Town of N. Providence v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13

• Decision Date: 29 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2021-58-Appeal
• Parties: Town of North Providence v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Town of North Providence v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13.

No. 2021-58-Appeal

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

June 29, 2022

Providence County Superior Court PM 18-6456, Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough.

For Plaintiff:

Vincent F. Ragosta, Esq.

For Defendant:

Edward C. Roy, Jr., Esq.

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and Long, JJ.

OPINION

Melissa A. Long Associate Justice

The plaintiff, the Town of North Providence (the town), appeals from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 13 (the union). The Superior Court judgment denied the town's petition to vacate an arbitration award and granted the union's motion to confirm the award. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

This action stems from a dispute between the town and the union as to the effect of a collective bargaining agreement governing the employment relationship between the town and the town's police officers (the CBA). The facts that gave rise to the instant appeal are not in dispute.

On February 3, 2017, Detective Scott Godin retired from the North Providence Police Department. Detective Godin's retirement created a vacancy in one of the nine detective positions to which the North Providence Town Council had authorized assignment of eligible patrol officers pursuant to the CBA.

Article VIII, Section 1 of the CBA provides, in part: "The Town agrees to fill [detective] vacancies within forty-five (45) days from the date the vacancy is recognized, subject to the provisions of Article III, Section 1" (the forty-five-day provision). Following Det. Godin's retirement, Mayor Lombardi proposed as part of the town's budget deliberations to eliminate one detective position from the town's organizational chart. The town council ultimately rejected the mayor's proposal. In the meantime, however, the town did not fill the detective vacancy created by the retirement of Det. Godin, and waited until December 2017 to appoint the next-in-line eligible patrol officer-Officer Matthew Phelan (the grievant)-to the vacancy.

The union grieved the town's delay on behalf of the grievant, alleging that the grievant was eligible for and entitled to the appointment to detective effective March 21, 2017, the date the parties stipulated as forty-five days after Det. Godin's retirement had created the vacancy on February 3, 2017. The parties did not resolve the grievance, and the union appealed the matter to arbitration pursuant to the CBA.

Before the arbitrator, the parties presented the following questions: "Is the grievance substantively arbitrable? If so, did the Town violate the [CBA] when it failed to assign a detective from the existing promotional list, or list, on or before March 21, 2017? If so, what shall be the remedy?"

The union asserted that the forty-five-day provision compelled the town to fill the detective vacancy within forty-five days of Det. Godin's retirement, and that the town had violated the CBA by failing to do so. The union urged the arbitrator to accept that the forty-five-day provision mandated that the town fill a vacancy within forty-five days of the vacancy's creation. The union asked the arbitrator to deem March 21, 2017, as the grievant's assignment date and to award retroactive seniority and time-in-grade as of that date.

The town countered that the forty-five-day clock began running only once the town "recognized" the vacancy, rather than when the vacancy was created by Det. Godin's retirement. The town asserted that there was no evidence that the town had "recognized" the vacancy on February 3, 2017, such that the town could have violated the CBA by failing to fill the vacancy by forty-five days later, on March 21, 2017. The town further asserted that the CBA tasked the town, not the union, with determining the size and structure of the town's police department, and that the town had exclusive rights and managerial authority to determine whether to recognize a vacancy.

The arbitrator found in favor of the union. In the written arbitration award decision, the arbitrator began by reviewing Article II, Section 1 of the CBA, entitled "Management Rights" (the management-rights provision), which reads:

"The Union recognizes that except as limited, abridged or relinquished by the terms and provisions of this agreement, all rights to manage, direct or supervise the operation of the department and the employees are vested in the Town. For example, but not limited thereto, the Town shall have the exclusive rights, subject to the provisions of this agreement and consistent with applicable laws and regulations: (a) to direct employees in the performance of official duties; (b) to maintain the efficiency of the operations entrusted to it; (c) to issue reasonable rules and regulations; and (d) to suspend, discharge or otherwise discipline members of the department * * * and (e) to exercise any and all rights and authority granted to the Town as an employer by statute, ordinance and applicable regulations, and to comply with its responsibility thereunder.

