Town of Canton v. Town of Burlington

• Decision Date: 31 January 1890
• Citation: 58 Conn. 277,20 A. 602
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF CANTON v. TOWN OF BURLINGTON.

20 A. 602

58 Conn. 277

TOWN OF CANTON

v. TOWN OF BURLINGTON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Jan., 1890.

Appeal from court of common pleas, Hartford county; WHITE, Judge.

C. H. Briscoe and J. P. Andrews, for appellant. J. J. Jennings, for appellee.

SEYMOUR, J. This is an appeal from the judgment of the court of common pleas in Hartford county in a suit brought to recover for the care and support of Francis Naylan, a pauper. In that court the defendant demurred to certain paragraphs of the complaint, and the court sustained the demurrer. The plaintiff then introduced its testimony, which is set out in the record, and rested its case. Thereupon the defendant moved for judgment as in case of nonsuit; which motion was allowed, and the subsequent motion of the plaintiff to set aside the judgment of nonsuit was overruled. In the argument before this court counsel addressed themselves mainly to the questions relating to the nonsuit; and, inasmuch as the decision of those will simplify the discussion of the other questions, we will dispose of them first. By our statute, a court may grant motions for judgment, as in case of nonsuit, if in its opinion the plaintiff shall have failed to make out a prima facie case. Gen. St. § 1109. In Naugatuck R. Co. v. Waterbury Button Cp., 24 Conn. 468, the court, in sustaining a judgment of nonsuit, said: "If all the facts claimed to be proved by the evidence of the plaintiff cannot, if true, make a prima facie case for him, it would be worse than idle to proceed further with the trial. * * * If the court comes to a wrong decision, there may be an appeal to the supreme court to correct the error, and beyond this there is no relief known to the law. The statute, as well as the common law, requires the plaintiff to introduce evidence which fairly tends to establish a prima facie case in his favor." In Booth v. Hart, 43 Conn. 480, the court says: "It is manifest that the plaintiff testified to facts sufficient, if uncontradicted, to establish her case. And there is nothing strange or incredible in her testimony. In cases tried to the jury, we have established the rule that if there is substantial evidence produced by the plaintiff in support of his cause, which should be weighed and considered by the jury, a nonsuit ought not to be granted. And we think the same rule should apply in cases tried by the court."

It is certain, from the testimony in the case before us, that the plaintiff introduced substantial evidence in support of its claim, which should have been considered and weighed, fairly tending to establish the following facts, namely: That Francis Naylan was an alien; that he had lived continuously with his sister in Burlington since March, 1873; that upon her death he was, within the meaning of the statute, a person needing relief, who had no settlement in any town in this state, and that he applied to G. H. Holcomb, a selectman of Burlington, for relief, which was thereupon furnished him by Burlington at Mrs. McNamara's, who lived in Canton; that he was supported there, upon the agreement of Burlington to pay for such support, (and which it in fact paid for during the first year,) being the only support he received, up to the date when Canton furnished him the supplies to recover for which this suit was brought; that when the Supplies were furnished he was a proper subject for help by Canton; that the supplies furnished were necessary, and of proper amount, and that due notice was given by the selectmen of Canton to the selectmen of Burlington, as set forth in the complaint. We do not overlook the defendant's claim that the testimony concerning the date of Naylan's sister's death, and the testimony of Mrs. McNamara as to the date when Naylan came to her house to be supported, taken in connection with the date of Mr. Holcomb's election as selectman, disproved, if it could be relied on, the plaintiff's claim that the agreement by Burlington to support Naylan at Mrs. McNamara's preceded his removal to her house, and showed that his removal was voluntary, without the intervention of Burlington, and, what was of the highest importance, was prior to his application for relief. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that there was positive testimony that this agreement of Burlington was made in response to Naylan's application for relief; that it preceded his removal; and that his removal was in consequence of such agreement. Applying the ordinary rules for testing the weight of testimony, there was much stronger evidence, as the case stood, that the agreement to support preceded the removal, and that the date which was given of the removal was incorrect, than there was that the date given was correct, and that therefore the removal preceded the agreement. This was a vital question, and we think it must be conceded that the plaintiff introduced substantial evidence in support of its claim which any tribunal should weigh and consider, and which, if the law applicable to the facts, as claimed and supported by such substantial evidence, is favorable to the plaintiff, should have protected it from the judgment appealed from.

Upon the facts above recited, Naylan was a state pauper. By the statute applicable to the case "all persons needing relief, who have no settlement in any town in this state, shall be state paupers, and shall, when needing relief, be provided for by the comptroller for the period of six months after they come into this state. "Pub. Acts 1878, p. 317, § 3. In Marlborough v. Chatham, 50 Conn. 554, it appeared that Michael Kelley came to the United States from Ireland in March, 1872, and, in April of that year, to Portland, in this state, where he remained until June, 1873. In July,...