Town of Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 October 2016
• Docket Number: KNLCV085007839S
• Parties: Town of Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

Town of Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc

No. KNLCV085007839S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New London, New London

October 6, 2016

October 7, 2016, Filed

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Robert F. Vacchelli, Judge.

This case is an action by the plaintiff, Town of Ledyard, to collect unpaid personal property taxes. The defendant is WMS Gaming, Inc. The action was resolved by agreement except that the parties reserved for court resolution the issue of the extent of defendant's liability for attorneys fees under General Statutes § 12-161a. The defendant agrees that it is liable to pay plaintiff's attorneys fees incurred in prosecuting the above titled action, the amount of which to be assessed in a later proceeding. It disputes that it is liable for the attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff in a related federal case titled Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE) (March 27, 2012), 2012 WL 1069342 (D.Conn., March 27, 2012), rev'd, 722 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the defendant has moved for summary judgment in its favor on the issue of liability only as to the fees incurred in the federal action in Doc. No 124.00. The plaintiff objected and filed a cross motion for summary judgment in its favor on that same issue in Doc. No. 151.00. The defendant objects to plaintiff's motion. For the following reasons, the court finds that the material facts are not in dispute and that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff's attorneys fees incurred in the related federal action. Thus, the court denies the defendant's motion, grants the plaintiff's cross motion, and enters partial summary judgment on the issue of liability in favor of the plaintiff with respect to attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiff in the related federal action. The plaintiff may file a motion for attorneys fees, within 30 days of issuance of this decision, and the court will conduct a hearing on that motion to determine the amount of the award, as necessary.

I

The law governing summary judgment is well-settled. As our Appellate Court has summarized:

Practice Book § [17-49] requires that judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A material fact is a fact that will make a difference in the result of the case . . . The facts at issue are those alleged in the pleadings. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn.App. 806, 809, 768 A.2d 950 (2001).

In seeking summary judgment, it is the movant who has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any issue of fact. The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact . . . As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394, 405, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004).

It is frequently stated in Connecticut's case law that, pursuant to Practice Book § § 17-45 and 17-46, a party opposing a summary judgment motion " must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." Harvey v. Boehringer Ingelheim Corp., 52 Conn.App. 1, 4, 724 A.2d 1143 (1999). As noted by the trial court in this case, typically " [d]emonstrating a genuine issue requires a showing of evidentiary facts or substantial evidence outside the pleadings from which material facts alleged in the pleadings can be warrantably inferred." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford Savings Bank v. Roina, 38 Conn.App. 240, 244, 659 A.2d 1226, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 915, 665 A.2d 609 (1995). Moreover, " [t]o establish the existence of a material fact, it is not enough for the party opposing summary judgment merely to assert the existence of a disputed issue . . . Such assertions are insufficient regardless of whether they are contained in a complaint or a brief . . . Further, unadmitted allegations in the pleadings do not constitute proof of the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 244-45.

Rockwell v. Quintner, 96 Conn.App. 221, 227-29, 899 A.2d 738, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 917, 908 A.2d 538 (2006).

The Practice Book further mandates that " [a]ny adverse party shall at least five days before the date the motion is to be considered on short calendar file opposing affidavits and other available documentary evidence. Affidavits, and other documentary proof not already part of the file, shall be filed and served as are pleadings." Practice Book § 17-45. " Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto." Practice Book § 17-46.

II

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the defendant supplied the court with pleadings and decisions from the instant case and the related federal litigation, and a copy of the legislative history of General Statutes § 12-161a. In opposition to the defendant's motion, and in support of its cross motion, the plaintiff supplied the court with excerpts from deposition transcripts, copies of e-mails and other correspondence, pleadings and other filings in the above captioned case, and records of the Tax Collector for the Town of Ledyard.

Based on the materials supplied, the court finds that the following material facts are not in dispute: In this action the plaintiff, Town of Ledyard (" Town"), seeks to collect personal property taxes it imposed on slot machines owned by the defendant, WMS Gaming, Inc. (" WMS") and leased to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation (" Tribe") for use in the Tribe's gaming facilities located on its reservation. The Town's one-count complaint stated a claim against WMS for unpaid personal property taxes in the amount of $18, 251.23, plus interest and penalties, and it sought, inter alia, attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 12-161a.

Two years prior to the Town commencing this lawsuit against WMS the Tribe brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Town challenging, as unauthorized, taxes the Town was imposing on a company called Atlantic City Coin & Slot Co. (" AC Coin"), another vendor that leased slot machines to the tribe for use in its gaming facilities. That suit was filed on August 3, 2006 by the Tribe against the Town claiming that the Town did not have authority to tax slot machines owned by AC Coin and leased to the Tribe for use wholly on the Tribe's reservation because the taxes were preempted by federal law and infringed on tribal sovereignty. That case was Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE).

Two years after the Tribe commenced its federal lawsuit against the Town, the Town brought the instant case in state court against WMS seeking to collect the same type of tax being challenged by the Tribe in the federal lawsuit. The Town commenced the instant action against WMS by writ, summons and complaint served on June 24, 2008. Upon learning of the Town's lawsuit against WMS, the Tribe brought a second, but identical lawsuit against the Town in federal court by Complaint filed on September 8, 2008, referencing the WMS property. That case was Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:08 CV 1355 (WWE). The Tribe immediately moved to consolidate the two federal cases. That motion was granted. WMS then sought, and received, a stay of the instant state court case, as the federal litigation effectively would be deciding whether the Town could collect personal property taxes on slot machines leased to the Tribe. Doc. No. 106.00. The only parties in the consolidated federal action were the Tribe and the Town defendants. Neither AC Coin nor WMS were parties in that federal action.

The consolidate federal cases were resolved on cross motions for summary judgment. In its March 27, 2012 memorandum of decision, the court, Eginton, S.U.S.D.J., granted the Tribe's motion for summary judgment and held that the taxes levied by the Town were preempted by federal law and interfered with the Tribe's self-determination and sovereignty. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, United States District Court, District of Conn., No. 3:06 CV 1212 (WWE), 2012 WL 1069342 (D.Conn. March 27, 2012) . On July 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the personal property taxes were not preempted by federal law and that the Town's interest in collecting the taxes outweighed the impact on tribal sovereignty. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 2013). In deciding the case, both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that they were deciding a...