Town of Gulf Shores v. Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1987
• Citation: 518 So.2d 1259
• Parties: TOWN OF GULF SHORES, et al. v. LAMAR ADVERTISING OF MOBILE, INC. LAMAR ADVERTISING OF MOBILE, INC. v. TOWN OF GULF SHORES, et al. 85-965, 85-1000.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1259

518 So.2d 1259

TOWN OF GULF SHORES, et al. v. LAMAR ADVERTISING OF MOBILE, INC.

LAMAR ADVERTISING OF MOBILE, INC. v. TOWN OF GULF SHORES, et al.

85-965, 85-1000.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Dec. 21, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1988.

Reggie Copeland, Jr., and J. Stuart Wallace of Nettles, Barker, Janecky & Copeland, Mobile, for appellants/cross-appellees.

A. Richard Maples, Jr., of Thiry, Maples & Brunson, Mobile, for appellees/cross-appellants.

ALMON, Justice.

Lamar Advertising of Mobile, Inc., filed this action seeking equitable relief and money damages. The trial court granted an injunction and dismissed the damages claim. The defendants, the Town of Gulf Shores and several of its officials, appeal from the granting of the injunction, and Lamar cross-appeals from the dismissal of the damages claim.

In July 1985 Lamar leased two parcels of property, one on either side of the intracoastal waterway bridge over which Highway 59 enters Gulf Shores, for the construction of a large billboard on each parcel of property. After securing the leases and obtaining permits from the state, Lamar began construction of the signs, which were to be approximately 110 feet high. The faces of the signs were to be 14 feet high by 48 feet wide and were to be 25 to 30 feet away from the bridge.

After beginning construction, Lamar was informed by employees of the Town of Gulf Shores that, although the billboards were not in the municipal limits of Gulf Shores, they were within the police jurisdiction, and that Lamar would have to obtain a building permit. The officials responsible for issuing building permits told Lamar's representative, Mike Manderson, that Lamar would have to obtain a business license before it could receive a permit. When Manderson applied to the town clerk for a license, the clerk told him he would have to take his request to the town council at its next meeting. Manderson and an attorney for Lamar attended that meeting; their request prompted considerable discussion, after which the council voted to issue Lamar a restricted business license that would allow Lamar to construct signs in other locations, but not next to the bridge over the intracoastal waterway.

Lamar filed this suit, claiming that Gulf Shores was attempting to enforce zoning ordinances outside its municipal limits. Gulf Shores argued that it was exercising its police power to insure the safety of its citizens and visitors. The trial court agreed with Lamar and granted an injunction prohibiting Gulf Shores from interfering with the construction of the billboards, but dismissed the claim for money damages.

Gulf Shores argues that the trial court erred in granting the injunction. A municipality has the authority to exercise certain police powers within its police jurisdiction. Ala.Code 1975, § 11-40-10. The power to enforce zoning regulations, however, does not extend beyond the municipal limits. Roberson v. City of Montgomery, 285 Ala. 421, 233 So.2d 69 (1970).

The trial court rejected the Town's contention that the signs would constitute a safety hazard and held that the decision to grant only a restricted license was arbitrary and capricious. The following portions of the court's order and judgment set forth the basis for its conclusions:

"7. At the Council meeting, the reasons discussed by the Council for such restriction were aesthetics and the creation of potential traffic hazards.

"8. The evidence was undisputed that the Town had never previously enforced license or permit requirements for signs located within its police jurisdiction.

"9. Defendant town has long had an ordinance which forbids the erection and maintenance of all general advertising signs.

"10. Subsequent to the filing of Lamar's complaint in this cause, but prior to the hearing on October 2, 1985, the sites on which Lamar had commenced erecting its signs were annexed by the Town and, according to the Town, then became subject to its ordinance which forbids general advertising signs.

"11. The Court finds no merit to the contention of Defendant Town that the proposed signs would create a safety hazard to passing motorists.

"12. The Court further finds that Defendant Town was without authority to deny issuance of the requested permits for locations within its police jurisdiction but outside its corporate limits on purely aesthetic grounds, and such denial was an abuse of discretion.

"13. At the time of filing of the present action, Lamar had a clear right...