Town of North Providence v. Drezek

Decision Date29 June 2010
Docket NumberC.A. PC 09-5835
PartiesTOWN OF NORTH PROVIDENCE v. SERGEANT DAVID DREZEK, in his capacity as President of the NORTH PROVIDENCE POLICE LODGE #13, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE; and DENNIS STONE, in his capacity as Secretary of the NORTH PROVIDENCE POLICE LODGE #13, FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE
CourtRhode Island Superior Court

DECISION

STERN J.

The Town of North Providence (Town or Plaintiff) seeks summary judgment on its complaint requesting a declaratory judgment against Sergeant David A. Drezek, in his capacity as President of the North Providence Police Lodge #13, Fraternal Order of Police (FOP or Defendant). The FOP has objected to the Town's motion and in turn requests this Court grant its cross-motion for summary judgment.

I Facts and Travel

The Town and the FOP are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA).1[] The Town is a municipal corporation and the FOP is a union certified by the Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board. Both parties seek this Court's guidance in resolving their dispute between the interplay of Article III, Section 1 of the CBA and Section 8-2-1 of the Charter of the Town of North Providence (Charter). Specifically, the Town does not believe that the CBA provision stating, "changes resulting in reduction in ranks and/or department strength are prohibited" is enforceable because of the Charter provision providing "[t]here shall be such other officers of subordinate rank and patrolman as the council shall establish upon recommendation of the director of public safety. The council may provide for such organization of the police department as it may deem necessary and appropriate for its efficient operation." (Def. Ex. 1, CBA, Article III, Section 1.) (Pl. Ex 3, Charter Art. 8-2-1 at 27.)

In 2009, the Town discontinued the practice of filling employment vacancies as they occurred. (Def. Memo. at 1 March 3, 2010.) In response to the practice, the FOP filed grievances which the Town denied. Prior to proceeding to arbitration, both the Town and the FOP agreed to ask this Court to decide the issue of whether the Charter prevents bargaining or arbitration on the dispute over the CBA provision.

The Town believes that the Charter gives the Town the authority to determine the size of the police department and that it is a non-delegable, non-bargainable duty of the Town to determine the department size. Further, the Town believes its Charter mandates it to unilaterally organize the superior officer complement of the police department without the issue being susceptible to bargaining or arbitration. The Town argues alternatively that if the Charter does not provide it with such authority, it has the authority pursuant to its inherent rights of management.

Conversely, the FOP believes that the Charter and the CBA provision are consistent because it interprets the Charter as an enabling act. Thereafter, the FOP argues the Town is free to negotiate with the FOP just as any other city or town would pursuant to the Municipal Police Arbitration Act (MPAA). See § 28-9.2-1 et seq. Indeed, it argues that the MPAA supercedes any duties the Town may have pursuant to its Charter because the MPAA applies alike to all cities and towns. O'Neill v. City of Providence, 480 A.2d 1375, 1379 (R.I. 1984). The FOP further insists that even if setting the size of the workforce is not subject to mandatory bargaining, the Town was free to bargain over the issue. Accordingly, the FOP asserts that it has a valid contract with the Town and that if the agreement is not enforced, it would violate the "Contracts Clause" of the United States or Rhode Island Constitution. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10 (providing "no State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts); R.I. Const. Art. I, § 12 (stating No . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be passed).

Article 8-2-1 of the Charter is entitled "Organization and Function." It provides, in pertinent part:

"The chief of police shall be the commanding officer of the police department. There shall be such other officers of subordinate rank and patrolman as the council shall establish upon recommendation of the director of public safety. The council may provide for such organization of the police department as it may deem necessary and appropriate for its efficient operation.
It shall be the duty of the chief of police to have direct supervision over all personnel under his command and to proscribe rules and regulations, as approved by the director of public safety, for the efficient operation and discipline of his department." (Pl. Ex 3, Charter Art. 8-2-1 at 27.)

