Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls

• Decision Date: 25 November 1975
• Docket Number: Nos. 113,114,s. 113
• Citation: 235 N.W.2d 435,70 Wis.2d 610
• Parties: TOWN OF LAFAYETTE, a body corporate, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent. TOWN OF HALLIE, a body corporate, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 435

235 N.W.2d 435

70 Wis.2d 610

TOWN OF LAFAYETTE, a body corporate, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.

TOWN OF HALLIE, a body corporate, Appellant, v. CITY OF CHIPPEWA FALLS, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent.

Nos. 113, 114.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Nov. 25, 1975.

Falkenberg & Sazama, Cadott, Thornton & Black, Eau Claire, for appellant.

B. James Colbert, Chippewa Falls, for respondent.

BEILFUSS, Justice.

The plaintiff-towns contend that the annexation ordinance is invalid for two reasons: (1) The majority of the qualified electors residing in the annexed area did not sign the petition as required for direct annexation by sec. 66.021(2)(a), Stats.; and (2) the annexation was contrary to the rule of reason.

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in concluding that a majority of the electors residing at Northern Colony and Training School had signed the petition for direct annexation as required by sec. 66.021(2)(a), Stats. ² The general qualifications for electors are set forth in sec. 6.02. ³ Under sec. 6.03, Stats.1971, ⁴ persons who are 'under guardianship, non compos mentis, or insane' are disqualified from voting. None of the patient-residents at Northern Colony signed the petition for direct annexation.

Twenty-four individuals who were patient-residents of Northern Colony at the time the petition was circulated testified at the trial. Their testimony indicated, and the trial court found, that all met the age and residence requirements for an elector and that none were under a court-appointed guardianship at that time. The plaintiffs dispute the trial court's finding of fact that none of those who testified at the trial and none of the other residents who met the age and residence requirements at the time the petition was circulated 'were capable of managing themselves or their affairs by virtue of their mental deficiency, and all were non compos mentis and under the guardianship of the State of Wisconsin.'

An annexation ordinance is presumed valid and the party attacking or challenging it bears the burden of proving it invalid. ⁵ The trial court's finding of fact that the patient-residents of Northern Colony were under guardianship and non compos mentis, and therefore disqualified as electors, cannot be overturned unless it is contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. ⁶

The term 'guardianship' is not defined in ch. 6, Stats. Plaintiffs contend that the definition of the term in sec. 880.01(3), Stats., should control. That section provides:

'880.01 Definitions. . . .

'(3) 'Guardian' means one appointed by a court to have care, custody and control of the person of a minor or an incompetent or the management of the estate of a minor, an incompetent or a spendthrift.'

Plaintiffs point out that none of the patient-residents at Northern Colony who testified at the trial were subject to a court-appointed guardian at the time the petition was circulated. The trial court determined that it was not bound by the definition of sec. 880.01(3) and held that the residents were under guardianship of the state.

The definitions contained in sec. 880.01, Stats., are prefaced by the provision '(f)or the purpose of this chapter.' This court has held that where a statutory definition is explicitly stated to apply 'in this chapter,' it is not mandatory that a court accept the definition in its interpretation of a statute not within the chapter. Paulsen Lumber, Inc. v. Myer (1970), 47 Wis.2d 621, 177 N.W.2d 884.

Where words used in a statute are not specifically defined they should be accorded their ordinary and accepted meaning. ⁷ This meaning may be established by the definition contained in a recognized dictionary. ⁸

Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951), defines 'Guardian' at page 834:

'A guardian is a person lawfully invested with the power, and charged with the duty, of taking care of the person and managing the property and rights of another person, who, for some peculiarity of status, or defect of age, understanding, or self-control, is considered incapable of administering his own affairs.' ⁹

The Mental Health Act (ch. 51, Stats.), governs the admission of persons to Northern Colony and Training School. Sec. 51.002(1) provides:

'Care and custody of committed persons. (1) Any person committed under this chapter shall be committed under the care and custody of a board established under s. 51.42 or 51.437, or the department if the department finds such person to be a nonresident of this state.'

We agree with the trial court that the state, through the appropriate board, is the guardian of those persons under the commonly accepted and ordinary meaning of that term.

