Town of North Redington Beach v. Williams, 67--480

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: PIERCE; LILES, C.J., and MANN
• Citation: Town of North Redington Beach v. Williams, 220 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1969)
• Decision Date: 19 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. 67--480,67--480
• Parties: TOWN OF NORTH REDINGTON BEACH, Florida, Appellant, v. Winnie G. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

Page 22

220 So.2d 22

TOWN OF NORTH REDINGTON BEACH, Florida, Appellant, v. Winnie G. WILLIAMS, Appellee.

No. 67--480.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Feb. 19, 1969.

Rehearing Denied April 1, 1969.

Hugh E. Reams, of Kiernan & Reams, and Harold J. Soehl, St. Petersburg, for appellant .

John W. Hamilton, of Ramseur, Bradham, Lyle, Skipper & Cramer, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

PIERCE, Judge.

This is an appeal by appellant Town of North Redington Beach, Florida, defendant below, from an adverse final judgment in a suit filed against the town by appellee, Winnie G. Williams, plaintiff below.

The subject matter of the litigation, and the sole point before this Court, is the validity of zoning Ordinance #65 of the defendant municipality as applied to plaintiff's property, Lot 10 of Bath Club Estates, located within the town limits.

On July 5, 1962, a comprehensive zoning plan for the town, embraced in Ordinance #42, became effective, under which ordinance properties within the area had a multi-family classification without restriction as to number of family or dwelling units. While this ordinance was still effective, plaintiff Williams, on April 29, 1964, through a local real estate broker, applied for and obtained permit from the local town officials to construct a 14-family unit facility upon her property; however she never pursued the project or further activated any building program pursuant to such permission. On September 29, 1965, the governing body of the town passed zoning Ordinance #65, the effect of which limited and restricted the use of her property to a maximum of four family or dwelling units.

Feeling that said Ordinance #65 constituted an unjust deprivation of her legal rights in the usage of her property, she filed suit in the Pinellas County Circuit Court asking that said Ordinance #65 be 'cancelled as constituting a cloud upon her title' and held void as an unwarranted and illegal restriction. The town answered, contending that Ordinance #65 was valid and enforceable as against her property; that it was not discriminatory nor constitutionally unjust; that she had been accorded a hearing before the local Planning and Zoning Board; and that such Board, after full hearing pro and con, had recommended the Ordinance to the town's Board of Commissioners, which latter Board had then approved and confirmed its enactment. The town further averred that the ordinance was 'fair and reasonable and necessary or proper to protect the property rights and interest of the public' and of the owners of adjacent and nearby properties, that the ordinance was reasonable and bore 'just relationship to health, safety, morals and welfare' of the community and its citizens, that the ordinance was 'fairly debatable and within the ambit of the town's discretion', and did not in any other way infringe upon her constitutional rights.

A three day trial was held before the Court, at which many witnesses, both expert and non-expert, testified, and more than 40 exhibits were put in evidence. The Chancellor entered final judgment holding Ordinance #65 to be 'arbitrary and unreasonable' and decreeing that it was unconstitutional and void as applied to plaintiff's land. The town has appealed to this Court, assigning twenty-one alleged errors, all of which may be epitomized by the 19th assignment which says that 'the Court erred in concluding that the validity of the zoning ordinance as amended is not fairly debatable'. We agree and reverse.

We take pardonable pride in quoting Inter alia from the 3rd District Court case of City of Coral Gables v. Sakolsky, Fla.App.1968, 215 So.2d 329, 333, as follows:

'Questions of zoning policy, of benefit or detriment, of what is good or bad for the city and the public, involve an exercise of police power and are essentially matters within the legislative orbit of the city. City of Miami Beach v. Greater Miami Hebrew Academy, Fla.App.1959, 108 So.2d 50; Josephson v. Autrey, Fla.1957, 96 So.2d 784. Zoning is the exclusive function of the appropriate zoning authorities and not the Courts, Hillsborough County v. Twin Lakes Mobile Home Village, Inc., Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 191; Allen v. Secor, Fla.App.1967, 195 So.2d 586, and a city's motive in enacting a zoning or rezoning ordinance is not subject to judicial inquiry. Housing Authority of City of Melbourne v. Richardson, Fla.App.1967, 196 So.2d 489.'

Zoning is not a matter for the Courts to decide or ordain by judicial fiat. As stated in Godson v. Town of Surfside, 1942, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So.2d 497 '(w) ith the wisdom of the town council in enacting the zoning ordinance, we are not concerned * * *' If there is a reason and a purpose for zoning ordinances, and they are fair, they should be upheld. The Courts have uniformly held that zoning ordinances are presumptively valid. See this 2nd District Court's opinion in City of Punta Gorda v. Morningstar, Fla.App.1959, 110 So.2d 449, and the authorities therein cited.

The 1st District Court in Burritt v. Harris, Fla.App.1964, 166 So.2d 168, held:

'The burden is upon the appellant to show reversible error, for the decree of the chancellor comes before this Court clothed with the presumption of correctness. City of Miami v. Hollis, Fla., 77 So.2d 834. One who assails the validity of a zoning regulation must carry the burden of proving its invalidity,...