Town of New London v. Colby Academy

• Decision Date: 17 March 1899
• Parties: TOWN OF NEW LONDON v. COLBY ACADEMY.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

46 A. 743

69 N.H. 443

TOWN OF NEW LONDON

v. COLBY ACADEMY.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Merrimack.

March 17, 1899.

Action of assumpsit by the town of New London against Colby Academy. Judgment for plaintiffs.

Assumpsit to recover taxes assessed against the defendants for the years 1896 and 1897 upon certain real estate. Facts found by the court. The defendants were incorporated July 4, 1837, under the name of the New London Academy (changed to Colby Academy by chapter 134, Laws 1878), with authority to establish "an institution in the town of New London * * * for the education and instruction of youth in useful knowledge," and to hold real and personal estate not exceeding $20,000 in value, and not exceeding $4,000 in value of the real estate "actually in the use and solely for the benefit of said institution, [to be] free from taxation: provided, the town of New London consent to the exemption of said taxation." Laws 1837, Priv. Acts, c. 29. The amount of real and personal estate which the corporation was authorized to hold has been increased to $300,000. Laws 1891, c. 236, § 3. In 1838 the town voted "to free the New London Academy and the property belonging to it from taxation." The real estate upon which the taxes in suit were assessed consisted of a lot of land with a house containing nineteen rooms, and barns and outbuildings upon the lot. From 1882, when it was given to the corporation, until 1893, it was occupied by the president of the institution. In the latter year five rooms were fitted up for the use of students, and the house was called an "overflow dormitory." Prior to January, 1897, more or less of these rooms were occupied by students, who paid rent for them to the corporation. The other portions of the house were occupied by one of the defendants' professors, who made a reduction of $200 a year in his salary in consideration of such use. The defendants paid the professor one-half of the sums received from the students as rent, for heating and taking care of their rooms. The professor continued to occupy the house on the same terms after January, 1897. The real estate has been taxed to the defendants each year since 1882, and they have paid the taxes, excepting those for the year 1892 (which were abated) and those sought to be recovered in this action. It is of the value of about $2,800; and the corporation owns other real estate in New London used for dormitories and school purposes, of the value of $15,000, which is not taxed.

Streeter, Walker & Hollis, for plaintiffs. Sargent, Hollis & Niles, for defendants.

CHASE, J.The defendants' charter authorized an exemption from taxation of only $4,000 worth of real estate. The town had no authority to enlarge this exemption. Laws 1837, Priv. Acts, c. 29, § 4; Mack v. Jones, 21 N. H. 393. Additional exemption is claimed under section 2, c. 55, Pub. St., which provides that "real estate * * * is liable to be. taxed, except houses of public worship, twenty-five hundred dollars of the value of parsonages owned by religious societies and occupied by their pastors, school houses, seminaries of learning, real estate of the United States, state, or town used for public purposes, and almshouses on lounty farms." The exception in this section, like the principal provision, refers to real estate. The particulars specified both before and after "seminaries of learning" are parcels or portions of real estate. A "seminary" is a place of education. Like "academy," the word has two meanings,— one referring to the institution, and the oth er to the building in which the institution performs its functions. "Phillips Exeter Academy" may mean the institution having that name or the building used by it for school purposes. And so may "New Hampshire Conference Seminary." The qualifying words, "of learning," were used in the statute to distinguish the real estate referred to from nurseries, etc. See Cent. Diet. "Seminaries." It is not the real estates of seminaries of learning that is excepted, but only "seminaries of learning"; that is to say, buildings used for school purposes. If the intent had been, as claimed by the defendants, to except all the real estate of such institutions, it is probable that the intent would have been more definitely expressed, especially in view of the fact that the other real estate excepted is described with definiteness. Portions of parsonages are excepted only when the parsonages are owned by religious societies and occupied by their pastors. Not all of the real estate of the United States, state, or town is excepted, but only such as is used for public purposes. It was no more necessary to specify the use to which buildings should be appropriated to bring them within the meaning of the description, "seminaries of learning," as used in the statute, than it was to specify such use in respect to "houses of public worship" or "school houses." The words themselves imply the uses which entitle buildings to such designations. "Seminaries of learning," like "school houses," are buildings appropriated for use by schools. "Every member of the community has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property. He is therefore bound to contribute his share in the expense of such protection, and to yield his personal service, when nec-essary or an equivalent." Bill of Rights, art. 12. By the constitution full power and authority are granted to the general court "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants of and residents within the state, and upon all estates within the same." Const, art. 5. "No exclusion of any...