"No provision of this agreement shall be applied or construed to limit, impede or abridge any of the Town's authority or obligations granted to it under municipal, state or federal law."

The arbitrator then reviewed the CBA provision at issue, the forty-five-day provision contained in Article VIII, Section 1, and reasoned that Article VIII was "[o]ne such article" through which the town had "limited, abridged or relinquished" its managerial rights. Article VIII, Section 1 reads, in pertinent part:

"Whenever there exists a vacancy in a supervisor's rank, or a detective assignment, the Public Safety Director agrees to fill said vacancy through competitive examinations extended to those employees of the next lowest rank, or to eligible patrolmen in the case of detectives.

"* * *

"The Town agrees to fill vacancies within forty-five (45) days from the date the vacancy is recognized, subject to the provisions of Article III, Section 1."

The arbitrator then turned to Article III, Section 1 of the CBA, which provides:

"The Town shall supply the Union with the current Organizational Chart within thirty (30) days from the ratification of this agreement, upon which shall be listed the numbers and ranks of officers and patrolmen authorized to serve on the department. * * *

"Any changes in the Organizational Chart, including but not limited to, changes in its design, staffing, numbers and/or ranks shall be management's prerogative. However, changes resulting in reduction in ranks and/or department strength are prohibited; provided, however, that this prohibition shall end and sunset on June 30, 2013 and be of no further force and effect."

The arbitrator found that there was no evidence that the town had modified the organizational chart after February 3, 2017.

Finally, the arbitrator recited Article VII of the CBA, which governs vacancies. The arbitrator determined, based on Article VII, that Det. Godin's retirement had "created" a vacancy.

After reviewing these provisions of the CBA, the arbitrator looked to Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) and The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1997) to define the word "recognize." The arbitrator determined, based on his reading of the definitions in those sources, that the town "recognized" the vacancy when it "had notice of" the vacancy. The arbitrator reasoned that the town "had notice of" the vacancy on February 3, 2017, when Det. Godin's retirement created the vacancy; therefore, the arbitrator concluded, the town had violated the CBA by failing to appoint the grievant by forty-five days later, March 21, 2017. The arbitrator awarded the grievant a retroactive assignment date with all contractual rights, including seniority, benefits, and compensation.

The town petitioned the Superior Court on September 10, 2018, to vacate the arbitration award, pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 28-9-14 and 28-9-18. The union opposed the petition and moved to confirm the arbitration award. The trial justice concluded that the arbitrator's decision did not rise to the level of implausibility, irrationality, manifest disregard, or a failure to draw its essence from the CBA, and that the arbitrator therefore did not exceed his authority. She therefore denied the town's petition to vacate the arbitration award and granted the union's motion to confirm the award.

The town timely appealed the resulting January 29, 2021 judgment of the Superior Court, asserting that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by disregarding the plain language of the CBA. Accordingly, we decide the issue of whether the arbitrator's interpretation of the CBA was in excess of his authority.

Discussion

"Public policy favors the finality of arbitration awards, and such awards enjoy a presumption of validity." Cumberland Teachers Association v. Cumberland School Committee, 45 A.3d 1188, 1191 (R.I. 2012) (quoting City of East Providence v. International Association of Firefighters Local 850, 982 A.2d 1281, 1285 (R.I. 2009)). The role of the judiciary in arbitration is therefore "statutorily prescribed" and "extremely limited." Id. (first quoting City of East Providence 982 A.2d at 1285, then quoting Aponik v. Lauricella, 844 A.2d 698, 703 (R.I. 2004)).

However "although public policy favors the final resolution of disputes by arbitration, this policy relies on the premise that arbitrators act within their power and authority." State, Department of Corrections v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 867 A.2d 823, 828 (R.I. 2005) (RIBCO I) (...