Town of Monroe v. Conn. River Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 27 July 1894 |
| Citation | 39 A. 1019,68 N.H. 89 |
| Parties | TOWN OF MONROE v. CONNECTICUT RIVER LUMBER CO. et al. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Grafton county.
Action by the town of Monroe against the Connecticut River Lumber Company and others. Verdict against the Connecticut River Lumber Company, and it brings exceptions. Overruled.
The declaration alleges, in substance, that the defendants Van Dyke and McFarland, in June, 1884, negligently repaired, and in part rebuilt, a dam owned by them on the Connecticut river; that Van Dyke sold his interest to the Connecticut River Lumber Company in 1885, but has since been the president and general manager of the company, and as such has had the control, management, and supervision of the dam, and that it has ever since been negligently kept and maintained by the defendants; that in May, 1888, the company negligently ran a large number of logs over the dam, Van Dyke directing and controlling the business; that by the negligence of the company and Van Dyke a large jam of logs formed upon and above the dam; that, in consequence of the jam, and of the negligent construction and maintenance of the dam, it gave way, and allowed the water and logs to escape, causing a washout of highways in the plaintiff town, compelling the town to repair some and to build new ones in place of others, the new ones being necessarily in less favorable locations, and so more expensive to maintain that those they replaced. The defendants demurred, because "there are no allegations of any Joint act causing damage, nor of any separate act causing damage, but the allegation is of separate acts at different times, participated in by part of the defendants, which caused the damage, in conjunction with other separate acts committed by other defendants"; and because "the plaintiffs have no legal interest in the highways sufficient to authorize them to maintain a suit." The demurrer was overruled, and the defendants excepted. Trial by jury. Verdict for Van Dyke and McFarland and against the Connecticut River Lumber Company.
The plaintiffs claimed, and introduced evidence tending to show, that Van Dyke owned the dam for several years prior to February 17, 1886, when he conveyed it to the company; that McFarland had a right since June, 1883, to a part of the water; that Van Dyke (during his ownership) and McFarland at different times, and independently of each other, repaired and rebuilt portions of the dam; that the work was negligently done; that the company, after the purchase from Van Dyke, were engaged in running logs down the river; that by their negligence a jam was formed in May, 1888, which brought an additional strain on the dam, and that they knowingly maintained the dam in an unsafe condition; that the dam gave way on account of its insufficiency to withstand the strain; that the washout was caused by the combined and concurrent negligence of all the defendants, and, in the absence of such negligence by any one of them, would not have happened. The jury were instructed that, if they found these claims sustained by the evidence, the plaintiffs were entitled to a verdict against all the defendants, and the defendants excepted. The company excepted to evidence of the separate negligence of Van Dyke and of McFarland in repairing and rebuilding the dam, and also to evidence of their own negligence in the management of their logs, not participated in by all the defendants. At the close of the evidence, the defendants moved that a verdict be directed in their favor, which was refused, and they excepted. The court ruled that Van Dyke, on the facts shown (but not here stated) as to his connection with the running of the logs, was not personally liable for any negligence therein. On the cross-examination of E. C. Waite, a witness for the defendants, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' counsel might read such parts of a previous statement in writing, made by the witness, as he desired to question the witness upon, and such parts only, and the defendants excepted. Counsel thereupon read the entire statement, some of which was not inconsistent with the testimony of the witness on the stand, and questioned the witness upon parts of it, to which the defendants excepted. In his argument to the jury the plaintiffs' counsel was permitted to argue that the facts were as stated by Waite in his previous statement, and that his testimony on the stand was false, to which the defendants excepted. During the argument for the plaintiffs, one of the defendants' counsel stepped to the bench, and desired an exception noted to what had just been said. The attention of the presiding justice had been diverted from the argument, so that he had not noticed the language complained of. On his requesting that the reporter's notes of the language be obtained, the defendants' counsel, after inquiry, reported that no minute of the language had been taken, and presented a writing as follows: "The Connecticut River Lumber Company desire an exception to that part of the argument referring to the education of George Van Dyke and the company about destroying dams, bridges, and property along the banks of the river." This exception was not called to the attention of the plaintiffs' counsel, and he had no knowledge of it till after the trial was over. Subject to the defendants' exception to the substance of the matter called for, and not to the qualification of the witness, F. H. Cross, one of the plaintiffs' selectmen in 1888, and their agent during that year in the business of reconstructing the roads, was allowed to give his estimate of the additional expense of...
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Story v. Concord & M. R. R.
...justice that the jury were not influenced thereby, the exception taken to the remark made was overruled. In Town of Monroe v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 68 N. H. 89, 39 Atl. 1019, counsel stated to the jury that the statements made by a witness in a deposition which was in evidence were ......
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Town of Bedford v. United States, 2137.
...of towns concerning highways. Cf. Gilman v. Town of Laconia, 55 N. H. 130, 131, 20 Am. Rep. 175; Town of Monroe v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 68 N. H. 89, 92, 39 A. 1019. Towns are permitted to recover for damages done town ways, for the simple reason that thus additional burdens are imp......
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Dye v. Burdick
...authority supporting these general rules, as applied to situations similar to the one at hand. In Town of Monroe v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 68 N.H. 89, 39 A. 1019 (1894), it was held that a purchaser of an unsafe dam, who fails to make it safe, and to so maintain it as not unnecessari......
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...was such that, by its exercise, the injury would have been prevented, was also a question for the jury. Town of Monroe v. Connecticut River Lumber Co., 68 N. H. 89, 93, 39 Atl. 1019. The defendants* answer is that the plaintiff's incapacity was produced by his voluntary intoxication. But, i......