As for the CBA, Article III, Section 1 provides:

"The Town shall supply the Union with the current Organizational Chart within thirty (30) days from the ratification of each agreement, upon which shall be listed the numbers and ranks of officers and patrolmen authorized to serve on the department. A copy of the Organization Chart shall be attached to and made a part of this agreement.
Any changes in the Organizational Chart, including but not limited to, changes in its design, staffing, numbers and/or ranks shall be management's prerogative. However, changes resulting in reduction in ranks and/or department strength are prohibited." (Def. Ex. 1, CBA, Article III, Section 1.)

Further, Article VII of the CBA, Section 3, entitled "Permanent Vacancies, " provides, "[a] permanent vacancy is created when any of the following personnel transactions occur: retirement, resignation, termination . . . . A permanent vacancy shall be filled within thirty (30) days unless otherwise provided for in the agreement." Id. And Section 5 of Article VII of the CBA, entitled "Filling Patrolmen Vacancies, " provides, "[w]henever a permanent vacancy occurs within the department, the Public Safety Director shall, within thirty (30) days therefrom, fill said vacancy . . . ." Id.

II Jurisdiction

It is well-settled that a declaratory judgment "is neither an action at law nor a suit in equity but a novel statutory proceeding . . . ." Northern Trust Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of Westerly, 899 A.2d 517, 520, n.6 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 92 R.I. 51, 53, 166 A.2d 216, 217 (1960)). This Court acknowledges that the purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act ("UDJA") is "to allow the trial justice to 'facilitate the termination of controversies.'" Bradford Assocs. v. R.I. Div. of Purchases, 772 A.2d 485, 489 (R.I. 2001) (citations omitted). Thus, the UDJA grants broad jurisdiction to the Superior Court to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." G.L. § 9-30-1; see also Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997) (stating that trial court's "decision to grant or to deny declaratory relief under the [UDJA] is purely discretionary[]"). Our Supreme Court has approved of this court's jurisdiction to resolve disputes between state law and collective bargaining agreements pursuant to the UDJA. Vose v. R.I. Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913 (R.I. 1991).

"[T]he issue of whether a dispute is arbitrable concerns a question of law and is subject to a broader standard of review than is the arbitrator's decision on the merits. Courts should not equate the issue of arbitrability with the deference due the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract." State Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals V. R.I. Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO, 692 A.2d 318, 323 (R.I. 1997) (internal citations omitted). This is true "especially when the question is not merely of contractual interpretation (that is, whether and to what extent the parties did agree to arbitrate) but of statutory authority (that is, whether and to what extent the parties could agree to arbitrate away a power that is statutorily given to the department and its director)." Id.

III The Charter and the MPAA Law

The General Assembly has the power to pass laws impacting cities and towns provided that the law does not affect the form of government of the city or town. See R.I. Const. Art XIII, § 4. If, conversely, a city or town charter portends to regulate the conduct on a matter of statewide concern, the General Assembly must expressly validate the act. Town of Johnson v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 128 (R.I. 2006) (citing Royal v. Barry, 91 R.I. 24, 30, 160 A.2d 572, 575 (1960) (recognizing charter provision could not regulate school committee unless expressly ratified by general assembly); Local No. 799, International Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347 (R.I. 1986) (determining that the clear and unambiguous intent of the Legislature was to enact P.L. 1981 Ch. 37 as an exception to the general law, and thus held that the charter provision was a special act taking "precedence over any inconsistent provisions of the general laws). It is beyond dispute that the regulation of police officers is a matter of statewide concern. McCarthy v. Johnson, 574 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1990); Bruckshaw v. Paolino, 557 A.2d 1221, 1223 (R.I. 1989) (recognizing state maintains sovereignty over the regulation of police affairs); Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978) (alluding to long line of precedent giving general assembly control over police matters).

After the General Assembly expressly validates a charter provision the Court is to treat the provision like a statute. Local No. 799, International Association of Firefighters AFL-CIO v. Napolitano, 516 A.2d 1347, 1349 (R.I. 1986). Moreover, if the approved charter provision clearly and unambiguously conflicts with an inconsistent provision of the General Laws, the Court should treat the charter provision as a special act which takes precedent over the...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT