Town of Clanton v. Chilton County

• Decision Date: 16 December 1920
• Docket Number: 5 Div. 771
• Citation: 87 So. 345,205 Ala. 103
• Parties: TOWN OF CLANTON v. CHILTON COUNTY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

87 So. 345

205 Ala. 103

TOWN OF CLANTON v. CHILTON COUNTY.

5 Div. 771

Supreme Court of Alabama

December 16, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Chilton County; B.K. McMorris, Judge.

Action by Chilton County against the Town of Clanton on a contract for street improvement. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Lawrence F. Gerald, of Clanton, for appellant.

Thos A. Curry and Grady Reynolds, both of Clanton, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

The county of Chilton obtained the judgment appealed from against the town of Clanton (appellant) on the theory that the town was due the county the sum adjudicated in consequence of the fact that the county had, through the county's road contractor, improved a street in the town--a street that connected at the corporate limits of the town with a cross-county highway then being built by the county. It appears that the source of the money wherewith it was contemplated the improvement of this street in Clanton was to be paid for was "interest-bearing" warrants issued by the county against the special road and bridge fund derived from a levy for that purpose under section 215 of the Constitution of 1901; and the completed improvement of this street was paid for by this method.

In view of the restrictive provisions of section 215 of the Constitution, the county authorities were forbidden to devote or to apply, directly or indirectly, the product of such special levy to the repair, construction, or improvement of any street in the town of Clanton; funds so derived or to be collected being restricted to use on, or to improve, public roads of the county. City of Demopolis v. Marengo County, 195 Ala. 214, 70 So. 275; County of Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 190 Ala. 366, 67 So 311, collecting earlier decisions. Hence any effort of the county of Chilton to so engage with the town of Clanton (if so) was wholly void, impossible of valid consummation.

The trial court entertained, and through rulings on the pleading on the admission of evidence, and instruction of the jury gave effect to the view that the circumstances and acts indicated raised up an implied promise on the part of the town of Clanton to pay or reimburse the county of Chilton the money expended by the county in improving, to the advantage of the town of Clanton, the street in question. As stated, no valid express contract between the county and the town could have been made with respect to the devotion, present or prospective, to the improvement of the town's street special road and bridge funds, collected or to be collected under the special levy authorized and governed in application by section 215 of the Constitution. In addition, no contract executed as Code, § 1183, prescribes (City of Mobile v Mobile Electric Co., 203 Ala. 574, 84 So. 816) was shown. So the only possible theory of right in the county to recover must be found, if at all, in a promise implied by law. Section 1183 of the Code itself does not conclude against the raising up of an implied promise on the part of a municipality in a proper case to satisfy obligations that in equity and good conscience it should discharge (see Allen v. Intendant, etc., 89 Ala. 641, 647, 8 So. 30, 9 L.R.A. 497); the whole design and effect of the statute being to define the mode of...