Town of Johnston v. Santilli

• Citation: 892 A.2d 123
• Decision Date: 03 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2004-320-Appeal.,2004-320-Appeal.
• Parties: TOWN OF JOHNSTON v. David J. SANTILLI et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

892 A.2d 123

TOWN OF JOHNSTON v. David J. SANTILLI et al.

No. 2004-320-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

March 3, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Louis DeSimone, Jr., Esq., for Plaintiff.

Stephen M. Robinson, Esq., Providence, for Defendant.

Present: WILLIAMS, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, SUTTELL, and ROBINSON, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

A hostile and fractious relationship between town hall and the school committee in the Town of Johnston has led to repeated clashes in the courtroom and in hearings before the Commissioner of Education. The specific battles between them primarily have been over money and budgetary control, but also have included allegations of intimidation of school department personnel, including the Superintendent of Schools, by both the Mayor and the Director of Finance.

The dispute before us presently involves cross-appeals from a declaratory judgment in which a justice of the Superior Court ruled that the Charter of the Town of Johnston does not require that the town solicitor be the exclusive legal counsel to the school committee.¹ For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse.

I Facts and Procedural History

The Johnston Town Charter establishes the Office of Town Solicitor and reserves in the mayor the authority to appoint a town solicitor as well as assistant town solicitors. The charter expressly delineates the duties of the town solicitor: he or she is to "be the attorney for the town and legal advisor to the Mayor, town council, and all other departments, offices and agencies of the town government." Despite this clear language, the school committee often has engaged the services of attorneys not affiliated with the town solicitor's office for a variety of reasons. It is also beyond dispute that the town administration and the school committee frequently have been embroiled in legal battles with each other, some of them visceral in nature. For example, in 1995 and again in 1998, the school committee alleged that the town failed to honor school department invoices, and the parties appeared before the Commissioner of Education to resolve the controversy. Also, in 1995, the school committee and the town again appeared before the commissioner when the school committee claimed that the town failed to provide it with sufficient funding, thereby rendering it unable to comply with state and federal mandates and its contractual obligations.

In 2001, the Superior Court granted the school committee injunctive relief when it again demonstrated that the municipality wrongfully had refused to honor school department invoices. Among the school committee's allegations was a claim that the town had frozen certain student activity accounts, threatening the cancellation of student field trips and other extracurricular activities. Each time one of these intramural slugfests has occurred, the town solicitor has represented the town and the school committee has retained outside counsel.

The positions of the parties concerning legal representation became crystallized in 1997, when the Johnston Federation of Teachers (union) sued the school committee, which then engaged independent counsel to defend itself. The union objected, arguing that only the town solicitor could represent the school committee. The solicitor moved to intervene to support the union position. It appears that cooler heads prevailed at that point, however, and in February 1998, the town council enacted Ordinance 1029, which authorized the school committee to hire its own lawyer.

Accompanying Ordinance 1029 was Town Council Resolution 421, passed on the same date and appointing the law firm of Asquith, Mahoney and Robinson to represent the school committee "on all matters until further notice." The resolution also expressed an intent to submit legislation to the General Assembly to amend title 16 of the General Laws so that the school committee would be enabled to engage its own legal counsel on a permanent basis.

The era of good feeling was short-lived, however, and on July 1, 2002, town solicitor Louis A. DeSimone corresponded with David Santilli, the chairman of the Johnston School Committee. In his letter, DeSimone reminded Santilli that the charter provides that the town solicitor "shall act as attorney for all departments and agencies of the Town of Johnston." DeSimone expressed his intention to begin to provide legal services to the school committee, and asked that all legal matters be referred to his office. Apparently, the solicitor's letter did not have the desired effect on the school committee, which continued to employ outside counsel as it saw fit. Matters came to a head on December 9, 2002, when the town council repealed Ordinance 1029. Shortly thereafter, on January 13, 2003, the town filed a complaint against the school committee in Superior Court, in which it alleged that notwithstanding the directive of the town solicitor and the repeal of the ordinance authorizing the retaining of outside counsel, the school committee had continued to employ attorney Stephen M. Robinson to represent it in legal matters. This, the town contended in its complaint, directly contravened the express mandate contained in the town charter. The town therefore asked the court to declare that only the solicitor could act as legal advisor to departments and agencies of the town, including the school committee. The town also requested the court to enjoin the school committee from seeking independent legal counsel. The school committee counterclaimed and argued that due to the contentious relationship between the town and the school committee, the town solicitor, whose interests were aligned with those of the town, could not represent the school committee without violating relevant provisions of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct and the Rhode Island Code of Ethics. The school committee requested that the court declare that it had the right to retain independent legal counsel, and it asked that the town be enjoined from interfering with this right. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The Superior Court granted the school committee's motion. The justice specifically did not rule on whether the town solicitor, in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Ethics, must refrain from representing the school committee when particular conflicts of interest arise. Rather, he declared that the Johnston Town Charter, which requires the solicitor to act as counsel for municipal departments and agencies of the town, does not apply to the Johnston School Committee, and therefore the school committee has the right to seek legal services from attorneys other than the town solicitor or assistant town solicitors.

The town filed a timely appeal, in support of which it argues that the justice abused his discretion when he ruled that the school committee has the inherent authority to engage its own legal counsel. The school committee cross-appealed, and argues that the trial court should have resolved the issue of whether the relationship between the school committee and the town solicitor creates a conflict of interest that would prohibit the solicitor from providing legal advice or representation to the school committee.

II Standard of Review

Both the school committee and the town maintain that because this case arises from an appeal of a declaratory judgment, this Court should review the justice's decision for abuse of discretion. See Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I.1997) (setting forth the standard of review for declaratory judgments). However, the basis of the parties' dispute actually hinges on the interpretation of Johnston's home rule charter, and this Court previously has explained that "[w]hen a court is called upon to construe the provisions of a municipal charter, the usual rules of statutory construction are employed." Coventry School Committee v. Richtarik, 122 R.I. 707, 713, 411 A.2d 912, 915 (1980) (citing Borromeo v. Personnel Board, 117 R.I. 382, 367 A.2d 711 (1977)). Therefore, when we interpret the meaning of a charter provision, we apply the same de novo standard of review that we use when faced with questions of statutory construction. See State v. Partington, 847 A.2d 272, 276 (R.I.2004) (applying de novo review after party sought declaratory judgment in statutory construction case). When we do so, we give the words of a charter provision "their usual and ordinary meaning." Carter v. City of Pawtucket, 115 R.I. 134, 138, 341 A.2d 53, 56 (1975).

III Analysis

A. The Johnston Town Charter

To determine the effect of Johnston's Town Charter on the school committee's right to hire independent counsel, we begin our analysis, as always, with the language of the disputed charter provisions:

"Sec. 6-4. Duties.

"The town solicitor shall be the attorney for the town and legal advisor to the mayor, town council, and all other departments, offices and agencies of the town government and shall direct the work of the assistant solicitors. It shall be the duty of the town solicitor to:

"(1) Appear for and protect the rights of the town in all actions, suits and proceedings, civil or criminal, in law or equity, brought by or against it or for or against any of its departments, including the board of canvassers and registration;

"(2) Examine and make recommendations in the form of all ordinances and resolutions and the form of all initiations for bids, contracts and other documents sent out by any department, office or agency of the town;

"(3) Perform such other duties appropriate to his office as the provisions of this Charter, the Mayor and/or the town council may require." (Emphasis added.)

"Sec. 6-6. Special powers.

"The statement in this Charter of duties of the town solicitor shall not be deemed to abridge such special powers and duties as are now and hereafter conferred upon town solicitors by law; however, no department or agency shall employ...