Persons who are non compos mentis or insane are, by the terms of sec. 6.03(1), Stats., and art. III, sec. 2 of the Wisconsin Constitution, disqualified from voting. Neither term is defined in ch. 6, and no case has been found which has construed the cited provisions in this context. This restriction upon the franchise right is apparently not uncommon, but it is generally unclear what the terms mean. See: 25 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, p. 777, sec. 89. One author has observed:

'. . . The lack of a definition in most state statutes makes it difficult to determine whether the prohibition is applicable only to persons hospitalized in mental institutions, whether it extends only to those legally adjudged incompetent, whether both classes are encompassed, or whether the law is even broader and applies to any mentally ill person, hospitalized or at large, adjudged incompetent or not.' Brackel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (Rev. ed. 1971), ch. 9, p. 308.

Webster's Third International Dictionary defines the terms as follows:

'non compos mentis--(L, lit., not having mastery of one's mind): not of sound mind: wholly lacking mental capacity to understand the nature, consequences, and effect of a situation or transaction.' p. 1536

'insane--1 a obs, of the mind: UNSOUND, DISORDERED b of a person: exhibiting unsoundness or disorder of mind: affected with insanity: MAD; esp: disordered in mind to such a degree as to be unable to function safely and competently in ordinary human relations--compare PSYCHOTIC.' p. 1167

The phrase 'non compos mentis,' as used in the electors' statute and the constitution, should be construed as a generic term that includes mental deficiency as well as insanity. There are, of course, degrees of mental deficiency and insanity or, as our statute describes it, mental illness. We believe the constitution and the statute intend that persons who are mentally incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and objective of the elective question should not be eligible to vote.

We are not concerned in this case with insanity or mental illness but rather with those persons suffering from mental deficiency.

The purpose of Northern Colony and similar institutions is set forth in sec. 51.22(1), Stats.:

'purpose. The purpose of the northern colony and training school, of the central colony and training school and of the southern colony and training school is to care for, train and have the custody of mentally deficient persons.'

'Mental deficiency' is defined in sec. 51.75, Stats., under Art. II(g) of the Interstate Compact on Mental Health:

'(g) 'Mental deficiency' means mental deficiency as defined by appropriate clinical authorities to such extent that a person so afflicted is incapable of managing himself and his affairs, but shall not include mental illness as defined herein.'

'Mental illness' is defined under Art. II(f) as:

'(f) 'Mental illness' means mental disease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires care and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of the community.'

The General Comment of Interim Committee, 1947, states that '. . . the term mentally ill is used instead of insane, mentally infirm instead of senile, mentally deficient instead of feeble-minded, idiotic, or imbecilic. . . .' ¹⁰

Commitment or admission to Northern Colony is either involuntary under the provisions of secs. 51.01, 51.02 and 51.065, Stats., or voluntary under sec. 51.10(1) and (1a). Sec. 51.005(2), Stats., provides:

'Legal Effect of Hospitalization. Hospitalization under this chapter, whether by voluntary admission or commitment, is not an adjudication of legal incompetency, but merely raises a rebuttable or disputable presumption of incompetency while the patient is under the jurisdiction of hospital authorities.'

Plaintiffs contend that this presumption of incompetency was effectively rebutted by the evidence. A number of the patients who testified at the trial indicated that they had either attended a voters' school or actually voted in the election. Claudia Maves, a psychologist employed by the state at Northern Colony, stated that in her opinion all of the persons who had testified had the intellectual capacity to understand voting with the proper instruction. In holding that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption of incompetency, the court stated:

'No evidence was forthcoming that any one of them was not mentally deficient. There was some testimony that some of the individuals had attended or were attending voting school at the Colony and that some had sufficient capacity to manipulate a voting machine and even to understand issues. The Court observed those persons who were committed to the Colony and testified. In all instances excepting two it was obvious to the Court from observing the witness and listening to his testimony that he was mentally deficient. All but two of those who testified had no knowledge or understanding of why they were in court. The fact remains that they were all mentally deficient and under the care and custody of the state at the time the petition was filed. The Court understands and appreciates the care and training given these individuals committed to the...