Town of Crandon v. Forest Cnty.

• Decision Date: 22 October 1895
• Citation: 64 N.W. 847,91 Wis. 239
• Parties: TOWN OF CRANDON v. FOREST COUNTY.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

91 Wis. 239

64 N.W. 847

TOWN OF CRANDON

v.FOREST COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 22, 1895.

Appeal from circuit court, Forest county; John Goodland, Judge.

Action by the town of Crandon against Forest county. From an order overruling its demurrer, defendant appeals. Reversed.

This is an appeal from an order overruling defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's complaint. By section 2 of chapter 270 of the Laws of 1887, under which the plaintiff town was organized, it was provided that “it shall be unlawful for any town in Forest county to raise or expend an amount exceeding $2,500 each year, for five years, for town purposes, and it shall be unlawful for any such town to raise or expend an amount exceeding $1,500 in each year, during the same time, for school purposes.” By section 1, c. 39, Laws 1891, and chapter 283, Laws 1893, the previous act was so amended as to fix the limit of town taxation and expenditure in the plaintiff town at $3,800 in any one year, until A. D. 1901, “for all town and school purposes whatsoever.” The complaint sets forth facts tending to show a necessity for raising and expending annually in said town a considerably greater sum for such purposes, and that the entire amount levied for such purposes in 1893 was $6,004; that the owners of the greater part of the real estate in the town, acting under the name and style of “The Wisconsin Taxpayers' Association,” refused to pay their taxes for that year in said town, claiming that so much of the town taxes as exceeded $3,800 was illegal and void; that the lands of said parties, with other lands, upon which the taxes were not paid for that year, were returned as delinquent by the town treasurer to the county treasurer of the county, the amount being $5,638.85 in excess of the amount due fom the plaintiff town to the defendant county, the state taxes for that year having been paid; that the parties comprising the said taxpayers' association appeared before the county board, and offered to pay the taxes upon their lands returned as delinquent, less the amount thereof so claimed to be illegal and void, which amounted to $416.27, if the county board would instruct the county treasurer to give a receipt in full for such taxes, and that the county board did instruct said county treasurer accordingly, and to charge said plaintiff town said $416.27 as an illegal tax because in excess of said $3,800 limit; that such taxpayers paid their taxes, less said illegal excess, and received receipts in full from the county treasurer, and he afterwards sold all other lands in said town returned as delinquent for nonpayment of taxes for that year, and paid to the treasurer of the plaintiff the moneys received by him for said delinquent taxes, less the amount due the county for county taxes, with interest and charges; and that the amount so paid was $416.27 less than the amount that should have been paid by reason of a part of the said town taxes having been so remitted as aforesaid, and which sum he should have collected and paid over. The complaint averred demand of that sum from the county treasurer and from the defendant; that the county treasurer had paid out all moneys retained by him for said delinquent taxes; and that the defendant and county treasurer refused to pay the plaintiff said sum of $416.27, insisting that it was for illegal taxes, and had been properly remitted. The plaintiff demanded judgment for that sum, with interest.Samuel Shaw and Fish & Cary, for appellant.

A. W. Shelton and Latta & Hoffman, for respondent.

PINNEY, J. (after stating the facts).

The plaintiff's contention is that the provisions of the acts cited above, limiting the amount which the town of Crandon might lawfully levy for taxes in any one year, and particularly as to the limit of $3,800 existing in the year in question, for town and school purposes, were unconstitutional and void for conflict with section 23, art. 4, of the constitution, in respect to uniformity of the system of town and county government, and it has occurred to us that there may be serious objection to the validity of such legislation by reason of the provision of section 31, art. 4, of the constitution, prohibiting special legislation ...