Town of Madison v. County of Dane
| Decision Date | 09 July 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006AP2554.,2006AP2554. |
| Citation | 2008 WI 83,752 N.W.2d 260 |
| Parties | TOWN OF MADISON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. COUNTY OF DANE, Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by Marcia MacKenzie, Corporation Counsel, and Gary Rehfeldt, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Madison, and oral argument by Gary Rehfeldt.
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by John M. Gerlach and Larowe, Gerlach & Roy, LLP, Madison, and oral argument by John M. Gerlach.
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Andrew T. Phillips, Kristen D. DeCato, and Stadler, Centofanti & Phillips, S.C., Mequon, on behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association.
This is a review of a published court of appeals opinion1 affirming a judgment of the Dane County circuit court, Judge David T. Flanagan, III, presiding. The County of Dane (County) challenges a judgment ordering the County to pay the Town of Madison (Town) $75,000 toward the cost of constructing a bridge, along with costs and fees.
¶ 2 The dispute in this case began when the County rejected the Town's Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2001-02)2 "bridge aid" petition as not meeting the statutory criteria for reimbursement. The Town filed a complaint with the Dane County Circuit Court, and the County's answer included the affirmative defense that the bridge was not "on a highway maintainable by the town" as required by § 81.38.
¶ 3 In a summary judgment decision and order, the circuit court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the County was responsible for paying one-half the cost of the bridge and ordering the County to pay $75,000 plus costs and fees. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court decision.
¶ 4 We conclude that the bridge at issue in this case was not a "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town" within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 because the bridge aid petition did not request funding to help connect the bridge to a highway maintainable by the Town or for the frontage road extension project in its entirety, because there was no existing highway extending to the planned bridge site at the time of the Town's petition, and because the bridge was still not connected to a highway upon completion. Section 81.38 requires funding for only those bridges built on highways in existence at the time of a bridge's construction. As such, the County appropriately denied the Town's § 81.38 "bridge aid" petition. We therefore reverse.
¶ 5 The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. The most pertinent facts relate to the Town's June 10, 2004, Dane County Bridge Aid Program petition for financial assistance in building a bridge ("the bridge").3 In its petition and accompanying letter, the Town requested $75,0004 for a new railroad overpass bridge that, the letter explained,
¶ 6 The formal petition requesting bridge aid did not describe the bridge itself as being on or connected to a highway, but described the bridge as located 1500 feet west of the nearest intersecting road. Architectural plans submitted along with the petition detail the design of the bridge but do not describe the bridge as being connected to any existing or future highways. However, the plans do describe the location of the bridge as "East Badger Road over Union Pacific Railroad."
¶ 7 Photographs and maps included in the record further clarify that the roadways the Town's project sought to connect, consisting of a segmented portion of East Badger Road5 on the east and Ski Lane on the west, would not in fact be connected through the bridge's construction. Rather, to the east of the tracks that the bridge would traverse was a 200-foot gap between the railroad tracks and an East Badger Road cul-de-sac, and to the west there was a much wider gap of land, including a quarter mile of unpaved right-of-way and embankment between the bridge and Ski Lane. The bridge, as proposed, was 100 feet long, thus traversing less than half the distance between the railroad tracks and the nearest road to the east and leaving even more of an area between the tracks and the road on the west. Thus, the plan was to a build a bridge before any highway was built to which the bridge would be directly connected.
¶ 8 In a letter dated September 9, 2004, the County denied the Town's request to include funding for the bridge in the County's budget, stating that the bridge did not qualify for the bridge aid program. The Town subsequently served the County with a notice of claim and claim, and an amended notice and accompanying claim, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1)(a)-(b). The amended notice formally recited the Town's June 10, 2004, "request for Dane County to pay one-half of the Town's cost of constructing the railroad overpass bridge which is part of the Town of Madison EDA project" and described the bridge as "located on the frontage road west of 323 West Beltline Highway."
¶ 9 Despite the County's bridge aid denial, the Town began construction of the bridge in January 2005, and construction was completed in March 2005. After the bridge was built, construction began that connected the roadway to the bridge on both sides. The extension of the roadway connecting it with the bridge was completed in August 2005, and the new road was dedicated in October 2005.
¶ 10 On May 6, 2005—after the bridge was built but before it was connected to the frontage road—the Town filed suit against the County seeking damages of $75,000, plus attorney's fees and costs. Although its answer admitted the facts alleged by the Town,6 the County also included in its answer a request that the circuit court dismiss the action on the basis of two affirmative defenses.
¶ 11 The first affirmative defense raised by the County, which is the central issue upon review, was its assertion that "[i]nsofar as the section of highway has not been constructed, it is not yet maintainable, and since the plaintiff's new construction of the bridge is not `on a highway maintainable by the town' as required by Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2003), the bridge does not qualify for aid." The County's second affirmative defense was an assertion that the Town failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The circuit court does not appear to have addressed the County's dismissal request.
¶ 12 On April 27, 2006, the Town filed a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the Town's summary judgment motion. The court concluded that it is illogical and inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 81.38's purpose of having counties absorb half the cost of bridge construction and repair to interpret "on a highway" to apply only to existing highways because "new bridges are often constructed where no highway existed previously." The court ruled that "recovery under Wis. Stats. § 81.38 is not precluded by the fact that a maintainable highway is not yet in existence," and ordered the County to pay $75,000 plus costs and fees.
¶ 13 On appeal by the County, the court of appeals described the proposed bridge as "connect[ing] previously unconnected portions of existing highways,"7 and affirmed the judgment, concluding that Wis. Stat. § 81.38 "includes aid for bridge construction where there is no preexisting highway if the completed bridge is `on a highway maintainable by the town.'" Town of Madison v. County of Dane, 2007 WI App 177, ¶¶ 1, 17, 22, 304 Wis.2d 402, 737 N.W.2d 16.
¶ 14 The County sought review by this court, and on September 13, 2007, review was granted.
¶ 15 The standard for reviewing summary judgment decisions is set forth by Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2)(2005-06), which provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same standards as a circuit court. Green Spring Farms v. Kersten, 136 Wis.2d 304, 315, 401 N.W.2d 816 (1987).
¶ 16 In this case, neither party argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact. As such, we solely decide whether the Town is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The question of law in this case is one of statutory interpretation. The outcome of the case depends on the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 81.38's language requiring a county to levy a tax to fund a bridge's construction or repair if it is "on a highway maintainable by the town."
¶ 17 When we interpret a statute, we begin with the text of the statute, and "[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted). Statutory language is generally given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning. Id. City of Milwaukee v. Washington, 2007 WI 104, ¶ 32, 304 Wis.2d 98, 735 N.W.2d 111 (citations omitted). Further, we examine statutory language "in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results." Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110. If a statutory provision is ambiguous, i.e., "if reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning," UFE Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 283, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996) (citation omitted), we examine extrinsic sources, such as legislative history,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Estate of Her, No. 2008AP979 (Wis. App. 3/19/2009)
...N.W.2d 857. Statutory interpretation and application are also questions of law, subject to our independent review. See Town of Madison v. County of Dane, 2008 WI 83, ¶51, 311 Wis. 2d 402, 752 N.W.2d ¶ 6 American Family argues that the DOC exclusion in Ju's Rav4 policy excludes him from rece......