Town of Glenrock v. Abadie

• Decision Date: 27 October 1953
• Docket Number: No. 2580,2580
• Citation: Town of Glenrock v. Abadie, 72 Wyo. 111, 262 P.2d 393 (Wyo. 1953)
• Parties: TOWN OF GLENROCK, v. ABADIE et al.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 393

262 P.2d 393

72 Wyo. 111

TOWN OF GLENROCK, v.ABADIE et al.

No. 2580.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Oct. 27, 1953.

Thomas O. Miller, Lusk, and Edward S. Halsey, Newcastle, in support of petition for rehearing, for respondent.

HARNSBERGER, Justice.

The petition for rehearing filed by the respondent asserts that this court disregarded its time-honored rules with respect to the consideration given to the general finding of fact made by the lower court.A complete refutation of this is found in the positive statement contained in our opinion, that the case might be decided on undisputed facts, followed by the further statement, that for the purpose of the case it would be admitted that there were mistakes in the deed from Engelking to Skinner and from Skinners to the town, and also that the town's deed to the Skinners for a one-half interest in the minerals was made in order to compensate the Skinners for some extra land not contemplated by the parties according to their contract.In other words, for the purpose of the case, we accepted in toto the whole of the factual position taken by the respondent which included the concession that the record showed that a one-half mineral interest still remained in the town.What ultimately became of the other one-half interest in the minerals is of no importance in this case.

We find no merit in the contention that by reasonable inference the evidence should be so enlarged as to justify a finding that there was an equitable estoppel against the town, because of supposed representations made by the town's officials.

The record fails to show that the town made any representations at all.There is no evidence that there were any representations binding upon the town, which either denied the town's title to the disputed mineral interest or acknowledged that such interest was owned or held by the Skinners.Where there is no precedent fact, there can be no inference, Chambers v. Hunt, 18 N.J.L. 339, and the mere possibility or even probability that a resulting fact might occur or exist, does not remove the desired conclusion from the realm of speculation and conjecture which is beyond the scope of reasonable inference.SeeLouisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mann's Adm'r, 227 Ky. 399, 13 S.W.2d 257, 258.This court in Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 51, 52, 241 P. 369, 242 P. 1107, 1110, said, '* * * Guesswork cannot be substituted for evidence or inference, for 'an inference is the conclusion drawn on reason from premises established by proof.In a sense, it is the thing proved.Guesswork is not.'White-house v. Bolster, 95 Me. 458, 50 A. 240. * * *' And in the same paragraph, concluded, '* * * But an inference cannot be based upon a mere possibility or probability; It can only be based upon a fact proved, or something known to be true.Seavey v. Laughlin, 98 Me. 517, 57 A. 796. * * *'

Also in Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. at pages 47, 48, 242 P. 1107, 1109, it was said:

'With reference to the subject in the case at bar, we think it cannot be said to have been practically impossible for the plaintiff to show whether or not an X-ray apparatus was available for the defendant's use prior to the time when it was used.Hence the reason for the application of such a rule of inference or presumption as now contended for is absent here.The fact of availability, if it existed, might have been established, and seemingly without difficulty, leaving no reasonable ground for the application of the rule of inference with respect to the subject under consideration.'(Emphasis supplied.)

Logically applying this pronouncement to the matter here being considered, if it was the fact that the town had made the representations or committed the acts upon which an equitable estoppel could have been predicated, those facts 'cannot be said to have been practically impossible' of proof.So here, too, it might well be said that 'the reason for the application of such a rule of inference or presumption as now contended for is absent here.'

The urged equitable doctrines or maxims, 'Equity regards as done that which...