Town of Marlborough v. Afscme

• Decision Date: 09 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 31468.,31468.
• Citation: 23 A.3d 798,130 Conn.App. 556
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: TOWN OF MARLBOROUGHv.AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 818–052.

130 Conn.App. 556

23 A.3d 798

TOWN OF MARLBOROUGH

v.AFSCME, COUNCIL 4, LOCAL 818–052.

No. 31468.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 7, 2011.Decided Aug. 9, 2011.

Proloy K. Das, with whom was Andrew L. Houlding, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).J. William Gagne, Jr., West Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Kimberly A. Cuneo, for the appellee (defendant).GRUENDEL, BEACH and ROBINSON, Js.ROBINSON, J.

The plaintiff, town of Marlborough, appeals from the judgment of the trial court denying its application to vacate an arbitration award (application) in which an arbitration panel found in favor of the defendant, AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818–052, and concluded that the plaintiff had violated a collective bargaining agreement when it terminated the grievant, Emily Chaponis, from the position of assessor without just cause. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly denied its application because the award (1) violates the clearly defined public policy that “elected executive leaders have the responsibility and the right to appoint public officers” and (2) constitutes a manifest disregard of the law. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The charter for the plaintiff (charter) provides that the board of selectmen (board) shall appoint various officers, including an assessor, “to serve at the direction of the [s]electmen ... and whose powers and duties shall be as prescribed by [o]rdniance or in the [General Statutes].” ¹ Pursuant to the charter, the board appointed the grievant to the office of assessor, effective January 7, 2002. In November, 2003, the term of the board that had appointed the grievant ended. The incoming board elected to accept the appointments made by the previous board, and the grievant continued to occupy the office of assessor.

During the grievant's tenure as assessor, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that became effective on July 1, 2007. The agreement provided that the defendant was the exclusive representative for a bargaining unit that included the office of assessor.² The agreement further provided that “[a]ny disciplinary action shall be applied for just cause” and that “[a]ll disciplinary action may be appealed through the ... grievance procedure” set forth in the agreement.

In November, 2007, a newly elected board met to make the appointments provided for by the charter. The first selectman asked for a motion to reappoint the grievant to the office of assessor but no motion was made, and the grievant was not reappointed. On November 14, 2007, because of the board's failure to reappoint the grievant, the plaintiff discharged her.

The grievant filed a grievance through the defendant, alleging that the plaintiff had violated the agreement because her discharge was not based on just cause. After the grievance advanced without resolution through the grievance procedure set forth in the agreement, the dispute was referred to the state board of mediation and arbitration.³ The issue submitted to the arbitration panel was as follows: “Did the [plaintiff] violate the collective bargaining agreement when it discharged the grievant on November 14, 2007 without just cause? If so, what shall the remedy be?”

At the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff first argued that discharging an appointed officer because the board did not reappoint her after the expiration of her term in office did not constitute a disciplinary action. Therefore, because such a discharge was not a disciplinary action, the plaintiff claimed that it did not have to comply with the just cause provision of the agreement.

The plaintiff also argued that interpreting the agreement in a manner that would require it to demonstrate just cause before it could discharge an appointed officer after the expiration of her term in office would result in a conflict between the agreement and General Statutes § 9–187(a). ⁴ Without citing to any supporting legal authority, the plaintiff further argued that when such a conflict results, “the statute trumps the conflicting provisions of the ... agreement.” On the basis of these arguments, the plaintiff claimed that it could discharge the grievant “as a result of her non-reappointment, notwithstanding any ‘just cause’ provisions....”

The defendant countered by arguing that, prior to the agreement, a term of office may have existed and reappointment by the board may have been necessary in order for the grievant to serve in the office of assessor. The defendant further argued that subsequent to the agreement, however, a term of office for the office of assessor “no longer exists because it directly contradicts specific terms of the [agreement].” Thus, the defendant claimed that the mere failure of the board to reappoint the grievant to the office of assessor did not constitute just cause for summary discharge.

A hearing was held before the arbitration panel on March 6, 2008. On August 6, 2008, the arbitration panel issued a fourteen page decision in which it found in favor of the defendant. In its discussion, the arbitration panel rejected the plaintiff's argument that it had a statutory right to discharge the grievant because “the grievant is not an ‘elected official’ and the statute is silent as to the definition of a[t]own [o]fficial.” Having rejected the plaintiff's statutory argument, the arbitration panel concluded that the agreement applied to the office of assessor and that the plaintiff was required to “abide by all the conditions it agreed to accept” by entering into the agreement. The arbitration panel found that these conditions included a requirement that “ ‘just cause’ must be enumerated specifically when there is the involuntary loss of employment.” Because “there was no just cause reason cited as mandated by the ... agreement,” the arbitration panel concluded that the plaintiff had violated the agreement when it discharged the grievant. The arbitration panel directed the plaintiff to reinstate the grievant to the position of assessor and to make her whole for any lost wages and benefits during the period of discharge, less any outside earning she may have received.

On September 4, 2008, the plaintiff filed its application in the trial court. See General Statutes § 52–418.⁵ In its application, the plaintiff claimed that the arbitration panel had exceeded its authority in issuing the award because “[t]he award violate[d] explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy....” In its memorandum of law in support of the application, the plaintiff specifically claimed that “[t]he arbitration award ... violate[d] the strong public policy [of] protecting parties' freedom of contract.” The plaintiff also claimed in its application that the arbitration panel had exceeded its authority because “[t]he award manifest[ed] an egregious or patently irrational application of the law.” ⁶

The court conducted a hearing on the application on August 11, 2009. On August 25, 2009, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the application. The court concluded that “[n]o well defined policy has been cited which would be violated by retaining an assessor in her position, whose job performance brooked no criticism. No irrational application of the law by the [p]anel has been proven.” This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before addressing the plaintiff's claims, we first set forth the legal principles that guide our review of an arbitration award based on an unrestricted submission.⁷ “Judicial review of arbitral decisions is narrowly confined.... When the parties agree to arbitration and establish the authority of the arbitrator through the terms of their submission, the extent of our judicial review of the award is delineated by the scope of the parties' agreement.... When the scope of the submission is unrestricted, the resulting award is not subject to de novo review even for errors of law so long as the award conforms to the submission.... Because we favor arbitration as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner designed to minimize interference with an efficient and economical system of alternative dispute resolution....

“Where the submission does not otherwise state, the arbitrators are empowered to decide factual and legal questions and an award cannot be vacated on the grounds that ... the interpretation of the agreement by the arbitrators was erroneous. Courts will not review the evidence nor, where the submission is unrestricted, will they review the arbitrators' decision of the legal questions involved.... In other words, [u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators' decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law or fact....

“The long-standing principles governing consensual arbitration are, however, subject to certain exceptions. Although we have traditionally afforded considerable deference to the decisions of arbitrators, we have also conducted a more searching review of arbitral awards in certain circumstances. In Garrity v. McCaskey, [223 Conn. 1, 6, 612 A.2d 742 (1992) ], [our Supreme Court] listed three recognized grounds for vacating an award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of a statute ... (2) the award violates clear public policy ... or (3) the award contravenes one or more of the statutory proscriptions of § 52–418(a).... The judicial recognition of these grounds for vacatur evinces a willingness, in limited circumstances, to employ a heightened standard of judicial review of arbitral conclusions, despite the traditional high level of deference afforded to arbitrators' decisions when made in accordance with their authority pursuant to an unrestricted...