Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1944
• Docket Number: 27895.
• Citation: 53 N.E.2d 161,222 Ind. 253
• Parties: TOWN OF FLORA v. INDIANA SERVICE CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

53 N.E.2d 161

222 Ind. 253

TOWN OF FLORA v. INDIANA SERVICE CORPORATION et al.

No. 27895.

Supreme Court of Indiana

February 28, 1944

Appeal from Carroll Circuit Court; William B. Smith Judge.

A D. Bishop, of Flora, and Scifres & Hollingsworth, of Lebanon, for appellant.

James M. Barrett, Jr., Phil M. McNagny, Leigh L. Hunt, Ward Dildine, and Von Livingston, all of Ft. Wayne, and Joseph T Ives, of Delphi, for appellees.

SHAKE Judge.

Briefly the history of this case is as follows: Pursuant to a petition of the voters, the Board of Trustees of the Town of Flora adopted a resolution to acquire by purchase or condemnation the electric utility property of the appellee Indiana Service Corporation. The voters of the town approved this action at a special election. The trustees then made an offer to purchase only a part of the property described in said resolution. This offer was rejected and the town instituted a condemnation proceeding. The appellees filed objections to the appointment of appraisers. There was a trial, resulting in the objections being overruled. Appraisers were appointed and an appeal to this court followed. The judgment was reversed with a specific mandate to the trial court 'to vacate the order appointing appraisers and to sustain the appellants' objections.' Indiana Service Corporation v. Town of Flora, 1940, 218 Ind. 208, 31 N.E.2d 1015, 1017. Thereafter, the court below, acting pursuant to said mandate, entered a judgment to the effect that the objections made to the appointment of appraisers 'be, and the same are in all things sustained and that the plaintiff take nothing by its complaint herein.' (Our italics).

Subsequently, the trustees of the town made a new offer to purchase said utility property, which offer embraced all of the property described in the original declaratory resolution. This offer was likewise rejected and the appellant thereupon instituted a new action in condemnation. Objections to the appointment of appraisers were again filed by the appellees herein. There was a trial on a stipulation of facts, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the appellees, sustaining all of their said objections. The appellant moved for a new trial on the ground that the decision was contrary to law, which motion was overruled, and this appeal followed.

The proposition relied upon by the appellees in defense of the judgment in their favor, which is here being reviewed, is as follows: Under the statute by virtue of which the appellant has now twice sought to condemn the appellees' property, approval of the voters of the Town of Flora is an indispensable prerequisite. § 54-612, Burns' 1933, § 14029, Baldwin's 1934. Such approval was purportedly given, but the appellees asserted in their objections to the former proceedings, as well as in present action, that such election was not legally held. They now say, in addition, that the issue and fact of such illegality was finally adjudicated in their favor in the former condemnation proceeding when the court below decided that their objections in the first case were 'in all things sustained.' Reliance is placed upon the rule of law known as the doctrine of res judicata.

It is necessary that we have, on the outset, a clear understanding of the principles of law upon which appellees rest their case. There are two well defined branches of the rule of res judicata. The subject has often been confused by the loose use of descriptive terms. One branch of the subject deals with prior adjudication as a bar. Under it a cause of action finally determined between the parties on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, cannot again be litigated by new proceedings before the same or any other tribunal, except by way of review according to law. Such a judgment or decree so rendered is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action, between the same parties, or those in privity with them. Every question which was within the issues, and which, under the issues, might have been proved, will be presumed to have been proved and adjudicated. Jordan v. Sisson, 1924, 82 Ind.App. 128, 141 N.E. 881. This rule is perhaps best described as 'estoppel by judgment.'

The other branch of the subject applies where the causes of action are not the same, but where some fact or question has been determined and adjudicated in the former suit, and the same fact or question is again put in issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties. In such cases the former adjudication of the fact or question, if properly presented and relied on, will be held conclusive on the parties in the latter suit, regardless of the identity of the causes of action, or the lack of it, in the two suits. When the second action between the same parties is on a different cause of action, claim, or demand, it is well settled that the judgment in the first suit operates as an estoppel only as to the point or question actually litigated and determined, and not as to other matters which might have been litigated and determined. In such cases the inquiry must always be as to the point or question actually litigated and determined in the original action. This branch of the subject may appropriately be described as 'estoppel by verdict or finding.' See Charles E. Harding Co. v. Harding, 1933, 352 Ill. 417, 186 N.E. 152, 88 A.L.R. 563 (Annotation on p. 574).

In this connection it should be further observed that where a judgment may have been based upon either or any of two or more distinct facts, a party desiring to plead the judgment as an estoppel by verdict or finding upon the particular fact involved in a subsequent suit must show that it went upon that fact, or else the question will be open to a new contention. The estoppel of a judgment is only presumptively conclusive, when it appears that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter brought in question. It is necessary to look to the complete record to ascertain what was the question in issue. Dygert v. Dygert, 1891, 4 Ind.App. 276, 29 N.E. 490.

The ancient common-law method of perpetuating a judgment was by engrossing the entire proceedings, including the pleadings orders and final disposition upon parchment. The judgment was evidenced by this roll. 34 C.J., Judgments, § 223 et seq. Our practice in this regard is regulated by statute. The pleadings in a cause are preserved in the office of the clerk. § 2-1052, Burns' 1933, § 157, Baldwin's 1934. The court proceedings are recorded in order books. § 4-324, Burns' 1933, §...