Town of Croydon v. Current Use Advisory Bd.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-160,80-160
• Citation: Town of Croydon v. Current Use Advisory Bd., 121 N.H. 442, 431 A.2d 126 (N.H. 1981)
• Parties: TOWN OF CROYDON v. CURRENT USE ADVISORY BOARD.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 126

431 A.2d 126

121 N.H. 442

TOWN OF CROYDON v.CURRENT USE ADVISORY BOARD.

No. 80-160.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 10, 1981.

K. William Clauson, Hanover (on the brief and orally), for plaintiff.

Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Andrew R. Grainger, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for defendant.

GRIMES, Chief Justice.

This appeal arises out of the Town of Croydon's ongoing challenge to New Hampshire's current use taxation statute, RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979).In Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Town of Croydon, 117 N.H. 365, 380, 373 A.2d 1313, 1322(1977), we held that the Blue Mountain Forest Association's (the Association) property in Croydon qualified for current use taxation as forest land.Thereafter, when the town refused to value the Association's land in accordance with the current use values established by the current use advisory board (the board), the Association brought a petition to compel the town to do so.The town defended that action by arguing that the current use values set by the board were only suggested values and not binding upon the towns.The town also contended that the values developed by the board were inconsistent with the requirements of RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979) and therefore could not bind the towns.The trial court transferred the legal questions raised by the town to this court, and we held that the current use values promulgated by the board were mandatory.Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Town of Croydon, 119 N.H. 202, 204-05, 400 A.2d 55, 57(1979).We further held that the town could not challenge the values established by the board in that proceeding because the board was not a party to the litigation, but that the town could challenge the values "in an appropriate proceeding" against the board pursuant to RSA 541-A:7.Id. at 205, 400 A.2d at 57.

The town took its cue and, on April 27, 1979, brought a declaratory judgment action against the board challenging the current use values for forest land set by the board.After hearing four days of testimony, the Master (John C. Fairbanks, Esq.) ruled that the current use values in question were consistent with RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979) and were not unreasonable.Cann, J., approved the master's recommendation, and the town appealed.We affirm.

RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979) is designed "to encourage the preservation of open space land ..." by providing "for valuation of land at current use levels rather than at the land's best and highest use."Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Town of Croydon, 119 N.H. at 203, 400 A.2d at 56.(Citations omitted.)Following the enactment of RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979) in 1973, the board established values for each category of land designated for current use treatment.The range of values prescribed by the board for forest land, the category of land involved in this case, was twenty to thirty-five dollars per acre.As of 1979, the valuation range for forest land established by the board had not changed.The issue on appeal is whether the twenty to thirty-five dollar valuation range is inconsistent with the spirit or letter of RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979) or otherwise unreasonable.

The board arrived at the range of values for forest land through a two-step process.First, the board assigned a base value of ten dollars per acre to all non-productive land in New Hampshire on the premise that all land has some value.The board then took values for forest land (based on the land's productive capacity) developed by the University of New Hampshire's Institute of Natural and Environmental Resources, averaged those values to produce a valuation range of ten to twenty-five dollars per acre, and added the ten-dollar-per-acre base figure to produce a current use valuation range of twenty to thirty-five dollars per acre.The town attacks both the method of arriving at this valuation range for forest land and the range of values itself.It seeks to value forest land in Croydon at fifty to seventy dollars per acre.

The town first challenges the range of values for forest land because that range is based upon the "average value of average acres" of forest land in New Hampshire.The town argues that there is no such thing as a "truly average acre" of forest land, that the board's range of values does not take into account the characteristics of particular parcels of land, and that the range of values does not provide an accurate means of determining the specific value of a specific tract of land.

Assuming arguendo that there is no such thing as an "average acre" of forest land, we still do not find that the board's use of average values renders the valuation range for forest land invalid.In the first place, the use of a range of values derived from average values make sense from an administrative perspective.In this context, we note the master's reference to "the almost impossible task of determining values applicable to individual tracts as distinct from general state-wide application ...."Furthermore, the use of a range of values still permits town assessors to take into account the unique qualities of each parcel of land being assessed and, within the limits of the range, to value the property accordingly.Thus, the objection that the characteristics and value of specific tracts of land is ignored under a scheme utilizing average values is obviated to the extent that it relates to parcels of forest land whose actual current use values fall within the twenty to thirty-five dollar per acre range.

We recognize that the actual current use value of some forest land may be less than twenty dollars per acre or greater than thirty-five dollars per acre, but that alone does not mean that a valuation system based on averages is unlawful.Indeed, to hold that the board must prescribe a range of values encompassing the current use value of every piece of forest land in the State, ranging from that with the lowest current use value to that with the highest, would be contrary to the purpose of RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979), "which is to create a statewide system of valuation of land classified for current use taxation at a sufficiently low level so as to encourage the land's preservation as open space."Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Town of Croydon, 119 N.H. at 204-05, 400 A.2d at 57.(Emphasis added.)The town's suggested "system" hardly seems a "statewide system."

We conclude that the use of a valuation range based on average values is a sensible approach to the task of valuing all of New Hampshire's forest land, and one consistent with the intent of RSA ch. 79-A(Supp.1979).Accordingly, we hold that the board was well within its discretion in utilizing this approach.For the same reasons, we reject the town's argument that the current use taxation statute does not authorize a thirty-five dollar per acre limitation on current use values.

The town next contends that the board's method of arriving at current use values for forest land does not reflect all of the criteria set forth in RSA 79-A:2 XI (Supp.1979).RSA 79-A:2 XI (Supp.1979) defines the "use value" of open space land as:

"... the valuation per acre which the land would command if it were required to remain henceforth in an open space qualifying use.This valuation will be determined by the assessor in accordance with the recommendations of the board for the class, type, grade and location of land under consideration and its income-producing capability."

The town specifically argues that the board's method of valuation wrongly ignores the "grade" and "location" of the land.We cannot agree.

There was testimony by Theodore Natti, the State's chief forester and the secretary of the current use advisory board, that all of the statutory criteria were taken into account in the income-production formula used by the board in developing the current use values for forest land.Mr. Natti specifically testified that the grade and location of land is reflected in the net stumpage prices incorporated in the formula.There was also testimony that the average values derived by the board poorly reflected the grade and location criteria.Conflicts and contradictions in the testimony, however, are for the trier of fact to resolve.Belknap Textiles, Inc. v. Belknap Industries, Inc., 121 N.H. ---, ---, 424 A.2d 1141, 1142(1981);Guy v. Hanley, 111 N.H. 73, 76, 276 A.2d 1, 3(1971).There was sufficient credible evidence to support the master's finding that the range of values for forest land established by the board adequately reflect all of the criteria set forth in RSA 79-A:2 XI (Supp.1979).Consequently, that finding must stand.Automated Housing Corp. v....