Town of Elgin v. Marshall

• Decision Date: 08 January 1883
• Citation: 27 L.Ed. 249,106 U.S. 578,1 S.Ct. 484
• Parties: TOWN OF ELGIN v. MARSHALL and another
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

106 U.S. 578

1 S.Ct. 484

27 L.Ed. 249

TOWN OF ELGIN v. MARSHALL and another.

January 8, 1883.

Gordon E. Cole, for plaintiff in error.

S. U. Pinney, for defendants in error.

MATTHEWS, J.

This action was brought by the defendants in error, being citizens of Wisconsin, against the plaintiff in error, to recover the amount due upon certain coupons or interest warrants, detached from municipal bonds, alleged to have been issued by the town of Elgin in aid of a railroad company. The defense set up was that the bonds and coupons were void, the statute, under the assumed authority of which they had been issued, being, as was alleged, unconstitutional. The cause was tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and it is part of the finding of the court that, at the time of rendering the judgment, the defendants in error were the owners of the bonds and coupons mentioned in the complaint, and judgment is given for the amount—$1,660.75—due thereon, being for the interest on 15 bonds of $500 each.

The case has been fully presented in argument upon its merits, as they appear from the findings of the court, but as we consider ourselves obliged to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction, we have considered no other question. This question is anticipated by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, who, while admitting that the amount sued for, and for which judgment was recovered, is less than $5,000, yet maintains that the value of the matter in dispute is in excess of that sum, because the defendants in error, being the holders and owners of the bonds to the amount of $7,500, have obtained, by the present judgment, an adjudication, conclusive upon the plaintiff in error, as an estoppel, of its liability to pay the entire amount of the principal sum.

It is true that the point actually litigated and determined in this action was the validity of the bonds, and as between these parties, in any subsequent action upon other coupons, or upon the bonds themselves, this judgment, according to the principles stated in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, might, and as to all questions actually adjudged would, be conclusive as an estoppel. And, accordingly, the plaintiff in error, in support of the jurisdiction of this court, relies on what was said in Troy v. Evans, 97 U. S. 1, that, 'prima facie, the judgment against a defendant in an action for money is the measure of our jurisdiction in his behalf. This prima facie case continues until the contrary is shown; and if jurisdiction is invoked because of the collateral effect a judgment may have in another action, it must appear that the judgment conclusively settles the rights of the parties in a matter actually in dispute, the sum or value of which exceeds the required amount.' The point was not involved in the decision of that case, as the writ of error was in fact dismissed, and what was said in the opinion seems to have been rather intended as a concession for the sake of argument, than as a statement of a conclusion of law. The inference now sought to be drawn from it we are not able to adopt. In our opinion, sections 691 and 692, Rev. St., which limit the jurisdiction of this court, on writs of error and appeal, to review final judgments in civil actions, and final decrees in cases of equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to those where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $5,000, have reference to the matter which is directly in dispute, in the particular cause in which the judg- ment or decree, sought to be reviewed, has been rendered, and do not permit us, for the purpose of determining its sum or value, to estimate its collateral effect in a subsequent suit between the same or other parties.

The rule, it is true, is an arbitrary one, as it is based upon a fixed amount, representing pecuniary value, and, for that reason, excludes the jurisdiction of this court in cases which involve rights that, because they are priceless, have no measure in money, (Lee v. Lee, 8 Pet. 44; Pratt v. Fitzhugh, 1 Black, 271; Barry v. Mercein, 5 How. 103; Sparrow v. Strong, 3 Wall. 97;) but, as it draws the boundary line of jurisdiction, it is to be construed with strictness and rigor. As jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of parties, but must be given by the law, so it ought not to be extended by doubtful constructions. Undoubtedly, congress, in establishing a rule for determining the appellant jurisdiction of this court, among other reasons of convenience that dictated the adoption of the money value of the matter in dispute, had in view that it was precise and definite. Ordinarily, it would appear in the pleadings and judgment, where the claim must be stated and determined; but where the recovery of specific property, real or personal, is sought, affidavits of value were permitted, from the beginning, as a suitable mode of ascertaining the fact, and bringing it upon the record. Williamson...