Town of Bristol v. Town of Fox

• Decision Date: 20 January 1896
• Citation: 42 N.E. 887,159 Ill. 500
• Parties: TOWN OF BRISTOL v. TOWN OF FOX.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

159 Ill. 500

42 N.E. 887

TOWN OF BRISTOL

v.TOWN OF FOX.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 20, 1896.

Appeal from appellate court, Second district.

Action by the town of Bristol against the town of Fox to recover for money expended in the support of paupers residing in the town of Bristol, but for the support of wnich plaintiff alleged defendant was liable, under Rev. St. c. 107, § 16, as amended by Acts 1889 (3 Starr & C. Ann. St. 937). From a judgment of the appellate court (45 Ill. App. 330) reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiff, the latter appeals. Reversed.

Craig, C. J., dissenting.

M. O. Southworth, for appellant.

A. C. Little, for appellee.

WILKIN, J.

This action in assumpsit was begun in the circuit court of Kane county by the town of Bristol against the town of Fox. A trial by the court without a jury resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff for $222.20 and costs of suit. The appellate court of the Second district, on appeal, rendered a final judgment of reversal, but incorporated in the same a finding of facts, in conformity with section 88 of the practice act (2 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 1842, par. 88), and granted an appeal to this court upon a certificate of importance.

The action is brought under section 16 of chapter 107, Rev. St., as amended by the act of 1889 (3 Starr & C. Ann. St. 937), which provides: ‘If any person shall become chargeable as a pauper in any county or town, who did not reside therein at the commencement of twelve months immediately preceding his becoming so chargeable, but did, at that time, reside in some other county or town in this state, it shall be the duty of the county or town clerk, as the case may be, to send written notice, by mail or otherwise, to the county clerk of the county in which the pauper so resided, or if he then resided in a town supporting its own poor, to the town clerk of such town, requesting the proper authorities of such county or town to remove said pauper forthwith, and to pay the expenses accrued and to accrue, in taking care of the same; and such county or town as the case may be, where such pauper resided at the commencement of the twelve months immediately preceding such person becoming chargeable as a pauper, shall pay to the county or town so taking care of such pauper, all reasonable charges for the same, and such amount may be recovered by suit in any court of competent jurisdiction.’ No propositions of law were submitted to be held or refused by the trial court, and hence it must be presumed that it correctly applied the law to the facts of the case, and that the appellate court reversed its judgment because it found the facts different from that court. This is further shown by the fact that the final judgment of the appellate court contains a certificate of the facts as it found them.

It appears from the undisputed facts that both these towns are in Kendall county, and each supports its paupers. One Arthur Bell, with his family, a wife and four small children, was a resident of the town of Fox prior and until about August 18, 1889, when he removed into the town of Kendall in said county, where, in January following, a fifth child was born. The family remained in Kendall until about the 18th of March following, and then removed to the town of Bristol, where they have since resided. On the 16th of May, Bell was drowned, leaving his widow, Sarah, and the five children without means of support. She at once applied to the supervisor of the town of Bristol, who, as overseer of the poor, after notifying the authorities of the town of Fox, furnished her with necessaries for herself and children from time to time prior to the 15th day of August, 1890, which were paid for by the town of Fox, and this suit is brought to recover money paid for such support furnished after that date. The appellate court found the facts as to this claim as follows: ‘That all necessaries furnished the said Sarah Bell and her family before the 15th day of August, 1890, by the appellee, were paid for by the appellant; that before that date appellant had provided her and her family a suitable habitation in the town of Fox in which to live, and offered to remove her to said habitation, and there support her and her family; that said Sarah Bell refused to be so removed, and threatened with prosecution any one who should attempt to remove her; that before that date appellant duly notified appellee of its offer to so remove and support her in the town of Fox, and that appellant would not pay for any necessaries furnished Sarah Bell or her family while she remained in said town of Bristol; that none of the necessaries or expenditures, as furnished said Sarah Bell and made the basis of this suit, were furnished prior to the 15th of August, 1890.’ Manifestly, the finding and judgment of the appellate court is based upon the fact that Mrs. Bell refused to allow herself and family to be removed to the town of Fox, and the notification by that town to the town of Bristol of such refusal, and that it would no longer be responsible for her support. No other fact necessary to the plaintiff's right of action is controverted by the defendant, or found adversely to it by the appellate court. The mother, upon whom was cast the duty of supporting not only herself but her infant children, and being unable to do so, but compelled to apply to the public authorities for relief, as was shown in our former opinion, together with her children, became, in contemplation of law, paupers. In habitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Middleborough, 12 Metc. (Mass). 35; Inhabitants of Garland v. Inhabitants of Dover, 19 Me. 441; Inhabitants of Clinton v. Inhabitants of York, 26 Me. 167; Green v. Inhabitants of Buckfield, 3 Greenl. 136; Croydon v. Sullivan Co., 47 N. H. 179;Town of Northfield v. Town of Roxbury, 15 Vt. 622; and Town of Lyme v. Town of East-Haddam, 14 Conn. 394. That this family became a charge, as paupers, in the town of Bristol, was admitted by the defendant (the town of Fox) by its paying all the expenses incurred by the former for their support prior to August 15th.

The sole question in the case, therefore, is, was the town of Fox discharged of its liability for the support of this family by its offer to remove it to a suitable habitation within its own boundaries, and there provide for it, and the refusal of the mother to be so removed, threatening the officers with prosecution if any attempt was made to do so. Most of the argument for and against the proposition is directed to the inquiry whether or not the defendant below had the right, under the statute, to remove the paupers against their will. Counsel for appellee insist that, its officers having provided for their suitable support in their own town, to which the paupers refused to allow themselves to be taken, and the statute making no provision for the removal, except by their consent, its liability to the plaintiff ceased. The contention, broadly stated, is that a county or town, becoming liable to another for the support of its paupers under section 16, supra, is discharged from that liability upon the refusal of the pauper to return or consent to be taken back to its own territory, and this for the reason that it has no power of removal against such consent, and has a right to say where and how it will provide for the support of its poor. On the other hand, it is insisted that the statute, by fair and necessary implication, makes it the duty of the county or town so liable to remove the paupers upon proper notice, and that the statute itself is a sufficient warrant and authority of law for such removal, with or without the consent of the pauper, and therefore the liability continues until removal. In disposing of this controversy in our former opinion we said: ‘The statute of this state, while requiring the town of settlement of the pauper to remove him or her from the town in which he or she may...