Town of New Shoreham v. Ball

• Decision Date: 22 November 1884
• Citation: 14 R.I. 566
• Parties: TOWN OF NEW SHOREHAM v. NICHOLAS BALL et als.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

14 R.I. 566

TOWN OF NEW SHOREHAM v. NICHOLAS BALL et als.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

November 22, 1884

A municipal corporation may acquire realty by possession and for other than municipal purposes.

In ejectment wherein the plaintiff's title rested on possession for more than twenty years, the locus was a long, sandy waste along the sea shore, and the defendants were mere intruders. The plaintiff, a municipal corporation had by vote let the locus year by year from 1829 to 1875. The court instructed the jury that to show title the town must prove open, adverse, actual, and exclusive possession for twenty continuous years, and " that the votes, though they were evidence of a claim of right on the part of the town, were not sufficient to prove title by possession unless the lessees took actual possession under them; that it was not necessary for the plaintiff town to show that the possession of its lessees was continuous in the sense of their being on the premises all the time; and that if the lessees were in possession of any part of said East Beach (the locus ) under the votes, it might be considered that they were in possession of the whole for the purpose of acquiring title by possession by the town."

Held, that the instruction, in the circumstances contained no error entitling the defendants to a new trial.

Held, further, that passage over the locus by the inhabitants of the town to get sea weed or sand, or use of the locus for temporary deposit of sea weed, would not amount to an interruption of the possession.

There being evidence to show that the locus was known as the East Beach:

Held, that it was for the jury to determine whether or not the town let the locus by the name of the East Beach.

DEFENDANTS' petition for a new trial.

William P. Sheffield & William P. Sheffield, Jun., for plaintiff.

William F. Slocum & Nicholas Van Slyck, for defendants.

DURFEE C. J.

This is a petition for the new trial of an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff, the town of New Shoreham, recovered a verdict against the defendants, who are the petitioners. The new trial is asked because, as alleged, the court erred in certain rulings and instructions given at the trial, and in refusing certain rulings and instructions requested by the defendants.

The town in proof of title adduced evidence of possession for more than twenty years. It appeared, however, that the premises were not used for municipal purposes, but were part of a larger tract which was for the most of the time in the occupation of tenants of the town. The defendants contended that the town could not acquire title by possession for any other than municipal purposes, and requested the court so to charge, but the court refused so to charge, and they excepted. The cases cited in support of the exceptions do not go to the point that a town cannot acquire land by possession for other than municipal purposes, but only to the point that it is ultra vires for a town to purchase land for other than such purposes. We think this is quite a different proposition; for a town cannot purchase land without expending its moneys, and it has no right to expend its moneys, raised by taxation or otherwise for municipal purposes, for other purposes. The acquirement of land by possession does not involve an expenditure any more than does the acquirement of land by deed of gift or by devise; and it has been decided that a gift or devise of land to a town is good, even though the land be given or devised in general terms, and be accepted without any intent to use it directly for municipal purposes. Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 13 Mass. 371; Sargent v. Cornish, 54 N.H. 18; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, § 437. Land so given, even when not wanted for municipal purposes, may be applied by sale or lease to the alleviation of municipal burdens. It is not necessary to suppose that the possession here, which was maintained under a claim of right, began otherwise than rightfully. Indeed the cases hold that if land be acquired ultra vires by a corporation, the title passes, nevertheless, and cannot be collaterally impeached. Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Barrow v. Nashville & Charlotte T. C. 9 Humph. 304; Davis v. Old Colony Railroad, 131 Mass. 258; Jones v. Habersham, 17 Otto, 174. We do not think the defendants are entitled to a new trial on the ground first assigned.

The second ground assigned for a new trial is the refusal of the court to give certain instructions requested by the defendants, without qualifying them. The plaintiff's testimony tended to show that the demanded premises were part of a strip of uninclosed land, a mile and a half in length from north to south, lying between an ancient highway or driftway and the sea shore, and bounding east on the sea shore; that this strip was called the East Beach; that the town had been in the habit of letting it by vote year by year, from 1829 to 1875, sometimes for pasturage and sometimes for other purposes, and that the lessees had entered upon said strip under these votes and used it for the purposes for which it had been let to them. The court instructed the jury that in order to show title the plaintiff town must prove that it had been in the open, adverse, actual, and exclusive possession for the period of twenty years continuously, and that the votes, though they were evidence of a claim of right on the part of the town, were not sufficient to prove title by possession, unless the lessees took actual possession under them. The court, however, added that it was not necessary for the plaintiff town to show that the possession of its lessees was continuous in the sense of their being on the premises all the time, and that if the lessees were in possession of any part of said East Beach under the votes, it might be considered that they were in possession of the whole for the purpose of acquiring title by possession by the town.

The point particularly pressed by the defendants is this, that the court erred in instructing the jury that " if the lessees were in possession of any part of said East Beach under the votes, it might be considered that they were in possession of the whole for the purpose of acquiring title for the...