights the selectmen denied. The defendant was informed that the matter had been placed in the hands of the town agent for investigation. The matter ran on until 1905, when the town employed the defendant to raise the west end of the bridge about two feet and to put in a supporting wing wall. At this time the town officers and the defendant had talk about the dam, but no permission to maintain it was given the defendant. In August, 1906, during a severe freshet, the wing wall at the south end of the west abutment went out, and one side of the traveled portion of the highway caved in. In the following September the bill in this case was brought With reference to the dam in its relation to the bridge the master reports:
The grounds on which the defendant claimed and claims a right to construct a dam at the bridge will now be considered. We here quote from the master's report as follows: The scope of the deed which the master above refers to appears from the second part of the description, which is this: "Meaning hereby to convey the whole of my interest in the forge, coal houses, ore houses, flume and dam standing on said land together with all the interest I have in the tools and implements belonging to said forge with the privilege of building any dam, or headgate, where the upper dam now stands, and may raise all the pond above said upper dam which is necessary for the forge and may have the privilege of erecting any cross dam above the upper pond which may be necessary for the forge below." Of the property conveyed by Aborns to Holley in 1847, Mrs. Cornelia Smith, the widow of one of the two surviving children of Holley, gave the defendant a quitclaim deed on December 1, 1890. Notwithstanding the mention of an upper dam in the deed from Aborns to Holley, the master is unable to find that there was a dam across the river further up stream than the old forge dam until one was built by the defendant, though we understand one of the master's findings to be, in substance, that there was at some time a short breakwater from the upper end of the island to the east bank of the stream, the purpose of which was to turn all the water of the stream into the main channel west of the island. It was conceded before the master that the water impounded by the old forge dam never set the water of the stream back as far as the bridge. At the time when the widow of one of Holley's children gave her quitclaim deed to the defendant, the old forge property had been abandoned for some 27 or 28 years. Counsel differ as to whether in any view of the facts the right to dam the stream at or near the old forge dam passed to the defendant. It is claimed on the part of the defendant that the reference to the forge water privilege in the deed from Aborns to Holley measured the extent of a right which passed to the grantee and which continued to exist after the forge was abandoned, and which passed to the defendant when he took his deed from Mrs. Smith. It is claimed by the orator that, in respect to a water privilege, whatever right Holley had ceased to exist when the forge was abandoned. But the question of who is right in this regard is not material in this case. If it is to be assumed that the defendant is right, and that Mrs. Smith's quitclaim deed gave the defendant all the right that Holley ever had, the most the defendant can claim in the way of a right to dam the river in this vicinity is a right to build a dam somewhere down stream from the bridge, and to maintain such dam at such height as would afford a water privilege at the site of the old forge equal...
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