Town of Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, s. 14324

• Decision Date: 10 December 1991
• Docket Number: Nos. 14324,s. 14324
• Citation: 600 A.2d 752,220 Conn. 516
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: TOWN OF KILLINGLY et al. v. CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL et al. to 14327.

Page 752

600 A.2d 752

220 Conn. 516

TOWN OF KILLINGLY et al. v. CONNECTICUT SITING COUNCIL et al.

Nos. 14324 to 14327.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 1, 1991.

Decided Dec. 10, 1991.

W. Richard Smith, Jr., with whom was Christopher J. Liebig, Hartford, for appellants in Docket No. 14325 (named plaintiff et al.).

Charles J. Nicol, with whom, on the brief, were Cynthia J. Rummell, Hartford, and Kathleen Eldergill, Manchester, for appellants in Docket Nos. 14324, 14326 and 14327 (plaintiff Providence Water Supply Bd. et al.).

Lawrence J. Golden, Hartford, with whom was Phyllis E. Lemell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, GLASS, COVELLO and BERDON, JJ.

GLASS, Associate Justice.

The named plaintiff, the town of Killingly, Killingly Planning and Zoning Commission and Killingly Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Commission, and the plaintiffs, Providence Water Supply Board, National Patent Medical, and Northeastern Connecticut Council of Governments, have appealed from the judgment of the trial court granting a motion filed by the defendant, Killingly Energy Limited Partnership (KELP), to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal of the decision of the named defendant, Connecticut Siting Council (siting council) granting KELP's application for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need. We reverse.

The facts material to the disposition of this appeal are undisputed. Pursuant to Chapter 277a of the Connecticut General Statutes, KELP filed an application with the siting council on May 6, 1988, for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the purpose of constructing a wood burning electric generating facility in the town of Killingly. The siting council issued the certificate to KELP, together with findings of fact, an opinion, and a decision and order on May 8, 1989. These documents were mailed to all parties of record on May 10, 1989. On June 5, 1989, the town of Killingly filed a request for a rehearing with the siting council. ¹ On June 6, 1989, a joint appeal to the Superior Court was filed by all of the plaintiffs, including the town of Killingly. On July 6, 1989, the siting council denied the town's request for a rehearing and mailed notice of its decision to all parties of record on July 10, 1989. The plaintiffs filed a joint amended appeal on August 8, 1989. On September 8, 1989, KELP filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that: (1) the plaintiffs' appeal was not from a "final decision" of the agency; (2) the plaintiffs were not aggrieved by a final decision of the agency at the time the appeal was filed; and (3) the appeal was not served on all parties of record nor filed in Superior Court within the required time limits. By a memorandum of decision and judgment issued October 26, 1990, the trial court granted KELP's motion. The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.

The dispositive issue is whether the trial court properly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' appeal because the plaintiffs failed to appeal from a final decision of the siting council. ² We conclude that the trial court improperly granted KELP's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' appeal, and, accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly concluded that the town's request for a rehearing on a limited issue suspended the finality of the May 8, 1989 decision of the siting council. KELP claims that the trial court correctly dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal as premature due to the pendency of the rehearing request at the time the appeal was filed. We agree with the plaintiffs.

In granting KELP's motion to dismiss, the trial court reasoned that the town's request for a rehearing rendered the siting council's decision "nonfinal" and, thus, not appealable. Appeals from decisions of the siting council are governed by General Statutes § 16-50q, which provides in relevant part that "[a]ny party may obtain judicial review of an order issued on an application for a certificate or an amendment of a certificate in accordance with the provisions of [General Statutes] section 4-183." General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 4-183, part of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), provides in pertinent part: "(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review by way of appeal under this chapter ... (b) Proceedings for such appeal shall be instituted by filing a petition in superior court ... within forty-five days after the mailing of the notice of the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is requested, within forty-five days after mailing of the notice of the decision thereon...." ³ Sections 16-50q and 4-183 thus make a "final decision" of an administrative agency a prerequisite to appellate review.

"The considerations underlying the requirement of finality of an agency decision as a prerequisite to judicial review are akin to those involved in the ripeness doctrine as applied to administrative rulings. '[I]ts basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.' Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). 'The cases dealing with judicial review of administrative actions have interpreted the "finality" element in a pragmatic way.' Id., [at] 149 . '[T]he relevant considerations in determining finality are whether the process of administrative decisionmaking has reached a stage where judicial review will not disrupt the orderly process of adjudication and whether rights or obligations have been determined or legal consequences will flow from the agency action.' Port of Boston Marine Terminal Assn. v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71, 91 S.Ct. 203, 27 L.Ed.2d 203 (1970)." New Haven v. New Haven Police Union Local 530, 210 Conn. 597, 604, 557 A.2d 506 (1989).

In applying these considerations to the present case, we conclude that the rights of the parties were determined by the May 8, 1989 order of the siting council granting KELP the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need. Once the certificate was issued, KELP could proceed with construction of the proposed facility in conformity with the terms, limitations and conditions contained in the certificate. General Statutes § 16-50k (a). ⁴ The rehearing requested by the town of Killingly sought to clarify a portion of the May 8 decision, and would not, if granted, have redetermined the rights of the parties. See footnote 1, supra. Finally, the denial of the rehearing request by the siting council on July 6, 1989, ensured that judicial review of the initial decision would not disrupt the orderly process of administrative decisionmaking.

We have held that " '[a]ppeals to courts from administrative agencies exist only under statutory authority. Charles Holdings, Ltd. v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 476, 479, 544 A.2d 633 (1988); Tazza v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 164 Conn. 187, 190, 319 A.2d 393 (1972)....' " Citizens Against Pollution Northwest, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 217 Conn. 143, 152, 584 A.2d 1183 (1991). We have further stated that the failure to comply strictly with the statutory provisions by which a statutory right to appeal is created will subject an appeal to dismissal. Id. at 152-53, 584 A.2d 1183. Nevertheless, "[w]here a decision as to whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is required, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged...." Demar v. Open Space & Conservation Commission, 211 Conn. 416, 425, 559 A.2d 1103 (1989); see LeConche v. Elligers, 215 Conn. 701, 709-10, 579 A.2d 1 (1990). A trial court should make every effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it, and, where practicable, should decide a procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal.

Recently, we reviewed a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction based on the claim of a premature appeal from a decision of an administrative agency. Miko v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220 Conn. 192, 596 A.2d 396 (1991). In Miko, a hearing officer for the commission on human rights and opportunities (CHRO) rendered a decision against the defendant property owner, William S. Miko. Miko filed a timely appeal in the Superior Court pursuant to § 4-183(b). The CHRO subsequently filed a timely petition for a rehearing, seeking to have interest added to the complainant's award. The CHRO then moved to dismiss Miko's appeal, asserting that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the rehearing request had suspended the finality of the agency decision. The CHRO hearing officer denied the CHRO's request for interest on the damages. Thereafter, the trial court denied the CHRO's motion to dismiss. We upheld the trial court's rejection of the challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction, stating: "Where one party complies with the requirements of Section 4-183(b) by filing a timely appeal, judicial economy and fairness dictate allowing that appeal to remain within the court's jurisdiction." Id., at 199, 596 A.2d 396.

In the present case, the plaintiffs' appeal to the Superior Court was filed within forty-five days after the mailing of the siting council's decision to grant the certificate to KELP. The appeal was thus filed within the statutory period prescribed by § 4-183(b). As we stated in Miko v. Commission on Human Rights &...