Town of North Providence v. Drezek
Decision Date | 29 June 2010 |
Docket Number | C.A. PC 09-5835 |
Parties | TOWN OF NORTH PROVIDENCE v. SERGEANT DAVID DREZEK, in his capacity as President of the NORTH PROVIDENCE POLICE LODGE #13, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE; and DENNIS STONE, in his capacity as Secretary of the NORTH PROVIDENCE POLICE LODGE #13, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE |
Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
DECISION
The Town of North Providence (Town or Plaintiff) seeks summary judgment on its complaint requesting a declaratory judgment against Sergeant David A. Drezek, in his capacity as President of the North Providence Police Lodge #13, Fraternal Order of Police (FOP or Defendant). The FOP has objected to the Town's motion and in turn requests this Court grant its cross-motion for summary judgment.
The Town and the FOP are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).1[] The Town is a municipal corporation and the FOP is a union certified by the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board. Both parties seek this Court's guidance in resolving their dispute between the interplay of Article III, Section 1 of the CBA and Section 8-2-1 of the Charter of the Town of North Providence (Charter). Specifically, the Town does not believe that the CBA provision stating, "changes resulting in reduction in ranks and/or department strength are prohibited" is enforceable because of the Charter provision providing (Def. Ex. 1, CBA, Article III, Section 1.) (Pl. Ex 3, Charter Art. 8-2-1 at 27.)
In 2009, the Town discontinued the practice of filling employment vacancies as they occurred. (Def. Memo. at 1 March 3, 2010.) In response to the practice, the FOP filed grievances which the Town denied. Prior to proceeding to arbitration, both the Town and the FOP agreed to ask this Court to decide the issue of whether the Charter prevents bargaining or arbitration on the dispute over the CBA provision.
The Town believes that the Charter gives the Town the authority to determine the size of the police department and that it is a non-delegable, non-bargainable duty of the Town to determine the department size. Further, the Town believes its Charter mandates it to unilaterally organize the superior officer complement of the police department without the issue being susceptible to bargaining or arbitration. The Town argues alternatively that if the Charter does not provide it with such authority, it has the authority pursuant to its inherent rights of management.
Conversely, the FOP believes that the Charter and the CBA provision are consistent because it interprets the Charter as an enabling act. Thereafter, the FOP argues the Town is free to negotiate with the FOP just as any other city or town would pursuant to the Municipal Police Arbitration Act (MPAA). See § 28-9.2-1 et seq. Indeed, it argues that the MPAA supercedes any duties the Town may have pursuant to its Charter because the MPAA applies alike to all cities and towns. O'Neill v. City of Providence, 480 A.2d 1375, 1379 (R.I. 1984). The FOP further insists that even if setting the size of the workforce is not subject to mandatory bargaining, the Town was free to bargain over the issue. Accordingly, the FOP asserts that it has a valid contract with the Town and that if the agreement is not enforced, it would violate the "Contracts Clause" of the United States or Rhode Island Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10 ( ); R.I. Const. Art. I, § 12 ( ).
Article 8-2-1 of the Charter is entitled "Organization and Function." It provides, in pertinent part:
As for the CBA, Article III, Section 1 provides:
Further, Article VII of the CBA, Section 3, entitled "Permanent Vacancies, " provides, Id. And Section 5 of Article VII of the CBA, entitled "Filling Patrolmen Vacancies, " provides, "[w]henever a permanent vacancy occurs within the department, the Public Safety Director shall, within thirty (30) days therefrom, fill said vacancy . . . ." Id.
It is well-settled that a declaratory judgment "is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity but a novel statutory proceeding . . . ." Northern Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of Westerly, 899 A.2d 517, 520, n.6 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 53, 166 A.2d 216, 217 (1960)). This Court acknowledges that the purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA") is "to allow the trial justice to 'facilitate the termination of controversies.'" Bradford Assocs. v. R.I. Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, the UDJA grants broad jurisdiction to the Superior Court to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." G.L. § 9-30-1; see also Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) ( ). Our Supreme Court has approved of this court's jurisdiction to resolve disputes between state law and collective bargaining agreements pursuant to the UDJA. Vose v. R.I. Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991).
State Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals V. R.I. Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO, 692 A.2d 318, 323 (R.I. 1997) (internal citations omitted). This is true "especially when the question is not merely of contractual interpretation (that is, whether and to what extent the parties did agree to arbitrate) but of statutory authority (that is, whether and to what extent the parties could agree to arbitrate away a power that is statutorily given to the department and its director)." Id.
The General Assembly has the power to pass laws impacting cities and towns provided that the law does not affect the form of government of the city or town. See R.I. Const. Art XIII, § 4. If, conversely, a city or town charter portends to regulate the conduct on a matter of statewide concern, the General Assembly must expressly validate the act. Town of Johnson v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 128 (R.I. 2006) (citing Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 30, 160 A.2d 572, 575 (1960) ( ); Local No. 799, International Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347 (R.I. 1986) ( ). It is beyond dispute that the regulation of police officers is a matter of statewide concern. McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1990); Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221, 1223 (R.I. 1989) ( ); Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978) ( ).
After the General Assembly expressly validates a charter provision the Court is to treat the provision like a statute. Local No. 799, International Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I. 1986). Moreover, if the approved charter provision clearly and unambiguously conflicts with an inconsistent provision of the General Laws, the Court should treat the charter provision as a special act which takes precedent over the...
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