Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co.
Citation | 65 F.2d 112 |
Decision Date | 11 May 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 761.,761. |
Parties | TOWN OF GREEN RIVER v. FULLER BRUSH CO. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Mahlon E. Wilson, of Salt Lake City, Utah, and T. S. Taliaferro, Jr., and Arthur Lee Taliaferro, both of Rock Springs, Wyo., and Robert C. Wilson, of Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant.
Samuel M. Lee and Ray E. Lee, both of Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellee.
Before LEWIS and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges, and JOHNSON, District Judge.
The decree in this case perpetually enjoined the Town of Green River, Wyoming, its officers and their successors, "from enforcing or attempting to enforce against said plaintiff, The Fuller Brush Company, the ordinance of said The Town of Green River, known as Ordinance No. 175, as same is set forth in full in the answer of said defendant herein."
The said ordinance is in these terms:
Appellee relying on the federal Constitution (Amendment 14; article 1, § 8) claims that the enforcement of the ordinance against its solicitors, representatives, and agents would deprive it of its property without due process of law, deny to it equal protection of law, and would interfere with interstate commerce. It further contends that the ordinance is not a valid exercise of the police power, but is an arbitrary and unreasonable attempt to exercise that power, and would be oppressive on appellee, and its enforcement without lawful right.
It is not doubted or questioned that the state has given the town by statute, according to the terms thereof, the power to declare what shall constitute a nuisance, to abate and prevent the same, and to inflict punishment on violators. Wyoming Comp. Stat. 1920, § 1754, 6th and 29th subdivisions, and section 7257.
When the bill came on for final hearing, the suit was submitted on a stipulation of facts, which are, insofar as material, these:
The matter in dispute exceeds $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
The Fuller Brush Company, a Delaware corporation, is engaged in the sale and distribution of goods, wares and merchandise to the public of the United States in general, having its principal place of business at Hartford, Connecticut. In carrying on its business of selling and distributing it has representatives, solicitors, and agents in various states of the United States who take orders for its goods, wares, and merchandise, and such orders are all forwarded to its office at Hartford or to various distributing stations throughout the United States to be accepted and filled, and the goods are shipped by common carrier for delivery. Shipments in fulfillment of orders obtained in Wyoming are interstate shipments.
The agents or solicitors of appellee go uninvited and against the wishes of the occupants of some of the dwellings in the town in and upon private premises and homes, and then and there solicit orders for appellee's goods, contrary to the express provisions of said ordinance.
When an agent of appellee goes to a residence to solicit orders for its goods he approaches in an orderly manner. When he reaches the house he rings the doorbell or knocks on the door. If the occupant of the house appears in response to the knock or ring, appellee's representative hands the occupant a card stating that he will call at some future time to redeem the card and present the occupant with a gift item with the compliments of appellee, and makes an appointment to call at a future time for an interview. If no one answers the knock or ring, appellee's agent leaves a card underneath the door or in some other secure place. Subsequently the representative calls again and knocks or rings and explains and demonstrates the use of appellee's goods and endeavors to obtain orders for goods like exhibited samples to be delivered at a future date. Orders taken are forwarded by the agent to appellee for acceptance, and if accepted the goods ordered are shipped for delivery. When received they are delivered to the customer in an orderly manner by the agent who took the order or some other representative of appellee, and the purchase price is collected and remitted to appellee.
The District Judge regarded the case as a close one, but reached the conclusion that the ordinance constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable regulation and entered the injunctive decree.
It will be observed that the prohibitions and penalties named in the ordinance are directed against solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants, and transient vendors of merchandise. Those named, except solicitors, have long been recognized as subject to regulation under the police power. Indeed, the power extends to the prohibition of such practices under penalty. Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 S. Ct. 367, 39 L. Ed. 430; Commonwealth v. Gardner, 133 Pa. 284, 19 A. 550, 7 L. R. A. 666, 19 Am. St. Rep. 645; Commonwealth v. Dunham, 191 Pa. 73, 43 A. 84; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 30 S. Ct. 493, 54 L. Ed. 673, 18 Ann. Cas. 865. But the ordinance here under consideration did not attempt to prohibit any of the parties named from selling their wares, either of goods carried with them or on samples for future delivery. It denounces a particular practice of such vendors or their agents. We must assume that the practice existed in the town as the first section states, and that it had become annoying and disturbing and objectionable to at least some of the citizens. We think like practices have become so general and common as to be of judicial knowledge, and that the frequent ringing of doorbells of private residences by itinerant vendors and solicitors is in fact a nuisance to the occupants of homes. It is not appellee and its solicitors and their methods alone that must be considered in determining the reasonableness of the ordinance, but many others as well who seek in the same way to dispose of their wares. One follows another until the ringing doorbells disturb the quietude of the home and become a constant annoyance. Another practice of the same sort has arisen within recent years of throwing advertisements at the entrance of homes. Men are employed for that purpose. Whole residence sections of cities and towns are at times flooded in this way to the annoyance of its citizens. Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 P. 343. We think no...
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